Daily Report

East Europe

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FBIS-EEU-96-040 *28 February 1996*

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Bulgaria: Pirinski Briefs Cabinet on Visit to Russia

AU2602181696 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 26 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] On 26 February, an extraordinary closed meeting of the government took place, at which Foreign Minister Georgi Pirinski briefed the participants on the results of his working visit to Russia, which took place on 23 to 24 February at the invitation of Russian Foreign Minister Evgeniy Primakov.

The government was briefed on the meetings that took place in Russia. The positions expressed by Foreign Minister Pirinski and the agreements that were reached were approved by the cabinet.

The cabinet adopted the draft of an agreement with the Russian Government on updating the bilateral intergovernmental and interstate treaties that were signed during the period 1945-91.

The review of the documents will be conducted at the session of the Bulgarian-Russian Commission on Economic and Scientific-Technical Cooperation, which opens tomorrow in Moscow. The Bulgarian delegation will be led by Deputy Prime Minister Doncho Konakchiev.

The closed meeting of the cabinet also dealt with our country's positions at the upcoming 6 to 7 March Sofia Session of the Bulgarian-Yugoslav Commission on Economic and Scientific Cooperation and the position of the Bulgarian delegation led by Foreign Minister Georgi Pirinski at the upcoming 27 February Brussels meeting of the foreign ministers of the EU members and associated members.

Bulgaria: Sofia To Host Ioannina-2, Balkan Meetings

AU2602143496 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1400 GMT 26 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The second meeting of the foreign ministers of Bulgaria, Greece, and Romania, also known as Ioannina-2, will take place in Sofia on 16-17 March, announced Pantaley Karasimeonov, Foreign Ministry spokesman.

The meeting will deal first of all with issues related to applying the peace accords on former Yugoslavia.

Staring tomorrow representatives of the Foreign Ministry will visit the capitals of all Balkan states. They will convey the official invitations of Prime Minister Zhan Videnov for a Balkan meeting in Sofia. The meeting is expected to take place at the end of June.

Bulgaria: Commentary Views Videnov's Potential 'Traps'

AU2702115396 Sofia SEGA in Bulgarian 22-28 Feb 96 p 17

[Article by Andrey Raychev: "Videnov's Four Traps"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Perhaps for the first time the leader of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] is suffering more criticism from his party colleagues than from others.

The reason is the fact that the problems and failures of Zhan Videnov's first year in power have still not been translated into the "language of bread and cheese" — the only language understood by the majority of the population and indeed, the only factor that interests the people. At the same time all Videnov's successes and victories have already been served to the population in an easy and understandable language.

This is why the assessments of Videnov's performance depend on preliminary expectations, which appear to have been refracted in a reverse prism. Those who had great positive expectations are dissatisfied, while those who expected a failure appear to be relatively satisfied. Indeed — most of the people appear to be satisfied because of the stability that has asserted itself.

The same consideration applies to another characteristic of the prime minister's current situation: He appears to have more and more problems with the leaders and the elite, including his own party, and less and less problems with the simple people.

What could be better? However, one must remember the presence of a bomb mechanism ticking away. If the "language of cheese" asserts itself, i.e., if the standard of living falls even by only 10-20 percent, (and this is inevitable), all the pluses of the situation will turn into minuses.

This is the price of crossing swords with the elites. They are weak and insignificant when the people are satisfied, and very powerful against the background of a universal dissatisfaction. This is so because the "language of cheese" determines the manner in which the people think.

One really is amazed by the consistency with which Videnov has spoiled his relations with entire social circles.

The mass media hold the first place in this list. The figure of the fantastic Raydovski acquires huge dimensions in this sense. Raydovski, the person who was called upon to construct relations with the mass media, became their main target and a basic source of insults

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directed at the journalists and problems for the government. This is no longer a matter of psychology, but simply the fact that Mr. Raydovski curses in a terrible manner and disconnects microphones when the wrong question is asked. Now this is a matter of relations between politics and the mass media.

"Good relations" in the eyes of Videnov's staff mean subjugation: "We are in power, you will listen to us." Nothing could be more erroneous even from the point of view of the rulers' interests — in the first crisis situation mass media treated in this manner become direct and rather efficient enemies. In addition, prior to any crisis situation the mass media create a permanent, negative, and lethal background.

The business circles are in second place. They are dissatisfied in almost every respect. This includes the simple cab drivers who immediately organized a protest rally, and extends to the major players, who control their emotions, and anticipate the endgame. The delicate fact is that not only Videnov, but anyone else who begins Bulgaria's normalization, would have to affect the interests of many circles. This is so simply because at the end of 1994 business as a whole got used to easy superprofits and absurd credits, and direct corruption became a part of every business venture.

Seeking a solution to this situation, Videnov's cabinet failed in trying to convince a relatively broad circle of businessmen of the necessity of normalization, and left this important layer of the population without a proper dialogue. Furthermore, a serious suspicion emerged that instead of introducing strict and universally valid rules of business, there are groups or a group, that receive preferential treatment, and that Greek interests are being favored.

There is also something else: For already more than one year, whenever a specific economic problem emerges, Videnov's cabinet tries to deal with it by strengthening the administrative principle instead of helping the private businessmen. This is a hopeless direction.

The intelligentsia is in third place. Turning the demonstration of power into a goal in itself and having no direct dialogue are possibly the worst tactics if you want to have normal relations with the intelligentsia. The mistakes of the prime minister's staff are especially striking in this sphere against the background of the experience Todor Zhivkov accumulated in relations with the intelligentsia. Of course, under Todor Zhivkov the intelligentsia had a much more important social role, but even now it has a substantial influence, especially when the social situation is exacerbated.

The broad circle of internal party elite, related to 10 November 1989 and the events afterward, is in fourth place. To quarrel simultaneously with Lilov and Lukanov is a matter that requires a special skill, and to add Prodev [DUMA chief editor] to this is even a matter of sheer and arrogant stupidity. As a result the BSP is shaken by something unique: The party is slowing learning to be critical toward its own leadership. Naturally, for the time being the formula prevails that Zhan is all right, but his circle is bad. However, everyone knows that such formulas bode storms.

Are those conflict relations irreversible? It still appears that they are not, despite the fact that time is running out. However, the change is a matter of politics rather than style. In the modern society the concentration of power means first of all concentration of mediating functions. To increase your power today means to increase your efficiency as a formula of cohabitation of different interests and tendencies. A different notion and practice rapidly destroy the politicians who adhere to them.

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Czech Republic: Commentary: West Acquiescent to Russia

AU2702124496 Prague CESKY TYDENIK in Czech 23-26 Feb 96 p 3

[Commentary by Josef Mlejnek Jr.: "Where Are the Limits of Acquiescence?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev recently nipped off for a visit to Belgrade. Apart from strengthening bilateral relations, chiefly in the military sphere, he used this opportunity again to make several harsh comments about NATO expansion. "Russia will try, by political and diplomatic means, to persuade its Western partners that NATO's further expansion to the east is unacceptable. Naturally, it is possible that our partners will not understand us and will continue to deal with the issue of expansion. In such case, Russia will have no choice but to consider appropriate measures to strengthen its own defense," railed Grachev. What are these "appropriate measures"? In essence, they would involve nothing other than renewing the Warsaw Pact. Apparently, Russia will strive to find suitable partners among the states of Central and East Europe and the former Soviet Union that would enter into a new military pact with Russia.

Grachev is not merely wasting his breath. While the West hesitates, Russia acts. It is actively forging agreements with its former satellites concerning supplies of military equipment and strategic raw materials. Thus, slowly but surely, certain states, such as Bulgaria and Slovakia, are becoming increasingly dependent on Mother Russia. And, as Grachev's visit to Belgrade indicates, another one whom the Kremlin has set its heart on making even more firmly dependent is Milosevic's Serbia. Russia has been holding a protective hand over it since the very beginning of the Balkan conflict, and, consequently, the agreement on military cooperation between the two countries in 1996 merely confirms the trends embarked upon.

Unfortunately, the West always reacts in the same way. Western statesmen take recourse in forlorn contradictory pseudologic: "NATO expansion yes, but we have to take Russia's interests into consideration." One thing is clearly apparent from this: NATO expansion is not on the day's agenda. Russia is awaiting presidential elections. Of course, with a glance at the characters of the individual candidates, one realizes very painfully that a policy perceived as the mechanical choice of the lesser evil surely has its limits. Zhirinovskiy undoubtedly appears to be a complete madman, but General Lebed and the Communist Party leader Zyuganov do not come across any more reliably. And Boris Yeltsin? The once aggrandized reformer has drowned the Western hopes invested in him in a bottle of vodka and has long been behaving in Chechnya the way Vladimir Zhirinovskiy would behave in his touted last leap toward the south. What will Russia be like when one of the serious contenders for the most senior post ascends the presidential throne in the Kremlin? On the issue of the North Atlantic alliance's expansion, more give and take will definitely not be given any say; on the contrary, the Russian "nyet" will acquire ever harsher and more menacing tones. Is there any way out of this very gloomy view of the not-too-distant future?

"Unfortunately, everything indicates that democracy and the free market are just an illusion in Russia. Poland's task is to persuade NATO to admit us, regardless of Russia's opposition. Despite this, it is not our task to persuade Russia to agree to our admission," wrote the Polish paper ZYCIE WARSZAWY. "Russia requires moral and material assistance, but pressure must be exerted on it at the same time. Unfortunately, however, European politicians, including [German] Foreign Minister Kinkel, are not prepared for such pressure," said the Russian human rights campaigner Sergey Kovalyov in Bonn recently.

But will Western politicians ever be prepared for pressure? After all, Russia's interests already lack a global dimension, which plays nicely into the hands of these acquiescent Western tactics. The West does not have to feel as threatened as the states of Central and East Europe. But what is lacking today may come soon, for, as we know, appetite increases with eating. Russian Nuclear Energy Minister Viktor Mikhaylov said in an interview for THE WASHINGTON POST that, if NATO expands to the east and deploys its tactical nuclear missiles in the Czech Republic, Russia will apparently "simply destroy" them. The spokesman for the U.S. Department of State was "unpleasantly surprised" by this statement because, apparently, senior Russian officials "understand our policy perfectly and would never adopt such a stance."

What are we to think? In principle, two explanations for this statement offer themselves. Either they understand nothing in Washington or they understand very well there and in Moscow, which, of course, means that NATO will not be enlarged. And, to ensure that there is no end to all of the misery, the U.S. presence in Europe is becoming weaker and Clinton's Republican rivals in the race for the White House are so downright isolationist that no change at all can be expected of them. The well-to-do EU should not be surprised if, ultimately, it finds itself in the position of Constantinople just before its fall. Even with its splendid agricultural policy, which swallows three-quarters of its budget. Certainly, these

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are very wild notions; unfortunately, however, they are not altogether unrealistic.

Czech Republic: Prime Minister Views EU Membership

MS2702160596 Dublin THE IRISH TIMES in English 24 Feb 96 p 10

[Report on interview with Czech Prime Minister Dr. Vaclav Klaus by Fergus Pyle in Dublin; date not given: "Trenchant and Formidable Advocate for a Czech Approach to the World"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] At the World Economic Forum at Davos earlier this month, the Czech Prime Minister, Dr Vaclav Klaus, was waxing eloquent about his country's opposition to farm subsidies. If anything needed to be changed, he declared it was the EU's agricultural policy, not that of the Czech Republic.

Dr Klaus is a professional economist, a politician who admires the Thatcherite revolution and above all else, some would say, a Czech, meaning he is outspoken and forthright in his views.

The combination sometimes rubs people up the wrong way. Mr Hans van den Broek, the EU Commissioner in charge of relations with central and eastern Europe, was drily responsive: "It is not the European Union that wants to join the Czech Republic; I speak for 15 EU member-states".

In reply to a question during his visit to Dublin this week, Dr Klaus was equally trenchant about the Visegrad group, set up after the collapse of communism for economic and security co-operation in central Europe.

Any significance that it might have had for co-ordinating EU applications has long been abandoned, but it still functions as a forum in which the Hungarians, Poles, Czechs and Slovaks exchange views.

In Dr Klaus's belief, reflecting the strong national element in Czech policy, Visegrad not only does not exist, but never has existed in any practical sense.

He deploys formidable irony. "How do you spell it? Visegrad is an artificial creation of several western politicians and most of the journalists. A typical standard person in the Czech Republic doesn't know what the term means. Visegrad is a hill and a castle in Prague, Visehrad in Czech pronunciation.

"In the permanent repetition of the adjective Visegrad we heard attempts by western Europe to push us away from themselves: 'What about trying first to co-operate among yourselves and then we will observe whether you are doing sufficient and may accept you as members?'

"That was very sensitive for us. A new artificial sub-regional integration in central and eastern Europe after Comecon simply wasn't a reasonable idea. Nobody was listening to that."

But he stresses there is close cooperation with the Czech Republic's neighbours through the Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA) which came into effect three years ago.

It now includes Slovenia in addition to the Visegrad group members and has plans for spreading its net to Romania and Bulgaria and possibly the Baltic states. "You in the west stubbornly refuse to notice CEFTA but for us it is a very prospective and positive organisation." Most tariffs have already been removed between member-states.

Politically, socially and economically, the Czechs argue, their republic enjoys greater stability than its neighbours: for example during Dr Klaus's period in government there have been six Polish prime ministers. It makes little sense, therefore, to co-ordinate positions in regard to EU membership.

One of Dr Klaus's missions in Dublin was to secure "another small signalling step" from the EU during the Irish presidency: "We need positive statements positive signals, for domestic consumption."

He pointed out that the Czech Republic has its own separate history, and now that the crucial moment of transition was past expectations were high.

"The surgery from communism to a free society and market economy is over and we are already, as I call it, in the rehabilitation centre. People don't compare themselves with the countries east and south of us, but with the countries west of us. Simply they want to be a normal European country in all meanings of the word.

"But it takes two to tango, and we can't dictate the moment of membership. We know the EU has internal things to solve, and I understand that without a new redefinition of the structure of EU institutions at the Inter-Governmental Conference, there can't be any enlargement of the European Union. I accept that."

More irony when Semtex, one of the better known Czechoslovak products, is mentioned. "How do you spell it? What's Semtex? It is probably a product of one of our chemical factories whether now or 10 years ago. We have never distributed it to anyone here, and so I have no comment. I have no idea, never heard, never touched."

Asked whether, as a leading monetarist, he sometimes feels isolated in post-Thatcher times, applying doctrine

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in a very particular situation, he replies: "In some respects I feel lonely, not just in central and eastern Europe but in western Europe as well.

"But in many respects I think our voice is very general. Definitely there are more general rules of transformation than the specifics of the Czech Republic."

Which, more or less, is where Mr van den Broek comes in.

Czech Republic: Klaus on EU, Steel Plant Privatization

LD2702191396 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1715 GMT 27 Feb 96

[Regular weekly interview with Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Lucie Weissova—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Weissova] Prime Minister, at about the time you were receiving an honorary doctorate at Buckingham University in London, the British prime minister was appealing to the members of the European Union [EU] to start talks with some countries of our region on membership. Did you talk about this topic during your trip to Ireland and Britain?

[Klaus] Naturally, this is a constant topic. I was surprised at how unequivocally Ireland is in favor of our EU entry. Everybody knows subconsciously that Ireland is a country that makes the most of the EU. This means that they pay into it much less than they are getting. [passage omitted] I was really surprised by the extremely positive reaction of the ruling circles of the president and parliament. So my feeling is good.

My visit to Britain was private, I was visiting private university soil, but, as is usually the case, many people there happened to be members of parliament, many happened to be deputy ministers of one kind or another. So thanks to this, I had numerous talks on the day I stayed there. I think that support on the part of Britain is also quite considerable.

[Weissova] We have just talked about the EU. And what about NATO? What was the significance of the recent Kohl-Yeltsin meeting for our entry?

[Klaus] I do not know. I do not think that individual meetings like this can change global trends and basic tendencies. It is evident that this meeting was aimed at addressing Russian voters before the coming presidential elections [words indistinct]. So I think that nothing fundamental has changed about the general process of approaching NATO. The idea that this December NATO should make another decision has not been questioned and that is important. Everything else is mental fumes [as heard].

[Weissova] Let us come back home. In connection with the protracted case of Poldi Kladno, there are those who say that privatization of a part of the steelworks by means of a public competition was chaotic and badly thought out, that the government has made a bad decision in this matter. What can you say about it?

[Klaus] I have talked about this many times, and I repeat that not all privatization competitions have found an ideal partner. Simply, not all of them have found an ideal owner, not all of them have been successful, and not all of them have been handled well in the small details. I repeat that the government said yes to this form of privatization, but it is clear that the entire game was played by the officials of two or three ministries and the government then approved merely the global framework. I really cannot say any more about this today. If I wrote some other sentences today in the agreements concluded at that time, well, yes, but I think it would be too late [sentence as heard].

The problem at the moment is something else. The problem is that at a certain time we provided three months' deadline in the law on competition. This deadline was to make it possible that no harsh measures would be taken at the time of transformation, to provide a chance for agreement during the three months. It is now becoming evident that this is turning against us and that it is high time to abolish this three months' protective deadline. Unfortunatelly, we cannot do it now just because of one enterprise because it would look like revenge is being taken on one enterprise. But it is evident that the time is ripe.

[Weissova] So the government will not initiate any law amendment?

[Klaus] It can initiate it. Despite this, I am saying that there can be no immediate impact on the situation at Poldi Kladno. [passage omitted]

Czech Republic: Ministries Vying To Control New Office

AU2702145096 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 26 Feb 96 pp 1-2

[Report by Jaroslav Kmenta and Sabina Slonkova: "Holan and Ruml Are Arguing Over the New Office"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The Defense and Interior Ministries are arguing over who will, in the future, exercise control over the influential office that will supervise the handling of information whose confidentiality is essential for the state's functioning and security. The establishment of this office is envisaged by the law on the protection of classified information that the government's Legislative Council should discuss this week.

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The new body, which will be called the National Security Office, will amass all of the classified information on the state and will supervise the people who come into contact with classified data. The office will also, for example, screen the companies that take part in strategic state tenders.

The Interior Ministry, which is drafting the law on the protection of classified information, is proposing that the National Security Office be subordinate to it. The Defense Ministry, however, sent a protest to Interior Minister Jan Ruml a few days ago in which it demanded that this powerful office be a completely independent state administration body.

"For such an office to fulfill its function, it has to be similar to the ones in the North Atlantic Alliance states—absolutely independent, with its own budget and organizational structure," maintains Colonel Jiri Hanacek, director of the Defense Ministry's Classified Information Department. The director of this office should, in the opinion of the Army, be appointed by the government and not by the interior minister only. "Otherwise, it will not be a national security service, but a specialist Interior Ministry workplace," says Hanacek.

The defense department claims that the Interior Ministry's proposal would return the situation regarding classified information to that in the period before November 1989, when the former State Security exercised control over it.

"The Interior Ministry would thus gain access to all of the information in the state. This would be a variation of what there was here under totalitarianism," claims Hanacek.

The Interior Ministry, however, strictly rejects such views. "The establishment of an independent office would be unnecessary and too expensive. The Interior Ministry has the most classified information, and, therefore, it would be logical for the office to be under it," said Vavrinec Korcis, the director of the ministry's Section for the Protection of State Secrecy and Classified Information.

The ministry also rejects the possibility that, after the establishment of the office, it would have a monopoly on all strategic information. "For example, Military Defense Intelligence and the Security Information Service will also be involved in the screenings of the people who will have access to classified data. The Defense Ministry would simply like to have control over the new office itself and, inasmuch as it is not succeeding in this, it is trying, at least, to prevent it from coming under the control of the Interior Ministry," claims Korcis.

At the moment, Interior Ministry experts are unable to say how much the establishment of the National Security Office will cost or give the overall sum the state will need per annum to protect classified information. Nevertheless, the screenings of the people who will deal with the classified information and the establishment of a workplace within the National Security Office that will issue the screening certificates to these people will, first and foremost, swallow up tens of millions of korunas per annum.

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Slovakia: EU Criticizes Country's Ethnic Minority Policy

LD2702143096 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1300 GMT 27 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The European Union today yet again pointed to the shortcomings of Slovakia in fulfilling the principles of democracy and the protection of rights of ethnic minorities. In its viewpoint, which it presented to the Slovak delegation at the session of the European Union Association Council [in Brussels], it further appealed to Slovakia to cancel the 10-percent import surcharge and to close the nuclear reactors that do not meet Western safety requirements.

Although it praised Slovakia's good macroeconomic results, it drew attention to the need for progress in restructuring the financial sector and in facilitating foreign investments.

Slovakia: Kovac Not To Seek Reelection

LD2802112596 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 0600 GMT 28 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The first day of the visit of President Michal Kovac to the Nove Zamky district [in southern Slovakia] ended with a public meeting last night [27 February]. [passage omitted] Our correspondent Peter Rohac is on the line from Nove Zamky.

[Rohac] [Passage omitted] Local citizens are very interested in the president's trip. Questions put to him during last night's discussion concerned, above all, the relationship between Slovakia's top constitutional officials. Michal Kovac's objective is to renew communication between the president on the one hand and the prime minister and parliament spokesman on the other.

It also emerged from the discussion that the president believes he will be able to defend the claims for which Ivan Lexa [director of the Slovak Intelligence Service] has lodged a complaint against him and that he will not seek reelection to the post of president after his term of office has expired.

Responding to a question about territorial autonomy [for the Hungarian minority in Slovakia], the president said that this is an exaggerated demand and that everything could be resolved by giving more power to local government. [passage omitted]

The president will visit the town of Surany later today. This means that Michal Kovac (?has failed to avoid) an unpleasant discussion with Surany citizens, who sent a statement to him beforehand saying that the president is not welcome in Surany. [passage omitted]

Slovakia: President Comments on Son's Return Home

AU2702190996 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 23 Feb 96 pp 1-2

[Report on interview with Slovak President Michal Kovac by Julius Gembicky in Bratislava on 22 February: "President Michal Kovac Fears for the Safety of His Son Following His Return Home, and Therefore Will Ask Protection for Him"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—Today, after almost half a year of forced stay in Austria, following the decision of the Vienna Upper Provincial Court, Michal Kovac Jr. is returning home. Immediately before his son's arrival, Slovak President Michal Kovac commented for NARODNA OBRODA on his testimony, on the accusation raised against some of the agents of the Slovak Information Service [SIS] of conspiring to abduct his son.

To the question of why he decided to testify before the Upper Provincial Court in Vienna, he replied that such a case was uncommon not only for the Austrian judicial authorities, but also for other European democracies. The unusual nature lies in the Austrian authorities being able to reconfirm that a Slovak citizen was dragged into their country by force and against his will. At the same time, they were aware of the international warrant having been issued for the arrest of this citizen. Hence, they faced the problem of priorities in this case—the violation and protection of the basic human rights and freedoms of a foreign citizen or the international arrest warrant. Since I myself have not doubted the abduction of my son by force as I was the first to see him just several hours after the kidnapping, I wanted to help prevent a faulty international precedent—to make all of the governments respect basic human rights first and make sure that no right comes out of the original wrong. President Kovac confided that, because of this, he is even more sorry that the Slovak Government did not fulfill its basic obligations to its citizen and did not defend one who was abducted abroad by force. These were the main reasons for accepting the proposal by my son's defense attorney in Vienna, E. Kresbach, to testify after the court officially decided that I should be heard as a witness.

Regarding the reproach from the SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA daily that he did not present any tangible evidence on the participation of SIS in the abduction of his son, the president responded by saying that it is unsubstantiated and imprecise. He observed that his task was only to explain how he arrived at the idea that SIS equipment and some employees took part in this abduction and that evidence to this effect exists even

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in our investigation file, which he has studied, and the testimony of the eyewitness, Oskar F., who was questioned by both Slovak and Austrian investigators, also corroborates the SIS involvement. Moreover, the two testimonies agree. This person really exists. Therefore, I do not see any reason, President Kovac observed, why, according to the testimony of this witness, SIS should not be at least suspected of participating in this deed. I realize that, from the vantage point of criminal law, it is possible to speak only of reasonable suspicion. Nevertheless, I believe that there is sufficient evidence to suspect a crime. Not a single piece of evidence has been disproved. Moreover, the public has not been presented with any other version of the forced abduction of a Slovak citizen to Austria.

To the next question, of when he believes the time will be ripe for presenting tangible evidence of SIS's having taken part in the abduction, the president replied that he would like it very much if the Slovak authorities engaged in the prosecution were successful in the investigation of this singular, organized crime. This would confirm the fact that a state based on the rule of law exists here, that the investigators proceed independently, and that the prosecutor is on the side of law and contributes actively to the detection of the culprits of the crime. If the investigators achieve this through honest work, lay charges against either specific persons or an organization, and submit the affair to an independent court, they will fulfill the expectations of the substantial majority of Slovak society, people abroad, and me. As president, I would be forced to present tangible evidence before the public if our judicial authorities bring the matter to an impasse and leave it ad acta because of their inability to find the culprit.

President Kovac pointed out that the return of his son could become an impulse for an acceleration of the investigation because the Slovak investigation bodies will have him at their disposal at any time. If the photographs of some people suspected of the abduction were shown to his son, he might be able to identify them, he remembers. Apparently I am not the only one to realize that the period of more than five months the investigation has taken in Slovakia alone sheds an unfavorable light on the Slovak judicial authorities. With whomever I have spoken so far, they all say that in any other country, after the first findings regarding the circumstances of the abduction, similar to those detected here, the investigation would have been completed in a month or two. The culprits would already have been tried elsewhere. After all, with the progress of time after the abduction, serious crimes are more difficult to document and culprits more difficult to convict.

Today's return of my son will be a relief for me because I felt the obligation toward my grandchildren and his wife, President Kovac confided, in conclusion. After all, they have to live off something. His children are looking forward to his return. Well, my son will have to take care, primarily that the accusation or suspicion of his participation in the Technopol affair is disproved as soon as possible. I, myself, have no doubts at all. Only this will enable him to dedicate himself to the support of his family. He will be very busy because the Technopol affair harmed him tremendously as a businessman. The massive propaganda has put him in a situation where not only many citizens but also businessmen perceived him as a man who committed a serious crime. This can have an unfortunate effect on his future work.

To the closing question of whether he is worried about his son's safety after his return today, President Kovac admitted that he is worried about his son and, therefore, will demand his protection.

Slovakia: Ministry Criticizes Diplomatic Note Response

AU2702185896 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 24 Feb 96 p 2

[TASR report: "MZV SR: An Unnecessary Campaign"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—In connection with the reactions by some of the media to the note addressed by the Slovak Foreign Ministry [MZV SR] to the Embassy of the Republic of Austria on 20 February 1996, the MZV SR spokesman deems it necessary to emphasize that, although the text of the note is available, many commentators are formulating constructions that do not correspond to its contents. For example, the MZV SR has not cast doubt on the verdict of the Austrian court. In the text, not only was the court's activity not called into question, but, on the contrary, the MZV SR expressed in the note "its firm conviction regarding the indubitability of Austria's democratic legal system." The MZV SR's spokesman is surprised that some commentators substitute a text expressing generally accepted understanding for the principles of international law with casting doubt on the verdict itself. At the same time, these authors do not notice that, in the note, the MZV SR distinguishes the agency reports—while it expresses the hope that they are "either imprecise or untrue"—from the possible text of the justification of the verdict that the court was supposed to have delivered.

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Slovakia: Kovac Jr Case Triggers Editor's Dismissal

AU2702164096

[FBIS Report] Slovak newspapers from 21 to 24 February publish a number of reports on, and reactions to, the dismissal of Slovak Radio commentator Michal Berko on 20 February, due to a feature on the Michal Kovac Jr. affair broadcast in the 14 February evening edition of the "Radiozurnal" news program. Berko himself is convinced that his dismissal was preceded by an intervention by the Slovak secret service.

Bratislava SME in Slovak on 21 February on pages 1 and 2 carries a 500-word report by "ll" entitled "M. Berko's Contract of Employment With Slovak Radio Terminated Because of Report on M. Kovac Jr. Affair." The report states that, on 20 February, Michal Michalcik, chief editor of Slovensko 1 (Slovakia 1) news programs, handed over to Michal Berko, Slovak Radio foreign policy commentator, the "decision on the immediate termination of his contract of employment." The reason cited in the decision is a feature in the 14 February 1996 evening edition of "Radiozurnal," which dealt with new developments in the Michal Kovac Jr. affair. As is stated in Slovak Radio management's decision, in quoting an article on the case published in the Austrian daily DIE PRESSE, "you directly accused the Slovak Information Service [SIS], in defiance of the fact that the whole case of Michal K. Jr. has not been legally wound up." The "decision" goes on to say that "this was not the first instance" of Berko's "deliberately violating the Labor Code and the Rules of News and Current Affairs Programs" and refers to his "foreign policy commentary of the week" broadcast on 15 October 1995, in which Berko reportedly "cast doubt on a decision made by the democratically elected parliament of the Slovak Republic and grossly accused the ambassador of the Russian Federation of misleading statements on the NATO enlargement issue."

Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 22 February on page 2 carries a 250-word report by Ivan Samel entitled "Slovak Radio Editor M. Berko Given Immediate Notice." The report points out that Berko's dismissal was preceded by an SIS protest statement of 15 February 1996, which, referring to Berko's feature, called it "startling that even Slovak Radio allowed itself to be drawn into the incendiary campaign against SIS by disseminating information on a simulated press conference held in Vienna. The words of the general director of Austrian Police that 'the police had no doubt about the identity of both men' were interpreted by the reporter as 'they are really SIS members.'"

Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 23 February on page 2 carries a 450-word report by "od" on the case entitled "Michal Berko: It Is a Political Case." The report includes the following passage on Berko's reaction to his dismissal: "Berko is convinced that SIS is behind his dismissal. 'It is a case of political persecution of a journalist because of his views, because of the presentation of information that he merely quoted from foreign sources,' Michal Berko told us, and added: 'It is a political case.'

"'This is the first time that anyone has been forced to leave radio within 24 hours,' the longtime foreign policy commentator, who, after November 1989, worked several years as deputy of Slovak Radio Director Vladimir Stefko, President Kovac's present spokesman, went on to say. Chief Editor Mich[illegible] Michalcik had warned Michal Berko that he wo[illegible]e dismissed. 'He told me openly that he would kick [illegible]e out,' the affected journalist says. The last warning from the management came in October 1995, after a commentary previewing Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar's visit to Moscow, in which Berko reacted, among other things, to some statements by Sergey Yastrzhembskiy, Russian ambassador to Slovakia. At that time, Berko supposedly offended the Russian diplomat."

Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 23 February on page 2 carries a 300-word report by "r" entitled "In Some Cases, Slovak Radio Does Not Respect the Professional Rights of Journalists." The report summarizes a statement issued by the Slovak Syndicate of Journalists [SSN] "Commission for the Protection of Professional Rights" on 22 February. The statement notes that the commission "has on record several cases arousing the serious suspicion that the professional rights of journalists are not respected in Slovak Radio" and mentions that "the case of Michal Berko is the latest of them." According to the report, other cases concern "the dismissal of Kveta Skvarkova from the post of department head after the broadcast of Ivan Strpka's 'Living Words' because of the alleged loss of Chief Editor Michal Michalcik's trust" and the banning on 23 December 1995 of an unspecified feature by editor Tamara Valkova, "despite the fact that all objections raised by Martin Dobos, head of the News Center, were accepted in the text." According to the statement, the SSN commission also keeps a record of "all other cases of interventions in commentaries."

In conclusion, the SSN Commission's statement notes that "there exists a strong suspicion that the document 'Rules of News and Current Affairs Programs' is being misused for political punishment of journalists and for interventions in broadcasts."

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Bratislava SME in Slovak on 23 February on page 4 carries a 700-word interview with Jan Baranek, chairman of the SSN Commission for the Protection of Journalists' Professional Rights, by Lubomir Lintner entitled "Creation of Atmosphere of Fear in Slovak Radio." In the interview, the place and date of which are not given, Baranek provides additional information on the cases of violation of journalists' professional rights by Slovak Radio criticized in the commission's statement of 22 February. Asked to assess the present situation in Slovak Radio's News and Current Affairs Department, Baranek says: "Slovak Radio's present management creates a politically motivated atmosphere of fear, which seriously violates the basic principles of plurality and democracy as well as Slovak Radio's status as a public corporation. There is a danger of Slovak Radio becoming an ideological instrument in the hands of several political parties and movements. Thereby, it would lose radio's main mission—to inform objectively and truthfully. Full responsibility for this situation is borne by the present management of Slovak Radio."

Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 24 February on page 2 carries a 500-word report by "pv" entitled "Michal Michalcik: Last Drop in Michal Berko's Cup." The report, based on interviews with Michal Michalcik, chief editor of Slovensko 1 radio station, and Martin Dobos, head of the News Center, deals with the reasons that made the Slovak Radio management give notice to commentator Michal Berko. Chief Editor Michalcik mentions Berko's commentaries "casting doubt on the decisions of the democratically elected Slovak parliament," his "offensive remarks" about the Russian ambassador to Slovakia, the "confusing of a MiG-21 with a MiG-29" in one of his reports, an unspecified "unpleasant occurrence at the workplace", and "other dirty linen" that Michalcik prefers not to "wash in public." He also mentions Berko's "political commentaries" published in the daily SME, pointing out that "a radio commentator must not present confrontational views in other media and sign them as the representative of a public corporation." According to Michalcik, Berko's feature in the 14 February edition of Radiozurnal, "because of which Slovak Radio had to apologize publicly to SIS," was therefore just "the last drop." At the same time, Michalcik rejects as "unwarranted" Berko's endeavor to "politicize" the issue and to portray himself as the victim of an "act of political persecution," arguing that Berko "did not lose his job because of his political stands but because of his professional mistakes."

Asked to respond to Berko's "conviction" that SIS was behind his dismissal, Martin Dobos says: "If one did not feel like crying, this would be a laughing matter. These are rumors, a lot of hot air, not backed by any facts."

Slovakia: Meciar Addresses HZDS Republic Presidium

AU2702155696 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 26 Feb 96 pp 1-2

[Article by Eva Zelenayova: "V. Meciar: The Movement Has Made a Considerable Impact on the Nation's History and on the People's Lives"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ruzomberok—The final meeting of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] Republic Presidium [RP] in its current form was held in Ruzomberok on 24 February. The next meeting will be held after the 6th Republic Assembly. The movement's chairman, Vladimir Meciar, made use of this occasion to thank everyone for his work. He also pointed out that the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia has made a considerable impact on the nation's history and on the people's lives. He recalled the night of 4-5 November 1991, when the movement established itself as a political force of the center that is viable and has no parallel in Europe. "But this is not our mistake," said Meciar.

As usual, Movement Chairman Vladimir Meciar delivered a report on the current political situation. He assessed the course to date of the preparation of the draft law on territorial-administrative division. At the same time, he emphasized that citizens from various towns are sending petitions and that the government is trying to accommodate all of them. The Republic Presidium voted in favor of a proposal to create eight regions and 74 districts. Coalition deputies will discuss the proposal this week, and it is envisaged that, following its approval in the National Council of the Slovak Republic, it could become valid as of 1 July of this year. Movement Deputy Chairman A. Matejka said at a press briefing that the material provision for the new districts is not a problem.

Will There Be a Coalition With the SDL?

Vladimir Meciar dealt with the issue of the possible entry of the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] into the coalition. He said that the SDL has issued, in this regard, a document for its future course of action that corresponds precisely to the conduct of this political entity to date. The HZDS Republic Presidium therefore adopted a resolution in which it commits the Political Board to making a decision on who will negotiate with the SDL representatives. He also briefed the RP HZDS on the planned meeting with representatives from the Hungarian Coalition. According to the information available, the Hungarian Coalition has apparently drafted a proposal for talks on Slovakia's territorial-administrative division, while the horizontal dividing line for the re-

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gions follows the line of Slovakia's occupied territories in 1938.

The Movement Is Not Opposed to the Return of M.K. Jr.

V. Meciar also touched on the difficulties in the negotiations on the General Agreement involving the government, employers, and the trade unions. With regard to the surrender of Michal Kovac [MK] Jr. to Slovakia, he said that the HZDS is not opposed to this because it occasions the situation that prevailed here before his sojourn in Austria. "The statement by an Austrian judge that M.K. Jr. was abducted to the territory of a foreign state by citizens of his own country makes it clear that this case was oriented toward discrediting the government and the Slovak Republic," said V. Meciar, and he continued: "It is also obvious that only those who do not want to see this do not see it."

The Slovak Republic Is Not Changing Its Foreign Policy

The movement's chairman also assessed Slovakia's economic development. He stated that the results achieved in 1996 are, compared with 1995, better. He also referred to the privatization of the banks and devoted a great deal of time to our foreign relations. He again repeated that the Slovak Republic's foreign policy is not changing, but, in view of international developments, it will be necessary to devote one session of the HZDS Republic Presidium to foreign policy alone.

In its resolution, the HZDS Republic Presidium made note of, among other things, the evaluation of the district assemblies and the report by the commission chairmen on the preparations for the 6th HZDS Republic Assembly, and, at the same time, it also approved an RP HZDS proposal that the assembly be held in Zvolen on 23 and 24 March. It also made note of a proposal for the activities on the fifth anniversary of the founding of the HZDS and the fulfillment of the HZDS's program in the small and medium-sized enterprise sphere. It recommended a whole series of tasks for the district presidiums. The RP HZDS adopted a declaration in which, among other things, it aired its views on the Michal K. Jr. affair. It emphasized that "the introduction of political aspects into this affair is purely expedient, and the HZDS rejects any statements whose central meaning is to disparage the movement regardless of the final decision made by the criminal bodies. The HZDS has always respected the decisions made by free democratic bodies and has never been interested in casting doubt on these decisions," says the RP HZDS in its declaration.

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Hungary: MDF Draws Up Party Program for 2 Mar Meeting

AU2802102696 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 26 Feb 96 pp 1, 4

[Report by Jozsef Szabo Bartha: The MDF's Draft Program Is Ready — The Coalition Is the Opponent; Need To Remain Open To Cooperation With Smallholders"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "Where Next, Hungary?" is the title of the document containing the Hungarian Democratic Forum's [MDF] situation analysis and recommendations. According to our information, the party's expert working group prepared the draft program that is intended for the party's 2 March national meeting, and it has also been discussed by the MDF's executive committee. What do we want? — the program's makers and presenters ask in the introduction of the as yet unpublished material, which is intended as the MDF's draft program.

The MDF, the draft says, evolves the nation's future image from the recognition, many thousands of years old, that the strength and stability of a state or a nation depend on having the largest possible size of middle class, their financial independence, well being, and moral level. In this respect, the party's goal and program have been unchanged since it was formed: "The enemy of the concept of nation is also our enemy and the enemy of ordinary Hungarian people, because the destruction of the bases of national cohesion and selfless cooperation can sink Hungary into third world conditions and make it a toy for foreign powers. We want to build an economy, society, and culture that maintains continuity with the best national traditions. These will be used as a source and, at the same time, this economy, society, and culture will harmonize with the institutions and spirit of the democratic Europe."

The MDF's economic policy goal is to establish a welfare market economy based on the fundamental values of freedom, property, competition, and welfare security, "whose broad base consists of the growing and increasingly richer middle classes." In wage struggles, the MDF is on the employees' side.

According to the draft, in the current situation it is not possible to raise quickly the Hungarian population's living standards but its sense of security can be improved. "The MDF will restore legal security and predictability."

The MDF places emphasis on economic growth, on the development of enterprises, and on the inflow of foreign working capital. It will privatize the banks and complete bank consolidation. "We want to stop bank corruption.... The Hungarian National Bank can regulate neither the amount of money nor the credit stock with adequate efficiency.... We must not handle the banking system as a political institution — this is the current practice — and its untenably low level has to be significantly improved."

When in government, the MDF wishes to have a budget policy that restores the necessary independence and decisionmaking freedom of the local governments. It wishes to reduce the 25-27 percent inflation to 10 percent. It considers the freezing of the foreign debt stock at a level lower than the current one an immediate task. "Unfortunately, we undoubtedly have to manage the foreign state debt accumulated by the irresponsible economic policy and we have to meet our interest payment obligations without creating doubts. Hungary has an open economy and it cannot lose the confidence of the international financial circles.... The economic policy programs and political promises aiming for the cancellation of the debt are false and cannot be fulfilled after the elections, either, or they would lead to a worse economic situation." The program considers a tax reform essential (it would reduce the tax and the social insurance contribution, and introduce family-based and enterprise stimulating taxation), but it would tighten up the collection of "reasonably levied taxes." We must restore tax discipline and, in accordance with this, we have to overhaul the tax authority, its spirit, and its organizational and legal framework.... The illegal economy has to be suppressed and made legal."

To prevent further destruction and deterioration of the agricultural sphere, the MDF promises to announce a new agricultural program, based on cooperation between family farms and producer enterprises, rather than on fictitious cooperatives. It considers it important to establish the institution of land mortgage and a customs policy protecting domestic products.

The draft states it is necessary to draw up a medium-term employment program and to have public work in the interest of reducing unemployment. It promises wide-ranging welfare measures: It would support individual home building and purchasing, access to one's first home (would spend some of the privatization income on this), would restore family supplement as a basic right and support for unemployed young people seeking their first job, and would introduce a tax allowance on children.

The program sees it as a vital issue for the nation to place environmental protection, health care, education, and cultural policies on new bases. "The cynicism with which the politicians of the current government coalition plan a drop in the population in the long run is appalling.... By defending the places of education, school-

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ing, higher education, and research against the narrow-minded tax-collecting and money-taking financial government, we are also defending Hungarian and universal culture. Rather than closing, we want to be opening schools."

The writers of the draft program believe that defense is not a matter for only one ministry. The reduction of the Army has to be stopped. Hungarian defense has to continue to be based on compulsory military service but the proportion of re-enlisted and contracted soldiers has to be increased. "A nation cannot beg defense guarantees for itself from its hoped-for future allies if it cannot itself contribute to the joint defense. NATO membership cannot replace the development of the Hungarian Army; on the contrary, it is impossible without it."

The MDF is in favor of Euro-Atlantic integration. Armed with the experiences of the first governmental cycle — the draft program says — it continues to strive to have an independent Hungarian foreign policy for which the representation of the national interest is a guiding principle.

The MDF continues to have the fate of the world's Hungarians at heart. It wishes to continue its former national minority policy, which was exemplary for the whole world.

The closing chapter of the draft program, the section on possible party links, states: "The Hungarian Socialist Party and the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] are the MDF's political opponents, whether they form a coalition or not, or whether they are in government or in opposition. The time that has passed since they came to power in 1994 has proved that this coalition is a cynical and pragmatic marriage of interests between those who possess party state privileges and their formerly rather loud opponents. It has also been proved that, in this marriage, the worse forces have become dominant in both parties. However, the smaller coalition member has to be listed among our political opponents for reasons of principle, too. The SZDSZ's leadership in no way represents classical Hungarian and classical European liberalism."

Finally, the writers of the draft program believe that the European democracies have actually been kept alive by two moderate forces: the moderate center left and the moderate center right. Democracy can easily slip into or turn in the direction of dictatorship in places where loud forces to the left or to the right of these forces come to power. In other words, democracy can easily become endangered if different forces come to power. This is one of the reasons it would be vitally important for a true social democracy to emerge, just as it is vitally important for the moderate center-right forces to cooperate. Therefore, the so-called three-party cooperation (Federation of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Party, MDF, Christian Democratic People's Party) is needed because of rational considerations that also rely on traditions, and the linking, coincidence, and political predictability of values, rather than for emotional or haphazard reasons. "The MDF has to continue to strive to cooperate with these parties in the local governments, at the county and Budapest general assemblies, and in the parliament, in other words, in every area where this is possible. In the meantime, we must also remain open to possible cooperation with the Smallholders."

Hungary: Changes Reported in Horn's Group of Advisers

AU2802084796 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 27 Feb 96 p 4

[Report by Imre Bednarik: "Horn's Group of Advisers Has Been Changed — Contact With Gobolyos and Patko Has Ended"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to NEPSZABADSAG's information, a number of changes have taken place in Prime Minister Gyula Horn's immediate environment in recent weeks. Gabor Gobolyos, Horn's foreign policy adviser, has left the Prime Minister's Office for the Foreign Ministry. He has been replaced by Tamas Horvath, who served as a diplomat in France and in Algeria. During the Nemeth administration he was then Foreign Minister Horn's cabinet chief.

Andras Toth, political state secretary at the Prime Minister's Office and the prime minister's cabinet chief, said that a number of changes have recently taken place in the group of Horn's advisers, and formal relations have been ended with, among others, Istvan Matko [position not specified], and with former Ambassador to Bonn Istvan Horvath. The prime minister is still in permanent touch with psychologist Peter Popper, writer Szilveszter Ordogh, and lawyer Tamas Revesz. However, Ordogh and Revesz have been nominated by the Hungarian Socialist Party to the media boards and, after Parliament's approval, their new positions will probably be incompatible with their positions as advisers. Therefore, Horn will have to find new advisers.

Toth confirmed that the prime minister does not wish to revive the formal adviser body he initially had. He seeks opinions and stances from various groups on economic policy issues. As examples, he mentioned the names of Erno Kemenes, member of the Central Bank Council, Tamas Katona, chairman of the Central Statistical Office, and economist Janos Kornai.

The government's press staff will be complete from the beginning of March. Agnes Koroncz, chief editor of the

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Hungarian Radio foreign broadcast editorial office, will be head of the Communications and Press Office of the prime minister's cabinet, and Jeno Jozsef Szabo, chief editor of the newspaper ORSZAGHATAR, has been the prime minister's press secretary since 15 February.

Hungary: FM Kovacs on EU Talks, Minorities in Former SFRY

LD2702184996 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 27 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The foreign ministers of the nine associate members had talks with EU leaders in Brussels today. Miklos Keleti reports.

[Keleti] Hungary also supports yesterday's statement by the EU that not even after the lifting of the arms embargo will they deliver weapons to Yugoslavia, Croatia, or Bosnia while the IFOR's [Implementation Force] peacekeeping mission is under way, the Hungarian foreign minister said, among other things, at the foreign ministerial conference of the EU and the associate members [EU Joint Association Council session]. [passage omitted]

Regarding the Balkans, Laszlo Kovacs urged the EU to call upon the Belgrade, Zagreb, and Sarajevo governments to start talks without delay with the legitimate representatives of the minorities there. [passage omitted]

Hungary: Daily on Plans for 'Europeanization' of NATO

AU2702191996 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 27 Feb 96 p 8

[Editorial by Gabor Lambert: "NATO's 'Europeanization'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A Pax-Americana has emerged in the Balkans after all, and the many years of inability to decide, as well as the indigestion of the opposing interests in dealing with the Yugoslav crisis, will probably last for a while in western Europe. Until then, analyses and studies keep emerging, analyses that caution the Americans not to monopolize the honor. Or they downright blame the selfish Washington diplomacy, the goal of which is to discredit the Europeans (like the Jane's security and military policy analysis group did recently in targeting Holbrooke, who enforced the peace). According to this logic, the elections to be held in Bosnia in six months' time are doomed to failure, and the opprobrium will again fall upon Europe while Washington's politicians are washing their hands. The aforementioned Jane's also warns that a possible division of Bosnia between Tudjman and Milosevic after the departure of the U.S. troops would also fall on the heads of the European decisionmakers.

In an atmosphere of impaired European self-awareness and suspicion, this continent's independent defense identity again comes to the fore. German Defense Minister Volker Ruehe thus chose a favorable psychological moment when he started lobbying in western European capitals in order to find followers for the implementation of his new idea, the Europeanization of NATO.

The essence of this idea is that the Europeans should be capable of managing a crisis even if the Americans do not want to participate. According to the German argument, the condition for keeping Washington in Europe is that the inhabitants of Europe accept greater responsibility for their own security in the future. In practice, the gradual integration of the Western European Union [WEU] into the EU would be one factor in all this.

The Yugoslav lessons are already restarting the debate on what to do with NATO's European wing, the WEU, a wing that has mostly existed on paper so far. Western Europe has to reevaluate its present security policy philosophy. This is interesting for Europe's eastern half, all the more so because, before ending this reevaluation, it can hardly be clear exactly which organization the new candidates could join, and when.

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B-H: Muratovic Views Talks With Granic, Kasagic

AU2802151096 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 28 Feb 96

[Report by Nada Cumurovic on news conference by Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic in Sarajevo on 28 February—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Cumurovic] This was a very good meeting with results. This is how Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic assessed the meeting held two days ago between the Governments of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia in Split.

Among six signed agreements is also the one on the construction of a great border crossing in Doljani, while the signing of another seven agreements is envisaged for the next meeting, which should be held in mid-March.

[Muratovic] I would particularly like to stress the agreements on the port of Ploce and passage through Neum Municipality.

[Cumurovic] Prime Minister Muratovic explained that the Republic of Croatia is to hand over to Bosnia-Herzegovina a part of the port of Ploce for 99 years without limitations and free passage to the border, while our country is to provide free passage through Neum Municipality to Croatia. Important issues are the establishment of a common market, transition without visas, and road and railroad traffic.

As for yesterday's meeting in Banja Luka between the prime ministers of the federation and the Serb entity, Prime Minister Muratovic said:

[Muratovic] The reconstruction of the infrastructure is one issue, while the attempts to establish traffic between the two entities is something else. This traffic includes payment and trade operations. We are going for completely unified payment operations, which should start functioning in some 10 days with one institute for payment operations.

[Cumurovic] The Bosnia-Herzegovina Government is not prepared to allow trade operations between the two entities until border control is established between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro. It proposed yesterday that the current controllers of the sanctions should change into monitors with the presence of relevant bodies of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The third topic, that is, the third reason for today's news conference by Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic was the transfer of authority in Sarajevo districts. The prime minister said that, apart from the satisfaction with the realization of the process, some criticism has also been directed at us, mostly unjustified as was proven by written statements by the people in charge of the control of certain areas. As for the continuation of the process:

[Muratovic] With tomorrow's opening of Ilijas, we expect that the road to central Bosnia will be opened, which will significantly improve the access to Sarajevo. This road will be temporarily used for the south, that is, toward Mostar so long as there is danger on the road to Ilidza.

[Cumurovic] Prime Minister Muratovic was asked a series of questions at this news conference, such as whether the government has lodged a protest with the Implementation Force [IFOR] because of Karadzic's presence in Banja Luka yesterday, to which Muratovic said that it had not been confirmed officially that the war criminal was in town, even though the chances are that he was. He was asked about Hidajet Delic, our imprisoned colleague, who was discussed in Banja Luka yesterday. The people we met do not control the military authorities who are holding Delic. General Tolimir's name came up as the man responsible for this, Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic said at today's news conference.

B-H: Kasagic Greets Lifting of Sanctions

AU2702131796 Paris AFP in English 1141 GMT 27 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Banja Luka, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Feb 27 (AFP)—Officials in this Bosnian Serb stronghold expressed satisfaction Tuesday at the UN decision to suspend economic sanctions against the Serbs saying that it would allow them to develop contact with other nations.

"The (self-styled) Serb Republic can now walk through the front door to face the world," said Rajko Kasagic, the Bosnian Serb "prime minister."

"We can now reach out to the world and the world can come to us," he said.

He added that the Serb Republic was in great need of international assistance to relaunch its war-shattered economy.

Kasagic also said that the suspension of sanctions would allow the Bosnian Serbs to restore relations with rump-Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and all the former Yugoslav republics, including Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia.

The UN Security Council was expected Tuesday to formally suspend economic sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs.

In New York, Security Council diplomats said that a formal announcement suspending sanctions imposed

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against the Bosnian Serbs in 1994 would be made Tuesday and would be effective the same day.

NATO chief Javier Solana confirmed Monday that the Serbs had complied with military requirements in the Dayton agreement on Bosnia for sanctions to be suspended.

B-H: Karadzic Views Lifting of Economic Sanctions

LD2702200496 Pale Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1930 GMT 27 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Commenting on the decisions of the UN Security Council and the Federal [Yugoslav] Government to lift sanctions against the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, Dr. Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serb Republic, told GLAS SRPSKE that the entire life of the Serb Republic should progress. All economic organizations should move rapidly to meet international standards, for which a decree has already been issued. A decree has also been issued to renew ties with businessmen, particularly in Yugoslavia and elsewhere in the world. The economy should open up for fighters who are being demobilized so they can find employment and to enable them to make a rapid economic recovery.

If there is no war, the Serb Republic will have a great future, which begins today, Radovan Karadzic said following the lifting of sanctions against the Serb Republic.

B-H: Karadzic Hails Suspension of UN Sanctions

LD2802121096 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1145 GMT 28 Feb 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Banja Luka, Feb. 28 (TANJUG)—The entire life of Republika Srpska (Bosnian Serb republic, RS) should go forward now that sanctions have been suspended, RS President Radovan Karadzic told the Banja Luka daily GLAS SRPSKI on Wednesday.

'Regardless of the delay, we welcome the decision of the international community to suspend sanctions against Republika Srpska.... If there are no wars, Republika Srpska will have a great future, which begins already today,' Karadzic said.

The suspension of sanctions against Republika Srpska took effect automatically on Tuesday [27 February], after the U.N. Security Council received an Implementation Force (IFOR) report that the Serb side had withdrawn from the zones of separation and thus met the condition for their suspension.

Karadzic said the RS economy should reestablish old ties, primarily those with firms in Yugoslavia, and then also with others all over the world.

'Republika Srpska has met all the provisions of the Dayton accord and we believe that the international community, with an unbiased stand and equal treatment, would find in us (Republika Srpska) a reliable factor of peace for the region,' Karadzic assessed.

B-H: IFOR Welcomes Suspension of Sanctions

AU2702143796 Paris AFP in English 1336 GMT 27 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Feb 27 (AFP)—The NATO-led peace Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia on Tuesday welcomed the expected announcement of the suspension of international economic sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs.

"We welcome the steps taken by the Bosnian Serbs that have allowed for this situation, the suspension of sanctions," an IFOR spokesman said.

"We hope that the suspension will help the Bosnians Serb population to now start and indeed continue on the road of economic reconstruction and peace," IFOR spokesman General Andrew Cumming said.

The general added that if the Serbs seriously violated their obligations the sanctions could be reimposed.

"We have enjoyed good contacts with the (Serb) military authorities...and we are looking for durability," Cumming said.

B-H: Koljevic Says Lifting Sanctions 'Positive Step'

AU2702194196 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 27 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Nikola Koljevic, vice president of the Serb Republic, stated in Bijeljina that the suspension of sanctions against the Serb Republic was welcome and that it was another ray of hope that the peace would be a lasting and a stable one.

Serb Republic Vice President Milomir Draganic in Pale voiced his satisfaction with the suspension of sanctions. This is a positive step by the international community toward the Serb Republic and a confirmation that the international community has realized that the Serb Republic is consistent in the implementation of the peace agreement and that it honored all the deadlines in the implementation of the Dayton accord, Draganic said. He stressed that this was an opportunity to revive economic capacities in the Serb Republic as well as free trade relations with the world.

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B-H: Assembly Speaker Welcomes Lifting of Sanctions

LD2702202196 Pale Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1930 GMT 27 Feb 96

[Remarks by Momcilo Krajisnik, Bosnian Serb Republic assembly speaker, for Pale Srpska Televizija, in Pale on 27 February—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Of course we are pleased that the sanctions have been lifted. We are pleased for two reasons. One is that the sanctions were having a detrimental effect on our economy and on the social situation in the Serb Republic. The other reason is that the sanctions represent a symbolic act [as heard], and that is that the international community is observing the commitments which it undertook in the international agreement from Dayton, and we can also hope that other things will be honored in the future.

The sanctions also symbolically represent the separation of the eastern and western parts of the Serbian ethnic region, so we can only be satisfied, although we have to say that the sanctions should have been lifted much earlier because we had observed the two provisions of the Dayton agreement by 19 January, and from that date the sanctions were being maintained illegally.

B-H: Serbs, Bulgarians Discuss Economic Ties

AU2702200696 Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 26 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] In Banja Luka today, the prime minister of the Serb Republic received the representatives of the Bulgarian state-economic delegation headed by (Ognjen Petkov), head of the [word indistinct] and economic service at the Bulgarian Embassy in Belgrade.

It was stated that economic cooperation would be established between the companies in the Serb Republic and those in Bulgaria, and also that there would be a presentation of the Serb Republic state companies at the international fair in Plovdiv.

Representatives of the Banja Luka companies and the deputy president of the Chamber of Commerce of the Serb Republic, Svetislav Mudrenovic, also attended today's reception. Mudrenovic stated the following to correspondents after the reception:

[Begin Mudrenovic recording] We talked to the representative of the Bulgarian Embassy in Belgrade today, mostly about economic cooperation. Namely, during the war, there was no economic cooperation, in view of the sanctions introduced by the international community. We therefore discussed the reestablishment of economic cooperation and agreed that, in early April, an economic delegation headed by several of their deputy ministers will come here. We also discussed direct contact with certain economic organizations and certain branches of industry, such as [word indistinct], the auto industry, the tobacco industry, the wood and timber industry, and the leather goods and footwear industry. I will give you only one example: Before the war, Incel's [Banja Luka pulp and paper industry] annual sales to Bulgaria were about $5 million.

Considering that Bulgaria is a sponsor in the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Yugoslavia, we discussed the modalities for satisfactory cooperation in this. We also discussed transport through Yugoslavia, our banking systems and cooperation in banking, and the adjustments of regulations necessary for the economic cooperation and trade to follow the rhythm that would be satisfactory for both sides and reach the level present before the war, if not an even higher level. [end recording]

B-H: PM Faults NATO for Not Arresting Karadzic

AU2802102596 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 28 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] [Words indistinct] there is no doubt about that, he added.

Republic Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic accused NATO forces of not arresting Karadzic in Banja Luka. What do you expect? He feels safe there, Prime Minister Muratovic told the reporters after returning to Sarajevo.

B-H: Aides Report Karadzic in Same Building as Bildt

AU2702201796 Paris AFP in English 1938 GMT 27 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Feb 27 (AFP)—Bosnian Serb leader and indicted war criminal Radovan Karadzic was in the wings of a meeting attended by senior civilian envoy Carl Bildt in northern Bosnia Tuesday [27 February], officials said.

Bildt, the high representative responsible for overseeing implementation of civilian aspects of the Dayton accords, did not meet Karadzic.

However the rebel leader was in the same building used to host a high-level meeting of Serb, Moslem and Croat officials, aides said.

Under the peace accord, international officials involved in implementing the plan and members of the NATO-led peace Implementation Force (IFOR) are banned from having contact with indicted war criminals.

"I gather he was there," said Duncan Bulivant, a spokesman for Bildt. "I don't think he was on display,

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he was not flaunting his presence and certainly a couple of his people were seen."

Bildt was meeting prime ministers from the trio of authorities that make up post-war Bosnia—the Bosnian Serb republic, the Moslem-Croat federation and the Bosnian Government.

The meeting in Banja Luka, a rebel stronghold and the largest town held by the Serbs, was held to discuss various aspects of civilian parts of the peace accord.

Bosnian Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic admitted to reporters in Banja Luka that he knew of the rebel leader's presence, which he blamed on IFOR.

Under the Dayton accord, IFOR troops—some of whom were in the building—have the authority but not the obligation to detain indicted war criminals and hand them over to a war crimes tribunal in The Hague.

B-H: Poll Shows Karadzic, SDS Favored in Elections

LD2702183896 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1756 GMT 25 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 25 Feb (SRNA)—According to SRNA's February opinion poll, Dr. Radovan Karadzic, president of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic [RS], and his Serb Democratic Party [SDS] have the best chance of victory in the first presidential and parliamentary elections in the RS, expected to be held in September.

In a random telephone poll, SRNA interviewed 350 people from all parts of the RS. Of these, 61.4 percent think that Dr. Karadzic will win in presidential elections, while 68.2 percent expect the SDS to triumph in parliamentary elections.

Presidential Elections

When asked "If standing, who has the best chance of winning in the presidential elections?," 61.4 percent tipped Dr. Karadzic to win, 11 percent favored Dr. Nikola Koljevic, the RS vice president, and 5 percent were for Predrag Radic, mayor of Banja Luka.

The rest fared as follows: Momcilo Krajisnik, president of the People's Assembly, is expected to win by 4.5 percent of those polled; Dragutin Ilic, president of the Socialist Party, by 2 percent; and General Ratko Mladic, by 1.4 percent. Nikola Poplasen, outgoing leader of the Serb Radical Party, was tipped to win by 0.8 percent of those questioned; Zeljko Raznjatovic, president of the Party of Serb Unity, by 0.5 percent; and Radislav Vukic, member of the SDS Main Committee, by 0.2 percent. Of the total number of those questioned, 12.5 percent replied "don't know" when asked who would win the presidential elections.

When asked "Who will you vote for if he decides to stand?," 55.4 percent said Dr. Karadzic; 9.4 percent for Dr. Koljevic; and 6 percent for Radic.

The rest fared as follows: Krajisnik, 2.5 percent; Ilic, 2 percent; Mladic, 1.4 percent; Poplasen, 1.1 percent; Arkan, 0.5 percent; Radoslav Brdjanin, 0.28 percent; and Vukic, 0.28 percent. Of the total number, 20.85 percent did not know who they would vote for.

Parliamentary Elections

Asked "Which party has the best chance of winning in parliamentary elections?," 68.2 percent opted for the SDS, 17.7 percent for the Socialist Party of the RS, 7.4 percent for Serb Radical Party of the Serb Republic, 0.5 percent for the Party of Serb Unity, and 6.2 percent did not know.

Asked "Which party are you going to vote for?," the largest number, or 58.2 percent, said the SDS; 13.7 percent favored the Socialist Party of the RS; and 8.5 percent were for the Serb Radical Party of the RS.

The rest fared as follows: the Party of Serb Unity, 1.1 percent; Independent Social Democrats of the Serb Republic, 0.8 percent; the Liberal Party of Banja Luka, 0.2 percent; and the Serb Renewal Movement, 0.2 percent. "Don't know" was the response by 17.3 percent of the people questioned.

Asked "Will the leading international factors be neutral in the elections or will they try to influence their outcome?," 83 percent expects the international community to be biased, 6.8 percent believes in its neutrality, and 10.2 percent did not know.

General Indicators

Asked if they "will vote in the elections," 80.2 percent said yes and 19.8 percent did not know.

Out of all those polled, 35.4 percent said they belong to a political party and 64.6 do not; 18 percent received elementary level education, 58.3 secondary education, and 23.7 percent had higher or university education.

When it comes to age, 51.7 percent belong to the 18-40 age group, 36 percent to the 40-60 age group, and 12.3 percent were over 60; of the total sample, 36.3 were women and 63.7 percent men.

In an attempt to obtain the most objective results and accurate picture possible of the preelection mood, SRNA researchers opted for a random telephone poll. In preparing the poll we tried to achieve balance

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in the size of the samples from different parts of the RS to avoid bias. The opinion poll covered 22 towns: Banja Luka and Serb Sarajevo—30 people questioned in each; Prijedor, Bijeljina, and Doboj—25 each; Brcko, Zvornik, Visegrad, Srbinje, Pale, Bileca, and Trebinje—20 each; Sokolac, Han Pijesak, Rogatica, Gacko, and Nevesinje—10 each; Milici, Vlasenica, Bratunac, Sekovici, and Ljubinje—five each.

B-H: Commentary Dismisses Opposition to Karadzic's SDS

AU2302212796 Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE (Bosnian Serb) in Serbo-Croatian 15 Feb 96 p 4

[Commentary by Slavko Jovicic: "Big Words by Small Parties"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Although only just over six months are left until the official elections in the union of the Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat federation, which will be held under the patronage of the international community, some things have already become starkly obvious.

The results of the vote of the entire electorate on the territory of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina will to a great extent determine the future of Bosnia-Herzegovina. One thing that can already be noticed is the great confusion within the ranks of the opposition parties, that is, their political agony, which has been destroying the electoral tissue of the Serb national corpus primarily within the Serb Republic. It is clear even to completely apolitical citizens far from current daily political events that some contradictory and strange things, to say the least, have been happening on the Serb Republic's political stage.

At this moment, more than 30 registered political parties and citizens' associations have been carrying out their final preparations and, in the fervent race against time, trying to win over the Serb electorate for their own interests. This large number of "newly composed" (read: "hybrid") pretenders to power is not as surprising as their already clear retrograde programs are!

Helping To Damage Themselves Alone

By turning back the wheel of history to the prewar state, the opposition is doing damage to itself. With fancy false promises and a patronizing attitude, they are trying to win over the voters and are lamenting their own fate without any indications of success. With their politically extremist moves (false promises), these spiritual caretakers and "fighters" for the interest of the Serb people are again trying to push the Serb people into the wide-open jaws of the enraged beast (that is, the Muslim state), which will not be satisfied even with new quantities of newly spilt Serb blood. These gentlemen, who again work in collaboration with like-minded people in Sarajevo on the revitalization of the already fossilized "sovereign" Bosnia-Herzegovina, should know that this is a Sisyphean task. They should know that at least! The opposition, whose basic task is to grab power, should reckon with the fact that it is clear even to any layman that in this conglomerate of ideas and programs, nobody possesses a "magic wand" with which they would "make happy" the already suffering people troubled by war horrors. The people will certainly not swallow this false bait.

Preserving Our State

What does exist as a fact is the legality and legitimacy of the Serb Republic and its integral continuity expressed by its own army and police, judiciary, radio and television, press, and so on.

All citizens know down to the smallest detail how much trouble and how many lost lives it took us to achieve what we have today. It is only the enemies and adversaries of the Serb state who will say that "the sacrifices were in vain, as the Serb nation is defeated," forgetting that, apart from "domestic" enemies in the form of the Muslim-Croat coalition, the Serb people also had to fight all those tricksters and universal opponents of the Orthodox Serb people.

This one, as well as many other indisputable facts are being—consciously or not—ignored by the leaders of the still minor parties on the Serb Republic political scene.

True, the Serb Democratic Party [SDS] has also been experiencing great problems and inconsistencies in implementing its own program, as well as in leading this state, which was created with great troubles. However, the SDS will certainly be able to find new solutions and the way out of this situation, if it first creates a different political, economic, and cultural atmosphere. Priority tasks, and the SDS is well aware of those, are to revitalize the economy, solve the status of the fighters and disabled, accommodate the great number of refugees and displaced people, and take care of the families of fallen fighters. All this demands long and troublesome work, which the SDS must endure if it is to achieve success and victory at the coming elections, which is the only realistic option.

Therefore, at this moment, the SDS is the only political party capable of keeping the continuity of the Serb Republic and, through that, fulfilling the national interests of the Serb people. Everything else would equal a catastrophe with unforseeable consequences.

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B-H: SDA's Ceman Views Party's Election Strategy

AU2702165096 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian 26 Feb 96 p 4

[Unattributed interview with SDA Secretary General Mirsad Ceman; place and date not given: "We Are Not a Taciturn Party"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Mirsad Ceman, secretary general of the SDA [Party of Democratic Action] of Bosnia-Herzegovina, disagrees that his party, as opposed to the "loud-mouth" parties of the opposition, is a taciturn party. According to Ceman, the goal of the SDA is to settle things by democratic action. A lot has been worked out through state bodies, and sometimes it is felt that it is not always necessary to state attitudes, but he does not think they have deprived the public of attitudes regarding important issues. "Therefore, I would like you to specify any important issue toward which the SDA did not state its attitude," Ceman says.

The Party's Attitude

[VECERNJE NOVINE] Mostar; Srebrenica and Zepa at the time of their fall; Izetbegovic's New Year's letters to citizens about Santa Claus....

[Ceman] The question of Mostar, as far as we are concerned, has been politically defined by our statement that it must and should remain an undivided city. We have given a mandate to our negotiators to take actions within this framework. The model proposed by Hans Koschnick is not the best of options in many respects, but, regarding some important elements, it is satisfactory. The assessment that the SDA did not react immediately to the problem of Srebrenica is also incorrect. The local SDA boards in Kladanj, Zivinice, Tuzla, and the free area of Zvornik reacted immediately, whereas I, as SDA secretary general, immediately went to Tuzla, while the SDA initiated the formation of a particular fund. Again, it is not enough to speak about the condemnation of the evil that happened there, and if you have the same impression, then this is, perhaps, an opportunity for us to be sometimes more agressive than we consider necessary. As for Izetbegovic's reaction, I listened to and read some commentaries saying it is almost impossible for him to react as a citizen without the weight he already has as the president. We left it to the public to judge this issue and, in such a way, secured a sort of probing of public opinion. However, as we are talking about this issue here and now, I think the attitude of President Izetbegovic has, in any case, been judged too severely. I am sure that President Izetbegovic's intention was not to imply that the rights of others should be restricted, but rather to point out that it is necessary to take care about the dispositions and rights, if you will, of the Bosniaks who do not always identify themselves with such values, without denying them to others.

To Keep Silent or Not

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] Nevertheless, how good a foundation is your silence for the establishment of a general people's front, which the SDA called for recently? Do you have any contacts with other parties?

[Ceman] No matter whether keeping silent or talking, any party in the position of the ruling party is attacked by the opposition. As for a general people's front, I think we have already had one since the beginning of the aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina. It has not existed formally, but actually, it has existed.

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] The public has paid great attention to the cadre shifts in SDA bodies at the last meeting of the Main Board.

[Ceman] All of us may now comment on whether that was a necessary thing to do, but the things are now as they are. To be honest, I was surprised to see that some of our members did not get the necessary number of votes. However, the SDA decided to make several positions vacant, and, following that logic, some people had to go.

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] There are many rumors about trends and factions in the party.

[Ceman] In my opinion, those are not factions possibly based on some ideological or platform differences. We are not talking here about factions in any way, but rather about some personal, mutual affinities of some members toward other members, and, on that foundation—perhaps the term is too strong—factionalism has appeared in SDA bodies. That is known and understandable, though rather detrimental in the current situation.

Breakup With Silajdzic

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] How painful was the break up with Silajdzic? Did the SDA do enough to prevent it?

[Ceman] You see, what is happening now, after Silajdzic's declaration and dissociation from the SDA, is certainly bad for the Bosniaks and Bosnia-Herzegovina in general, because, instead of using all potentials available to resolve our increasing existential problems, we are engaged and will be further engaged in matters of prestige. I am sorry that all that happened, but I have to say that the SDA did a lot to prevent such a development.

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] Are you afraid that Silajdzic might take some of your memberhip away from your party?

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[Ceman] Probably, and such a thing happens regularly in similar cases. I would not make any forecasts right now, but everything that happens, including actions by Silajdzic and his future party, must be in the interest of our people and state.

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] The SDA has elected to its Main Board two popular generals from [Bosnian] Krajina [Atif Dudakovic and Mehmet Alagic], while a third has been elected to the Executive Board. Will that really be enough to strengthen positions in the Bosnian Krajina?

[Ceman] In the region of Bihac, the late Irfan Ljubijankic and others laid the foundations for the complete structure, including the army structure as well. With this, the process of superstructuring was rounded off, but in fact the SDA is supposed to answer new challenges only after peace is reestablished. Therefore, we see the election of the generals as a recognition given to them by the SDA, but also as their right, as citizens, to be involved in these processes.

In All Regions

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] How realistic is it to expect the SDA's quick resumption of activities in the Serb entity and its real comeback in territories controlled by the HVO [Croatian Defense Council]?

[Ceman] Right now that is very difficult to forecast. When speaking of the Serb entity, that will depend particularly on the support given by international mentors in any respect, because a precondition for fair and correct elections that could be recognized is to make possible the activities of the parties, including the SDA, in those regions. We have never obstructed the work of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community]. The HDZ has been active all the time in Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zenica, Tesanj... wherever they wanted. We expect reciprocity.

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] Who is the SDA counting on in the coming elections? New, fresh people or the old, proven ones who won the past elections?

[Ceman] Generally, the SDA will run in the elections with both new and old names, but it is early to talk about them right now, because we are still reconsidering them.

[Box 1, p 4]

[Ceman] Enver Kreso is no longer a member of the Executive Board of the SDA because, before the last meeting of the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, he resigned from the position of chairman of the Club of SDA Assembly Deputies because of a ministerial position with the government of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

At the last meeting of the Main Board, he did not get enough votes to remain on the Executive Board, but he kept the position because of his function as chairman of the Club. Having lost that function, he dropped out of the party's body as well.

[Box 2, p 4]

[Ceman] We assess that, in the coming election, the voters will considerably base their decisions on the names put forward as the representatives of certain policies.

[Box 3, p 4]

[VECERNJE NOVOSTI] We asked Ceman about the SDA's chances of winning in Tuzla, where the party had lost in the past elections. Pointing out that they are running in the elections in order to win them, Ceman says that the SDA in Tuzla has grown considerably stronger, and it will present itself as a party that not only makes promises, but also keeps them. Ceman assesses that the SDA winning a majority in the wider region of Tuzla is beyond any doubt, while, in the city itself, it will at least strengthen its position considerably.

B-H: Generals' Membership in SDA Causes Controversy

96P20300A

[FBIS Report] The membership of Generals Atif Dudakovic and Mehmed Alagic in the Party of Democratic Action (SDA) main committee opens old debates and provokes new discussions on the political role of the army and on who commands the army, an article reported in the news weekly, SVIJET. (1) Pointing out that in addition to Dudakovic and Alagic other generals have been members of the leadership of the SDA—the Muslim community's main party and the ruling party in Bosnia-Herzegovina—the weekly observed that only communists had more generals in their central committees. The membership of General Dudakovic is especially troubling for those persons who oppose the "meddling of soldiers" into political affairs and for those who oppose membership in ethnically based parties, the article continued. Although people had seen Dudakovic as a "Bosnian" rather than as a member of an ethnically based political party, the "very fact that he agreed to join it changes his image." The article cited the views of SDA Vice President Ejup Ganic, who saw nothing abnormal in such party membership: "Generals must participate in planning the further development of the state. They are not here just to fight and die." In contrast, the opposition has accused the ruling party, whose political philosophy it says is "clearly of religious origin," of becoming "militarized," the article noted, adding that,

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by appointing the two generals to the party leadership, the ruling party wished to gain complete control of the army.

The February issue of DANI viewed the two generals' party leadership positions as a great strengthening of the SDA and a preelection asset: "Both are from the Krajina region, both are commanders with wartime achievements and both have another common characteristic: their wartime record was undermined for the same reason—insufficient orientation toward the SDA. They proved their loyalty to the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina at the front, now they have to start proving it politically," the paper commented. (2)

On the same subject, an article in SLOBODNA BOSNA pointed out that three other generals, Delic, Muslimovic, and Mahmuljin, are already in the membership of the SDA main committee, along with a number of brigadier generals and other officers. The article contended that it is not difficult to guess the reasons why the SDA has hurriedly started to strengthen itself by promoting generals in recent weeks: "The strongest trump card" that the ruling party will have in the next elections is its "role in the defense of the country", i.e., "the building of the Bosnian Army." According to the article, the "militarization of the SDA" will not be controversial if it is used to build up the "authority of the ruling party" before the elections. It will be a "misfortune" only if it does not help the ruling party to achieve victory. "Generals do not like defeats, nor are they fond of frequent changes of the system," the article warned. (3)

Media Sources

(1) Sarajevo SVIJET in Serbo-Croatian 8 Feb 96 p 10

(2) Sarajevo DANI in Serbo-Croatian Feb 96 p 11
(3) Sarajevo SLOBODNA BOSNA in Serbo-Croatian 26 Jan 96 p 4

B-H: Milosevic Meets Russia's Afanasyevskiy, New Envoy

LD2802142296 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1309 GMT 28 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 28 Feb (TANJUG)—Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic received Nikolay Afanasyevskiy, Russian deputy minister of foreign affairs, and Yuriy Mikhailovich Kotov, the newly appointed ambassador of the Russian Federation to the FRY, today.

In talks which covered topical issues of importance for the further development of bilateral relations between the FRY and Russia, the two sides stressed that their countries attach great importance to the need to expand and advance comprehensive bilateral cooperation, in which a special role is earmarked for business partners in the FRY and Yugoslavia who have so far enjoyed successful business cooperation, a statement issued by the Serbian president says.

In President Milosevic's view, it is in the interest of both the FRY and Russia to ensure that economic cooperation soon reaches the level that existed prior to the economic embargo, with prospects for constant expansion and many new projects that should be launched as part of it. For its part, Russia is committed to the same.

President Milosevic wished the newly appointed Russian ambassador success in his new post in Belgrade.

The talks were also attended by Milan Milutinovic, FRY minister of foreign affairs.

B-H: Kasagic Says 40 War Criminals Fled to Serbia

AU2802124196 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 28 Feb 96 p 5

[Unattributed report: "Criminals Also Fled to FRY!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The 700 able-bodied persons who have fled the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina to Yugoslavia also include 40 war criminals! This assertion was made at the meeting of Prime Minister Rajko Kasagic with members of the Association of the Families of People Imprisoned and Disappeared on the Territory of the Former Bosnia-Herzegovina. A request was issued from this meeting in Banja Luka for Yugoslavia to arrest the 40 suspects and, if it is established that the suspicions are well grounded, to file appropriate indictments against them.

Kasagic told the meeting participants that there is also the question of the large number of missing, imprisoned, and unregistered persons on the territory of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina which is under the authority of IFOR [Implementation Force] and the ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross].

Representatives of the Association are demanding that a prerequisite for future negotiations with the representatives of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina be the solution to the question of imprisoned and missing Serb army fighters and that the Serb Republic government and the leadership of Serbia exert pressure on the international community so that the problem could be solved as soon as possible.

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B-H: Zvornik Mayor: Serbs Altering 'Demographic Makeup'

AU2702205096 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 27 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Prompted by the Serb entity's government decision to settle 7,000 citizens of Serb nationality from Ilijas in Bosniak houses and apartments in the occupied parts of Zvornik municipality, Zvornik municipal assembly chairman has forwarded a letter of protest to Carl Bildt. The letter states the following:

Trying to conceal their crimes, the Serb authorities in Pale are applying unheard of psychological pressure to prompt an exodus of the Serb population from Sarajevo suburbs and their resettlement in Bosniak homes from which they expelled the Bosniak people through aggression and ethnic cleansing. In this way they wish to alter the demographic makeup of the occupied territory.

It is clear from this that the Serb authorities are not fully implementing the Dayton agreement, because Annex 7, Articles 1, 2, and 3, stipulate that all displaced persons must be allowed to return to their homes, while all sides guarantee that they will do everything to ensure a safe return of refugees.

Carl Bildt is requested to influence the Serb entity's government to annul the decision on the settlement of Ilijas Serbs in homes belonging to Zvornik Bosniaks. The citizens of Zvornik Municipality are resolute about returning to their homes in keeping with the spirit of the Dayton agreement, reads the letter.

B-H: Ilidza Serbs Meet With Legitimate Authorities

AU2702200196 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 27 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] With a view to a successful implementation of provisions stipulated by the Dayton agreement and the Rome conference, and with stress on the process of the reintegration of Sarajevo as the starting point for the reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a second meeting was held in Ilidza today between representatives of the Ilidza interim municipal council and Serbs who wish to remain in the area after the arrival of federal authorities.

The meeting was organized by the Implementation Force Command and the Office of the EU High Representative for the Implementation of the Civilian Part of the Dayton agreement. The topics discussed were health care and education.

Nedeljko Prstojevic [Ilidza mayor] stressed that it was necessary to overcome all the horrors of war, just like after World War II, and to develop mutual cooperation in culture, economy, and other social and economic branches. He addressed the fact that there would be private property and houses through which the border between the entities would pass. The owners of such property should be allowed to maintain the property. Prstojevic said he would not be attending followup meetings; the delegations would comprise people from 1990 lists of party candidates or from parties that will stay in Ilidza and participate in the new political life in the municipality.

Husein Mahmutovic, head of the Ilidza interim municipal council, said that the leaders of the Ilidza municipality would remain consistent with the stances of the republican and federal government, which means that over 20,000 Serbs can stay in their homes.

The problem of Serbs staying in Sarajevo and the return of refugees to Ilidza are parallel. He said that an office for displaced persons had been formed in order to ensure the return of refugees to Ilidza. According to him, the process would progress much more freely if both sides were to cooperate. [passage omitted]

B-H: Bosnian Serb Commander Wants Road for Civilians

LD2702205296 Pale Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1930 GMT 27 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The General Staff of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic Army sent a request today to the competent IFOR [Implementation Force] command and Admiral Leighton Smith personally asking that the Ustipraca-Kopaci-Gorazde-Srbinje [Foca] road be opened in both directions from 1 March for civilian traffic and for the needs of Serb Republic citizens.

General Ratko Mladic, commander of the Serb Republic Army's General Staff, asked IFOR in the request to ensure the complete security of people and property and the escort of convoys on this road.

Gen. Mladic expressed his belief that Adm. Smith would meet the request, and thus improve IFOR's reputation with the Serb people and increase its contribution to the realization of the Dayton agreement in particular, because IFOR has already met similar requests of the Muslim-Croat Federation and it already had the necessary experience in these tasks.

B-H: 'Several Thousand' Refugees Leave for Teslic

AU2802122296 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 28 Feb 96

[Report by Senad Gurkalic from Jelah]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Gurkalic] Today at 1000 [0900 GMT] in Jelah a mass gathering took place of Bosniak

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citizens who were expelled from Teslic. They demonstrated peacefully in front of IFOR [Implementation Force] headquarters, represented in Jelah by a Polish battalion, and expressed their wish to return to their homes, which they should be able to do in accordance with Annex 7 of the Dayton agreement.

Jelah cannot be Mladenovo! UNHCR, why are you not implementing Annex 7! We have accepted peace so we could all go back home! These are just some of the messages written in Bosniak [as heard] and English on the banners.

When several thousand Teslic expellees approached the gates of the IFOR headquarters in Jelah, there was visible panic among the Polish soldiers, who assumed combat position unnecessarily, directing the guns of their transport vehicles at the gathered crowd. Everything, of course, passed without incident, but since the Polish battalion commander did not show up at the agreed time—allegedly he is away on business in Tuzla—the crowd set off on foot toward Teslic at 1100. [Word indistinct] we have a statement from Hadil Osmanovic, chief of the transitional municipal council of Teslic:

[Osmanovic] These citizens are conveying to the citizens of Serb nationality, who are in our homes, that they cannot build their lives in Bosniak homes. They should go back to their own homes. Everyone should go back home if we want a just and lasting peace to reign in this region.

[Gurkalic] Radio Teslic reporters will follow these events. We will probably have more information for the main newscast.

B-H: Croats Buy Property From Serbs Leaving Sarajevo

AU2602185596 Sarajevo LJILJAN in Serbo-Croatian 21 Feb 96 p 4

[Article by Fahrudin Salkic: "Sarajevo in a Ring of the 'Croatian Municipality of Stup'!?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Even though the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia has been dismantled as a parastate, the idea of a unified (translation: ethnic) political-territorial space for Bosnian Croats is still being implemented. The best proofs of this are the recent events in Zepce and its surrounding areas and the current events with the Croatian people in Mostar. In the shadow of these events, far away from the public eye, mechanisms have been established to create yet another possible center of future conflicts, and right at the doorstep of the capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Immediately after the signing of the Dayton accords, meetings were held in Ilidza and Kiseljak between representatives of the Serb authorities from the occupied parts of Sarajevo and the Croatian authorities from Kiseljak, aimed at finding the most favorable settlement to the current political, territorial and existential questions of Serbs and Croats in these parts of Sarajevo, which are supposed to be returned under the authority of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation. The joint conclusion made at all the meetings was that the establishment of "the Croatian municipality of Stup is in the interest of both the Croats and the Serbs!"

Conditions for Establishing Authorities

The results of these meetings are most apparent in Ilidza itself, Blazuj, and Hadzici. In the past month, Croatian war profiteers from Kiseljak and Kresevo have been buying up real estate, land, and housing and business facilities in Ilidza and Hadzici from Serb owners who have no intention of remaining there. Approximately 100 houses of Serb and Croat owners in Ilidza and Hadzici and some 50 business facilities in different conditions have been sold, as well as large quantities of furniture, appliances, and other transportable property at a public market opened at Kobiljaca saddle on the way between Ilidza and Kiseljak. Since the deadline for the return of these territories is a limiting factor that requires urgent steps, the prices of real estate are much lower than their real value. Sales contracts are being concluded, registered, and verified by the municipal court in Kiseljak, and considering that the municipality is part of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, while those are transfers of property owned by single persons, everything is legal and contracts are valid! Sales of transportable and nontransportable property are just a side effect of major intentions and deals by which ownership relations are being regulated in a microspace. Concretely, however, by Serb-Croat changeovers of ownership over real estate, the national structures in these regions will be considerably upset. Thereby strategic interests of the ruling Serb and Croat leaderships are partly realized as well.

This type of political action guarantees the stay of Serb populace on the territories that will be placed under the authority of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, prevents the real establishment of federal authorities, and enables Croats to express their interests in this part of Sarajevo, while all this will be possible to accomplish without violating the spirit and principles of the Dayton accords. It can be expected that the Croatian side, through the Assembly and other federal administrative bodies, will endeavor to accomplish the forming of a Croatian municipality whose territory

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would include Ilidza, Hadzici, Blazuj... adjacent to the similarly very Croatian municipalities of Kiseljak and Kresevo, which would lead to the founding of a big new "Croatian enclave!" The Serbs would be satisfied with such a solution as well, and certain provisions of the Dayton accords would be fulfilled, according to which the region of Sarajevo, after the withdrawal of Serb military and police formations, would enter the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, while the painless transfer of authority would be made possible as well. The Serbs will do their part of the job with help of foreign mediators (EU), submitting a number of convincing proofs that the forming of the Croatian municipality of Stup is the way to prevent an exodus of Serbs.

Croatian Authorities in Ilidza

Municipal borders in normal conditions represent formal administrative boundaries that determine jurisdictions and territorial divisions between municipal authorities, but in Sarajevo's (Bosnian) conditions they have a much deeper meaning and more complex political implications. "The Croatian authority" in Ilidza guarantees the continuity of the policy of prevention of the establishment of a unique political-territorial administration on the entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the creation of favorable conditions for definitive failure of the Dayton peace, and the final division of Bosnia-Herzegovina. A considerable role in the creation of preconditions for the accomplishment of this intention and such activities is played by EU representative Carl Bildt. Owing to his decision on postponing the deadline for the changeover of authorities in the occupied parts of Sarajevo, the time span within which this initiative can be achieved has been made more liberal. The blooming cooperation between the Ilidza Serbs and the Kiseljak Croats will make possible the achievement of political and territorial interests of the two partners: 1. Obstruction and prevention of the restoration of the prewar national balance in these areas, the stay of the Serb populace under the political and physical "protection" of the Croat corps within the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the expectation that the Bosniaks will look at this with equal suspicion as they look at their return in western Mostar; 2. Physical prevention of the opening of the city of Sarajevo toward the rest of Bosnia-Herzegovina by roads via Kiseljak and Hadzici; 3. Establishment of the same relations in this region like those existing in other regions under the control of the Croat corps in the Federation, which means creating a new center of potential conflicts according the Mostar model.

[Box, p 4]

Forming a Croatian municipality in Stup is not a new idea. Proposed by Slavko Zelic, it appeared as early as in 1993: "Sarajevo should be reasonably divided so that everybody can accomplish their national needs. Without it, there is no survival possibility for Croats in Sarajevo. We must have an administrative territorial unit where Croatian interests can be expressed. The Serb side has nothing against this. The Croatian municipality of Stup has been proposed in order to link up corridors with Kiseljak and Kresevo while still being part of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia."

[Box, p 4]

From a legal point of view, sales contracts concluded between parties from the Ilidza and Kiseljak regions (if they refer to property registered as one-to-one ownership) are completely valid. All administrative procedures regarding transfers of ownership can be completed at any one of the magistrates in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, while the buyer's only obligation to "the Serb municipality of Novo Sarajevo" (which includes Ilidza, Hadzici, and Blazuj) is to pay taxes on newly acquired property.

B-H: Serb Party Official Vows To Stay in Ilidza

AU2702202396 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 27 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] I will stay in Ilidza, Bosko Kuljanin, representative of the Ilidza branch of the Serb Democratic Party, said following today's meeting in Ilidza.

I am not sure exactly how many people will return, but those who stay are people who never even had an evil thought about their neighbors; they simply stayed on their property and defended it. Things are now as they are. People would like to stay; it is their great desire, but circumstances will not allow them to do so, Kuljanin said.

He added that, as far as the mass Serb exodus is concerned, it is not only propaganda, but also something that is in the people, their intution that dictates their behavior. Judging by all events, it is logical that the reconciliation process will not be instantaneous; it is possible that there will be mutual verbal conflicts and shifting of blame. A number of people who are now leaving will be back because nostalgia for one's birthplace exceeds everything else, Kuljanin said.

B-H: Serb Mayor 'Often' Met HDZ in Sarajevo

AU2802122396 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 28 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] During yesterday's meeting between representatives of the transitional municipal council of Ilidza and representatives of the local Serb

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authorities, Nedeljko Prstojevic, mayor of the so-called Serb district of Ilidza, stated that he often had meetings with people who declare themselves as representatives of the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] in Ilidza. He announced one such meeting today.

B-H: HDZ Denies Talks With Prstojevic in Sarajevo

AU2802124096 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 28 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] functions in accordance with the institutions of the system, and all those who hold talks with representatives of the Serb side can only do so as private people on their own behalf. They most certainly cannot do it on behalf of the HDZ since its legal representatives, who have been elected in a democratic way, are well known. Radosav Ljubas, chairman of the Ilidza municipal HDZ committee, stated this for B-H PRESS.

He added that Croats who fled at the beginning of the war to central Bosnia and who now want to return were probably the ones talking to [Ilidza Mayor Nedeljko] Prstojevic. According to Ljubas, the HDZ distances itself completely from such talks.

B-H: Koljevic, Riza View Vosgosca 'Irregularities'

AU2702202296 Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 26 Feb 96

[Report by (?Tanja Banduka)]

[FBIS Translated Text] Dr. Nikola Koljevic, the deputy president of the Serb Republic, received the UN secretary general's special envoy for the former Yugoslavia, Iqbal Riza, in Pale today. The conversation was mainly devoted to the people of Serb Sarajevo leaving the city. (?Tanja Banduka) has a report.

[(?Banduka)] The essence of the conversation concerned the irregularities in the transfer of power in the municipality of Vogosca. The representatives of the Serb Republic expressed concern about this issue and pointed out the key problems that need to be resolved in order for the situation on the ground to improve. In view of the fact that the international community is responsible for consistency in implementing the Dayton accord provisions regarding the transfer of power and police in Serb Sarajevo, Dr. Koljevic stated the following:

[Begin Koljevic recording] Vogosca was the first municipality, and everybody is well aware of the events and incidents that Mr. Iqbal and we hope will not be repeated. These events and incidents are well known because Mr. Bildt and Mr. Steiner were present there, so no witnesses are necessary for what was happening during the transfer of power in the municipality of Vogosca—Mr. Koprivica was present there, [words indistinct] the illegal [words indistinct] of the flag, the taking down of the insignia, and the expelling of the personnel, although, according to the agreement, the mayor should have stayed and should have been able to stay, regardless of the fact that federal police were coming.

The [words indistinct] objective problem is the shortage of police forces—the United Nations was able to provide only 15 percent of the forces that were planned, so the federal police could not be controlled. This is objective. [end Koljevic recording].

[(?Banduka)] Mr. Iqbal Riza said that today's talks were open and constructive, and expressed his concern about the situation.

[Begin Riza recording, in English with superimposed translation into Serbo-Croatian] This was our first meeting, and we talked openly. Mr. Koljevic expressed his concern about certain irregularities in the transfer of the police in Vogosca. This is also my concern. However, this is our first operation, and we are learning a lesson from it. I hope that everything will be much better in the municipality of Ilijas.

Our position is the following: We are aware that the situation is extremely difficult for the people in these areas, since the Dayton decisions have had negative consequences for the humanitarian situation on the ground. This is why the fear and uncertainty of the Sarajevo Serbs are justified. Our position is that the people should decide freely, without pressure and propaganda, whether they will stay or leave. We will respect their decision, but we would indeed like as many as possible to stay. [end recording].

The end to the media war between the Serb Republic and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation was also discussed at the meeting.

B-H: SGV Delegation Meets Vogosca Authorities

AU2702194096 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 27 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The implementation of the peace agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina that pertains to Sarajevo is mostly successful. This was concluded at today's joint meeting between representatives of the legitimate authorities in Vogosca municipality, headed by municipal chairman Muhamed Kozadar, and representatives of the Serb Civic Council [SGV] of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The SGV delegation comprised Mirko Pejanovic, Miro Lazovic, and Rajko Zivkovic. The talks were also attended by Federal Interior Minister Avdo Hebib and Sarajevo police chief Enes Bezdrob.

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This was the first official visit of an SGV delegation to Vogosca municipality since authority had been handed back to the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The municipal chairman said that not a single incident nor breaking of law and order regulations had been reported in the five days of new authority in Vogosca. According to his information, the territory of this municipality, one of the four which according to the Dayton agreement are included in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, still accommodates some 1,500 to 2,000 citizens of Serb nationality. There are no accurate assessments as to whether they will stay in their homes or whether a number of them would be leaving the area. The legitimate authorities are doing everything to ensure optimum conditions so they can stay in Sarajevo. It was stated as an illustration that the Vogosca police station comprises 85 employees, 47 of whom are Muslims, 30 are Serbs, and eight are Croats.

It was agreed to open an office in Vogosca tomorrow, in which SGV representatives would organize the Dobrotvor humanitarian organization and Prosvjeta organization, which would allow citizens of Serb nationality to meet. The office would be a link with the legitimate authorities. During the talks, Mirko Pejanovic requested that the newly established authorities in Vogosca organize talks with civilians so that the citizens' basic problems can be efficiently solved.

B-H: Muslims Wage 'Special War' of 'Terrorist Actions'

LD2702205696 Pale Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1930 GMT 27 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Teams of the Doboj public security station, which have been carrying out an investigation into an explosion that took place at a petrol station in Doboj in the buffer zone between the Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat federation two nights ago, have found messages with hostile content on the scene of the explosion.

According to the Doboj public security station, a white sheet covered with Islamic insignia was found; the perpetrators of the crime had written on the sheet: Death to the Serbs in Doboj. This was also witnessed by IFOR [Implementation Force] members and the international police force, which has also launched investigation.

It is obvious that Muslim forces have begun waging a new form of special war against the Serb Republic, by carrying out terrorist actions, which are mainly characteristic of the relations between Muslims and Croats, particularly in Mostar.

B-H: Evidence Gathered on Muslim Torture of Serbs

LD2802163296 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1442 GMT 28 Feb 96

["Pool" item by Petar Tomic]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Timisoara, Romania, Feb. 28 (TANJUG)—Four investigating teams of the Hague-based International War Crimes Tribunal have gathered evidence here over the past ten days of the torture of Serbs in Moslem-held prisoner camps in Konjic, on Mt. Igman and in Sarajevo.

Thirty Bosnian Serbs who were held prisoner by Moslems in the September 1992-January 1995 period have volunteered to testify in the presence of tribunal investigators. An initiative to this end was launched by the Association of Camp Inmates '91.

The 30 Bosnian Serbs were tortured in the Moslem-held prisoner camp Celebic near Konjic, central Bosnia, a silo in Hadzici near Sarajevo, the prisoner camp on Mt. Igman overlooking Sarajevo and the prisoner camp in Krupa, northwestern Bosnia.

They have decided to testify to help tribunal judges to gather evidence of war crimes by at least 150 Moslem officials, including Bosnian Moslem leader Alija Izetbegovic who, they said, was present in at least three cases when Serbs were tortured.

Persons under age, women and the elderly aged 60-80 were also held prisoner in the Moslem camps.

The witnesses listed as various methods of torture applied in the camps the breaking of hands, legs, fingers and toes, starving prisoners to death, psychological maltreatment and sexual abuse.

They described separately and in detail atrocities by ranking Moslem officials including president and other members of the Moslem presidency, members of the Sarajevo Moslem government, Moslem Army Commanders Sefer Halilovic and Jovan Divljak as well as others who ordered the torture of Serb civilians.

More than 1,200 Serb civilians were held prisoner in the camps. Some of them did not survive. In the Celebic prisoner camp alone, Moslems killed 18 persons in the presence of other inmates, the witnesses said.

They said the international community, including the International Red Cross, the United Nations and its Security Council, had been aware from the very start what was happening in the camps, but had chosen to keep quiet about it.

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The witnesses said they expected the Hague tribunal to act immediately and to take action on the strength of the evidence presented against all war criminals who had brutally tortured Serb civilians. They said if the tribunal did nothing even after these testimonies to punish war criminals who had been identified, they would regard it as a political body only, whose sole role is to look for culprits among Serbs.

Branka Jovanovic, the prisoners' representative, said after the investigation had ended late Tuesday [27 February] 'in our opinion, the judges took down our testimonies extremely correctly. They manifested a high degree of professionalism and good faith.' She said the people who had testified felt better now because they had done what they thought it was their duty to those who had perished in the camps and who no longer could speak of bestial manner in which they had been tortured. She praised Romanian authorities for the protection of the Bosnian Serb witnesses.

B-H: Difficult Position of Croats in Bugojno Reported

LD2802133996 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 27 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Over 17,000 Croats used to live in Bugojno. Today there are only about 1,000 living under the local Muslim regime. Over the past few days, international arbiters and mediators, the office of Bosnia-Herzegovina Coordinator Carl Bildt, and Croats from Bugojno municipality themselves have been drawing attention to their fate and to the failure to observe an agreement providing for the return of Croats to Bugojno. International mediators have called on the Muslim authorities in Bugojno to observe the existing agreements.

There are problems in Bugojno that are not being tackled and this worries me, Schwarz-Schilling, mediator for the federation, told President Zubak. For the Croats of Bugojno the problems besetting refugees in peacetime are as serious as those of war. Over 15,000 Croats have still not gone back to Bugojno, a municipality where, according to the last census, about 47,000 people lived in an area of 366 square kilometers. In the free, multiparty elections in 1990, Croats scored a victory in Bugojno. This has prompted Robert Owen, an arbiter for federation issues, to determine that the head of the municipal council should be a Croat. But according to Dzevad Mlaco, the local Muslim leader, this position will never be occupied by a Croat. This is why the international emissaries warned the Muslims: If you do not do what the arbiter says, counties will be set up without you and you will get no reconstruction help. A letter to this effect was sent to Mlaco from Bildt's office: You have still not fulfilled your obligations arising from the Dayton agreement, you are yet to allow 200 Croat refugee families to return to Bugojno. About 15,000 Croats are waiting to return, but this will not happen unless the international community exerts more pressure on Muslims in Bugojno and Sarajevo. [passage omitted]

The 1,000 Croats left in Bugojno are living in poverty. Although only 40 km from the Croatian border, they are being mistreated and their property stolen and destroyed. What rights has a Croat in Bugojno? Is it possible to have peace in Mostar while at the same time the illegitimate regime in Bugojno is treating Croats like dirt? [passage omitted]

B-H: Bugojno Official Protests Media Reporting

AU2702215096 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 27 Feb 96

[Report by Kemal Balihodzic from Bugojno]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Studio announcer] Since Sunday, 25 February, following Christian Schwartz-Schilling's visit to Bugojno, mediator for the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the media have tried to show Bugojno as the scene of numerous problems that are not being solved. This prompted Bugojno Municipal Assembly Chairman Dzevad Mlaco to hold a news conference today. Our correspondent, Kemal Balihodzic, cites the written statement released at the press conference.

[Balihodzic] Lately, on several occassions, Radio Television Bosnia-Herzegovina has reported and repeated one-sided, inaccurate, and malicious news pertaining to Bugojno, which stresses the grave situation in the field of human rights, all with the goal of destabilizing the good organization of the municipal authorities and drawing attention away from real problems in municipalities that hinder progress precisely in the field of basic human rights and liberties.

This is not the first time that calculated and prepared pressure has been applied on Bugojno by those people who cannot justify before the public the situation in areas where the basic human rights of Bosniaks are either withheld or violated. They need Bugojno, or a similar town, as an excuse for this kind of behavior. This has prompted the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency's Commission for the Protection of Human Rights to visit Bugojno several times. During their last visit on 14 September 1995, the commission established that almost all complaints were unsubstantiated. These complaints are mostly signed by older people, for whom they are prepared beforehand. However, if we are committed to positive processes in society, and

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the strengthening of the state and legal systems, then we must observe the situation throughout the region and establish the situation [words indistinct]. In this sense, we can list several elements for Bugojno, most of which are already known, but are consciously avoided because the same cannot be claimed for a number of municipalities whose [words indistinct] precisely those people who are spreading untruths about Bugojno, and who wish to turn it into a problem [words indistinct].

Bugojno is an open town, that is, freedom of movement, personal safety, and the safety of property is equal for all citizens. The citizens' rights and obligations are regulated by the existing laws of the Republic and Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. There is room for discussing issues pertaining to the efficiency and dynamics of the strengthening of the state and legal system of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the case of Bugojno, but the same is true for other areas. However, freedom of movement, personal safety, and the safety of citizens' property are the foundation stones of basic human rights. Unfortunately, these foundation stones still have not been established in a number of municipalities whose official representatives are trying to bypass this by stressing Bugojno and implying that it has the problems [words indistinct].

The Bosniak people of Bugojno, which was and still is the majority people, respect and will continue to respect other people's rights, but will not relinquish their rights, states the statement by Bugojno Municipal Chairman Dzevad Mlaco, released at today's news conference in Bugojno.

B-H: IFOR Radio Station, Paper Not Registered

96BA0157B Sarajevo DNEVNI AVAZ in Serbo-Croatian 26 Jan 96 p 7

[Article by A. Redzepagic: "The IFOR Is Playing, but Lacks a Bosnia-Herzegovina Note"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As of the other day, Sarajevo can count yet another radio station, this one belonging to the IFOR [Implementation Force]. Nothing surprising because a large number of what are called independent radio and TV stations have sprung up in the capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina during the last four years.

Even this IFOR station can be said to be independent. Independent in the sense that no one consulted anyone about establishing this station! They did it independently, as they pleased, paying no attention to anyone. Perhaps they did not know to whom to apply, or perhaps they did not know that they needed to inform anyone, we do not know.

The Law Has Not Been Adapted

The current Law on the Media states that any individual or legal entity has the right to establish a public medium (radio, TV, newspaper, etc.), and foreigners may not be founders and publishers, but may participate with their capital up to 25 percent.

Nevertheless, the IFOR radio station is here, and it is not alone: "The IFOR also has its newspaper GLASNIK MIRA [PEACE HERALD], printed in the Bosnian language in the Latin and Cyrillic alphabets."

Our competent authorities are aware that the radio station exists, that the magazine is being published, but they certainly are not aware of the reasons why no one deemed it appropriate to register. They have not received any notification in the Office for Information and Registration of the Media, a component of the Ministry of Science, Culture, and Athletics:

"We have nothing, they did not even ask us. But, at the same time, the law, which is the old prewar law, has not been adapted to the situation in which we find ourselves," says Neska Kulenovic of the Office for Information, adding that work is now being done to draft a new law, which will spell out this situation.

Agreement on Cooperation

"The Office for Information did at one time receive an application from the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] for establishment of an ultrashortwave station. But that was not feasible from the legal standpoint, but also because of the limited capacity of the frequency system. They are required to apply to us to establish this radio station; we do not know why they did not do so. The Directorate for Allocation of Frequencies of the Ministry of Communications and Transportation has sent a protest to Dr. Muratovic, chairman of the State Committee for Relations With the IFOR, so that they will react to this case," says Arif Zulic, assistant minister for science, culture, and athletics.

By all appearances, it seems that this protest has borne fruit. From what we have learned in the State Committee for Relations With the IFOR, talks are under way between representatives of the Directorate for Frequencies and the IFOR. If everything goes according to plan, similar stations will be set up in Banja Luka, Mostar, Tuzla, and Zenica.

"The IFOR has the right to do this under the agreement on cooperation and also the agreement on its status in our country," we were informed by Amir Hadziomeragic, assistant chairman of the State Committee for Relations With the IFOR.

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The IFOR certainly has the right to do this, but only in cooperation with our competent institutions. Emin Skopljak, director of the Directorate for Frequencies, has announced the possibility of reaching a satisfactory agreement soon. But can it really be satisfactory when we had to remind them what they are supposed to do?

Regardless of how necessary the IFOR is for us and how well and effectively they do their job, we ought not to tolerate their arrogant behavior and neglect of certain basic principles which need to be adhered to.

B-H: Joint Police Patrols To Increase in Mostar

AU2802115896 Paris AFP in English
1144 GMT 28 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Feb 28 (AFP)—Moslem and Croat police forces will increase the number of joint patrols being carried out across the divided Bosnian city of Mostar from the end of the week, an EU police official said Wednesday [28 February].

Six joint patrols, comprising one Croat and one Moslem policeman from Mostar, accompanied by a team of police 'minders' from Zagreb, Sarajevo and the European Union, will cross the city daily from Friday [1 March] onwards, the official said.

Since Monday [26 February], two joint patrols have been circulating in Mostar, which was devastated by an 11 month Moslem-Croat war. The city has been under shaky European administration since the war ended in March 1994.

Four other patrols have been confined to a narrow, and largely de-populated central district.

The Bosnian and Croatian presidents agreed in Rome 10 days ago to the creation of a joint Moslem-Croat police force in Mostar.

The EU-appointed administrator Mostar, Hans Koschnick immediately for the force to be formed on March 1. [as received]

To date there has been no evidence that the date will be met.

An EU official said Wednesday that negotiations were still underway over how to create a joint force.

On Saturday [24 February], an off-duty Moslem policeman who ventured into the Croat-held west side of the city was attacked and beaten.

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Croatia: Tudjman Addresses HDZ Session

LD2602201596 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1915 GMT 24 Feb 96

[Introductory address by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, chairman of the Croatian Democratic Community — HDZ, opening discussion on the second agenda item: HDZ and the multiparty system in the homeland war and in the building of the state; at 25 February HDZ Main Committee session in Zagreb — recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Under point two, we only wish to deal with party issues: the HDZ and the multiparty system in the homeland war and in the building of the state — the HDZ yesterday, today, and tomorrow.

Ladies and gentlemen, dear party friends, you are the leadership of the Croatian Democratic Community, the community which, over the past six years, achieved successes so great that they are unparalleled by any other party in Croatian history. This is what we promised to the Croatian people in our party program; this is what we have fulfilled. And what is our duty now? To further develop our state through strengthening both democracy in Croatia and Croatian state sovereignty.

If we achieved such results within the framework of Croatian history, then we have to add something else. There is not a single democratic party in Europe — and as far as I know not even in the world — which has achieved such results, such electoral victories as the HDZ has done. However, we are faced with such stage-managed attacks both from within and from outside by confused and deranged opponents of Croatian freedom and sovereignty that it is astonishing.

We have created democracy, they can say whatever they like. They even dare say — I am talking about a telegram that has just arrived which says — that in the beginning was the HDZ and oxen on the spit, and now there is the HDZ and oxen under the yoke. Adversaries of Croatian freedom, of Croatian democracy, of Croatian independence have gone so far that they even dare imagine everything, including that they will be able to topple this democratically elected government. They will not because they have neither enough intelligence nor strength. [applause] They will not because we are here with the majority of the Croat people, we who knew what we wanted and who will know what needs to be done today and tomorrow.

Even when we spoke about the economic situation — we are in no crisis today, we are not in a crisis, let alone in a catastrophic situation. On the contrary, we successfully and admiringly left behind the disintegration of the Yugoslav system, the war, the transition from the communist system to the system of free market economy and private entrepreneurship.

Most prominent world economic experts wondered how we managed to do all that without any difficulty even in the war. How we managed to create our army, to create our diplomatic service—all this cost a lot. How did we manage to eradicate hyperinflation that we inherited and finance so many expenditures involved in building the new Croatia? These economic experts had only one reply—because you had the political leadership that knew what it wanted and which was able to do it with reliance on the majority of its people and on the majority which we had in the parliament.

The results which we have achieved are such that they give us a basis for saying. Only thanks to the HDZ leadership have we created everything that we have; without the HDZ leadership this would not have happened, and in this sense, ladies and gentlemen, dear party friends, it is only in this light that one should look at the joint effort — about which I shall speak — to destabilize, compromise, and topple the HDZ by all possible means.

What are the reasons and objectives of such an orchestrated, stage-managed campaign inside and outside Croatia? Why are there such astonishing denials of everything that we have achieved which the whole of the objective world is observing with admiration? All forces have rallied against the HDZ, from the extreme right to the extreme left parties. All means are being used to destabilize and topple, including the organization of strikes, starting with the small one in the Croatia Bus Company. But even then it was said that this was only the beginning and that it would spread to the railways and to everything else.

From this rostrum I would like to tell all Croatian workers, particularly the railway workers—do not make yourselves an instrument in the fight against the Croatian state, against Croatian freedom, and against Croatian democracy. Croatian workers. This is your state, this is your government. We did not achieve Croatian freedom and Croatian democracy by striking; by striking you can achieve neither a better salary, nor wealth, nor greater freedom, nor democracy in Croatia. Do not make yourselves an instrument in the hands of those who oppose everything that we have achieved, who are in favor of toppling this democratic government, of seeing the Croatian state again lose direction — something that we overcame with great difficulty.

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Do not forget, Croatian railway workers, you were paid when you were unable to drive trains on the Croatian rail network, when we had to liberate it first. [applause] There are old trade unionists and communists among you and even those who now listen to those who wish to topple this Croatian democracy, the Croatian Government.

We can achieve a better living standard and a better salary only with this government which was democratically elected, and solely through increased production and better work results, not through being taken in by the politicizing of those who have never reconciled themselves with the free and sovereign Croatia. For the purpose of destabilization they are not only calling on workers and setting conditions — nothing more than to increase salaries by 100 percent, or 93 percent — that is how much they are prepared to give in.

They do not want an agreement with their government, they wish to cause a crisis. They wish to cause a crisis in the economic system, in the political system. They want to change this Croatia that we have created through the maturity of the political nation [as heard], through our resolve and intelligence and war sacrifices.

This is what we will know to defend, with an awareness of the majority of the Croatian population, including the working class. Of course, we will increase living standards because the efforts, sweat, and pain of the Croatian people will never serve anyone else's interests. They will go toward the well-being of the Croatian people and the stability of the Croatian state.

In addition to such demagogic... [pauses] as for the disturbing economic situation, I think that this will be discussed in greater detail in the third part, so I will not dwell on it here. These opponents of the HDZ are using even transparent... [pauses] to the extent of demanding—bring back the sacred name, Dinamo [pre-independence name of the Zagreb soccer club renamed Croatia], bring back the sacred name, Dinamo, which the communists imposed on Croatian sport after they destroyed the tradition of Croatian sport, such names as Haski, Gradjanski [pre World War II Croatian sports clubs]. Today the name Dinamo can still be found only in Cuprija and Pancevo and in other socialist countries which are yet to cleanse themselves or where the communists are returning to power.

But the situation is such that many people, even many opposition parties or the majority of their members, are going along with this harangue against the HDZ, in most cases unconsciously but some quite consciously, without realizing what the consequences would be if they were to be successful in their efforts.

Where do we find the origins of this convergence, from the extreme right to the extreme left, of everything that is unnatural, abnormal, of the convergence unprecedented in world democracy — as one of the deputies rightly said, I cannot remember whether it was at the plenary session or elsewhere, from fascists to communists — against the HDZ? The roots are to be found in the vestiges on Croatian soil of the old Yugoslavia — I have given the figures, about 20 percent — who in the ideological remnants of communism, of self-management, find their roots in the support of international circles for everything that is against the HDZ, and not just support but also incitement, encouragement, and, shall I say, organization, of all those who were in favor of preserving Yugoslavia and who cannot reconcile themselves with the existence of an independent and sovereign Croatia because, for their special reasons, perhaps because of spheres of interests, etc., they would want if not the old compromised Yugoslavia, then the one with a cute name like Euroslavia, or a union of southeastern Europe, or a confederation of the Adriatic-Black Sea countries, etc. [sentence as heard] This is where we can find the roots, the origins, the continuation of everything that stood at the outset against the HDZ and against our path toward Croatian democracy, Croatian sovereignty.

In other words, this is lingering on within the international community, which has — but, please, let us be objective as well — this world has several reasons for that. It wanted the international order to be differently arranged in this part of southeastern Europe and the Balkans. This world is also based on the antifascist victory; this world has its charter — if you remember I quoted it earlier — this world only wants those whom it can move around like pawns on its chessboard. As it did yesterday, that world continues to fear Croatia's influence today as well because Croatia's example reflects the need to build a new world order on the basis of genuine recognition of a nation's right to self-determination, to its sovereignty. At the same time, we tried to explain to them that they had no reason to treat only Croatia in this way since Croatia serves as an example in Europe, in central Europe — and for many of them it is a negative example of how to gain independence or demands by other nations. [sentence as heard] But the whole of mankind is aspiring to integrate technologically but retain its national distinctions. Starting with about 50, the United Nations now has, how many, 180 member countries. In other words, a new international order is possible only if built on the foundations suggested by Croatia: sovereignty, freedom, democracy, and links between sovereign countries, especially in former Yugoslavia, in this unfortunate region of the Balkans — to which we do not belong but are on its fringes — of southeastern

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Europe, a region burdened by contradictions not just of a national but also of a cultural nature, which in the end caused the war we had here.

However, the problem does not only lie in foreign attitudes, in foreign encouragement, in foreign attempts to direct Croatia's fate. As I said, we must take into account our objective situation, the vestiges of the past. I was given the opportunity to talk to an unbiased, serious foreigner and he said to me: Well, how is it possible that you tolerate such phenomena as FERAL TRIBUNE [satirical magazine] of Split, etc. I said, yes, it is amazing. This is not something that happens often, but you must remember that after World War One we had in Split the Orjun units, units of the Yugoslav revolutionary youth who used to beat up Croats, who were worse than the proponents of greater Serbia; that in World War Two and the Independent State of Croatia [NDH] we had the Croatian Chetnik detachment. So you see, this is where the roots are, and this phenomenon has not vanished yet. And we also have to face aspirations toward regionalization, toward the disintegration of Croatia, etc.

So, you see, we are facing not just political dilettantism and immaturity but also the legacies which are not easy to overcome, either physically or spiritually, in a very short period of time. And, as you know, the democratic world, such as it is, lays great store by democracy, by genuine democracy, but only if it serves the interests of the great and of those who are only interested in their hegemony, in their rule of the world and their spheres of influence, and as such even welcome the use of guns to seize parliament or allow Council of Europe membership, etc, etc.

It is clear then why the world as it is accepts the existence in Croatia, as a paragon of democracy, of articles as appear in the tabloid press, accepts those who were ringleaders under the Yugoslav communist regime in Croatia; in other words, this world approves of people precisely from these strata, these 15-20 percent of the population that were linked to Yugo-unitarist and communist circles, and accepts them as people who speak the truth about Croatia.

And why — and we must provide an answer — why is the HDZ opposed by the opposition, by Croatian democratic parties, and by indignant individuals? An answer must be found. Is it because of historically inevitable envy, because we had no state of our own and, as a result, Croatian political awareness could not be developed normally in the sense of being aware of what it means to have or not to have a state of one's own, of what it means to be under the wing or the rule of Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade? Or is it because, owing to circumstances, the people, our people, even serious people, fail to grasp that we cannot blame others for the fact that throughout Croatian history — since the medieval kingdom — there was no Croatian state capable of survival? The fault is with us as well. This is what we must not allow to be forgotten today, what we must explain to the people if not to the individuals who act against us out of envy because they have failed to match our achievements, because they want to win over voters at any price, because many individuals are not aware of the consequences for the Croatian people were they, in cooperation with the international circles who find it hard to accept a sovereign Croatia, to be successful in their intentions.

And this is where we find the origins of a perseverance to rally everyone, as I said, from the extreme right to the extreme left, to topple, at any price, the democratically elected authorities which have already held three elections although they did not have to. And let us be realistic. Let us remind them: We are witnessing a permanent coming together of forces against the HDZ. And why do they think that they will succeed this time? Why, when even in 1990, when there was a coalition of all democratic parties with support from abroad to oppose the communist authorities, even then they failed. But, owing to our program, which suited the majority of the Croatian people, the HDZ succeeded in building our democratic Croatia as it is now. Why would they be successful today when they failed in the 1992 elections, when everyone hoped and did their utmost to ensure that the Croatian Social Liberal Party [HSLS] stopped the HDZ from winning? Why would they succeed today when they failed in 1993 when the same task was allotted to the Croatian Peasant Party [HSS]?

Since the beginning, since the very day the HDZ was set up, since before the first HDZ convention, there have been constant attempts to cause a rift in our ranks; talks and pressures both at home and abroad, even being summoned for talks abroad. In other words, they have not succeeded. Those who left the HDZ only helped to strengthen the HDZ as a whole. Accordingly, they will not succeed this time either because the HDZ reflects the historical and existential needs and interests of the Croatian people. If we were to remain so, we must, understandably, get rid of all that is negative. We must show that we are capable and consistent not just as a party but also in managing the state.

What is the point of the current demagogic accusations to the effect that the HDZ, everything that is under the HDZ, is tantamount to theft, to crime? As I said earlier today, this is the last act in a scenario designed to discredit, compromise, and destabilize the HDZ and Croatia, and, as I said, each of these accusations — that the

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HDZ is a party of sinister intentions, the Herzegovina lobby, a mistaken policy toward Bosnia, and now, the latest insinuations that the HDZ is made up of a bunch of crooks, each of these insinuations has had an impact on the uninformed population. Well, a psychological war is often no less important than a proper war. And we have Belgrade and other centers in Europe and the world lined up aganst us, centers that cannot reconcile themselves with the existence of an independent Croatia. All this was being nicely cooked up and prepared so that when the time came to recognize Croatia, not only sundry political correspondents and agitators but also individual political foreign representatives were directly engaged in efforts to organize things against the HDZ.

Why the accusations that I am surrounded by incompetent people, by bootlickers, and careerists, when it is clear to everyone that I was building the HDZ and the state, and that we were successful only because we had, in our ranks, people of ideals, people of importance, brave but sensible people. Those who were at the fringes of the HDZ and who did not fit this description, well, these are existential laws which apply in any society, at all times, in every nation, in every state. [sentence as heard] But these are marginal issues which cannot affect the essence, the wholeness of our movement, of our party, and of our deeds so far. Only with this kind of people — capable, and for the most part honest, honorable, respected — could we establish our authority, could we take over from the previous authorities. We could not settle accounts in the way we wanted in the conditions of war and aggression, but we took the bull by the horns and will make something out of it. And these authorities, the army — and there are states which for decades have been trying to build the kind of army we took only couple of years to build and which was capable of inflicting on our enemy the most serious defeat in its history — ensure that we are recognized, as [Defense Minister] Gojko [Susak] and [Foreign Minister] Mate [Granic] said, as a regional power to be reckoned with.

As for our diplomatic service, well, I can tell you because I have met diplomats from all over the world, that our diplomats are of the caliber which few states have and this, precisely because we adhered to our program, because we invited everyone who wanted Croatia to be free and democratic, who wanted a Croatian state, and on that basis we have achieved all this. But all that is negative, all the problems that we have been encountering, they are inevitable, even under normal circumstances, in any state, in any society let alone under the circumstances we were and still are experiencing: the disintegration of the Yugoslav communist system, war, aggression. And we created all that despite the world. In other words, we can be proud of what we have achieved but at the same time we must be aware of why we are encountering negative attitudes, attempts to deny all this; and we must know how to counter the challenges of the present-day world and remain at the head of Croatian society.

This stage-managed crisis in the city of Zagreb and the county of Zagreb was also used in this context, my dear friends. We have been told that we do not recognize results of democratic elections. They forget that the HDZ in Zagreb has also won a relative majority, actually a majority; a majority that is even twice the number of the largest opposition party's. In Zagreb they refuse cooperation with the HDZ, which is the majority party in Croatia, which created this Croatian state, this Croatian democracy, in which even nonsense can be spoken, in which even (?anarchists) are tolerated; they say they have won 60 percent of the vote. What does it mean — they speak on behalf of 60 percent of the electorate?

I spoke with a serious man some time ago. He asked me how it was possible in our country that parties of the Left and of the Right were uniting, what the reasons were. What does it mean?, he asked. There is no example like this anywhere else in the democratic world. What does it mean — 60 percent? It is the same as being told by a shopkeeper that he has 60 tonnes of goods in his shop. What sort of goods? Some is timber, bricks. Some is corn, flour or tailings. Some is straw. How can this be considered unity, what is it? Or, an even better comparison — as if a peasant told you he had 60 animals on his farm — now whether these are piglets, calves, chickens, or geese [laughter, applause] — every reasonable peasant and man will know that a couple of thoroughbred horses or thoroughbred cows is worth more than such a lot put together [applause].

We cannot allow that such diverse and unnatural associations bring into question the functioning of authorities in the capital — in the city of Zagreb—and that Zagreb be used as a springboard for the whole of Croatia to bring into question everything that we have achieved. As they used the strike in the Croatia Bus Company to go further to the post, railways, they would like to go further. But let this be said between us—the fact that they went further is also a result of our policy of weakness because we did not spot it immediately and did not react politically, or in the sense of a government action against those who, out of petty political reasons, not out of their desire to protect workers, set about organizing such things. We had reports that they were going, that this was only an initial step [passage as heard].

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We have to be aware of what stands behind all this and be on the political level. And likewise the state administration has to perform its task in the name of democracy and protection of the constitutional and legal order.

What sort of ideological and political bases do they use to unite? HSP [Croatian Party of Rights], HND [Croatian Independent Democrats], SDP [Social Democratic Party], HSLS [Croatian Social-Liberal Party], Paraga, Mesic, Racan, Budisa, Gotovac, and everything else that is called ASH [Action of Social Democrats of Croatia], HNS [Croatian National Party], HSS [Croatian Peasant Party], IDS [Istrian Democratic Congress], and so on. What are their bases? Why? They are only and uniquely against the HDZ, wishing to topple the HDZ.

Gentlemen, we have both political maturity and a functioning constitutional and legal order and we know what sort of purpose this serves and we will know to explain things to the Croatian people, to the Croatian population. Why is the central Croatian party — the Croatian People's Democratic Party — why is it exposed to such unscrupulous attacks both from the Right and from the Left? We will remain the central party, the people's party, the overall people's and Croatian party. Many of you most probably remember me saying this prior to the first elections in 1990. Then I even showed something on a map.

Who benefits from obviously demented political lunatics who say that HDZ means fascism and totalitarianism, that the situation in the present-day Croatia is reminiscent of the last days of NDH? Look at such statements and remember what principles are urged by those world players who are considered founders of the current international order.

Such people forget that it is only thanks to the fact that the Croatian people embraced the HDZ program that today we have a truly independent and democratic Croatian state — such free democracy in which some can voice any sort of nonsense and not be punished for it. However, at the same time one has to be careful that this democratic nature should not turn into anarchism, which would bring into question the only essence of Croatian freedom and Croatian democracy.

I am asking you whether the following only amounts to political dilettantism, bedazzled stupidity, or a well-prepared provocation — today a newspaper appeared in Zagreb called the Independent State of Croatia (NDH) with the leading article "NDH Finally in Croatia." Who benefits from it? For what purpose?

The astonishing aspect of such political activity is best illustrated not only by the aggressive glorification of Ante Pavelic [president of the Nazi-puppet state of NDH], publication of his photos and texts, and glorification of the HOP [Croatian Defense Movement] network in the homeland and abroad, but also by saying that certain members of the Croatian Party of Rights are agents of the ruling HDZ — can you imagine that? — then criticizing such Croatian communist-revolutionaries as August Cesarec and Andrija Hebrang, and calling them Yugo-freaks, and calling for the destruction of anti-fascist plaques and monuments. Is this not to the benefit of those who may be the organizers of all this, those who wish to destroy this independent democratic Croatia, to say that this is a state like the fascist NDH?

Is this not to the benefit of all those Cicaks and Goldsteins — I would not even know their names — who are saying that in this Croatia, in Tudjman's and HDZ's Croatia, fascistic ustashdom is flourishing, as they say, and that this is nothing else but NDH. These are the blows we are taking from the right — they are threatening us — we who said through our freedom, through our program, and the policy of reconciliation: Forget what used to be; all those who embrace the idea of a democratic independent Croatia are welcome; part of those whose return to the country we facilitated have put themselves in a political action which is directly discrediting Croatia before the world and is contrary to its normal democratic development.

Saying that members of the Party of Rights are agents of the ruling party — where? Let us recall that the Belgrade UDBA [former Yugoslav state security service] and also the Croatian UDBA had their agents in all the emigre, political, radical, and Ustasha circles.

Does the international community need anything more than such confirmations from the Croatian side? I am really calling on those who care for the Croatian state to think and give up such provocative stupidities.

We should never again allow Bleiburg to happen! Today we have enough experience, wisdom and strength! But we cannot allow these crazed lunatics from the right and those who are not much more clever from the left to dispute it.

The public knows a lot of past and present tendencies of the left parties and of the teeny-weeny parties and of the parties that have strayed against HDZ. Let us be clear about it. I am not one to condemn everything outright. On the contrary, since the first HDZ Congress, since the first basic principles to the constitutional speeches, I have been saying all along that the Croatian nation must draw lessons from its history. Croat freedom, Croat democracy, Croat state sovereignty must be built on all

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elements of Croatian history, accepting the positive and rejecting the negative.

From the right, we should accept what is positive, statehood-making, and reject sectarianism and stupidities. From the left, we should accept what in it was also Croatian and their social program. From the left, we should also accept its contribution to modern Croatia. Because if there was no Croatian antifascism, this Croatia would not have existed.

As I have said at the first Congress, NDH was not only a quisling formation but also an expression of the Croatian people's desire for their state. But the antifascist movement on the territory of Croatia, the partisan movement, was also an expression of Croatian people's desire to secure its state in different conditions. That left gets some credit for the fact that we have found ourselves, in that sense, on the side of the victors. We should also not forget to give it credit for the return of Istria, Rijeka, Zadar, and the islands to the Croatian motherland.

So, we have never been advocating nor in the future will we advocate ignoring the Croat left as an integral part of Croat history and their contribution from among their ranks, to the creation of the new Croatia.

But at the same time, we should not be deaf and blind to the attempts to organize once again from among this left something contrary to the Croat national state interests.

And you understand, there are some among the Croats left who are encouraged by the fact that in some former socialist countries reformed communists have returned to power, in the sense that something similar could happen here.

On that political basis, meetings have already been held and there are like minded people from Triglav to the Vardar and even further afield.

On the other hand, the international circles organize meetings of parties and representatives of constitutional courts and representatives of national banks and some ministers in charge of certain sectors. [sentence as heard]

And on immediate political.. [pauses] I will now say something concrete.

This is not so well known either to you or the public. I must admit that at the time I put out the proposal two months ago for this main committee to be convened I had already arrived at some conclusions about the phenomena we are confronted with. But only a few days ago I arrived at some concrete conclusions that I am going to tell you something about.

Three years ago we already had an international Croatian initiative, appearing at the instigation of world centers, from Europe to America and from America to Europe.

Around 30 Croatian intellectuals assembled, mainly well-meaning people and also some who knew what they wanted to achieve with this.

But when well-meaning, intelligent people saw what it was really about they withdrew. Nothing was left from this Croatian international initiative except — let me remind you of the appeal of some international and domestic intellectuals — the open letter to the president of Croatia to resign.

Today we are confronted with something far more serious. On the territory of Germany and Austria, even at that time, something called DEHOS had been organized — Democratic Croatian General Congress, with the subheading of Diaspora Union for Promotion of Democracy in Croatia. Organized since the very beginning of the creation of Croatia, only last year did it get in full swing and gave itself free reign. A presidium is at the head of DEHOS. Can you imagine?

That presidium is sending from Germany and Austria directions, instructions, and programs to the leaders of some opposition parties. It also organizes meetings with the blessings of some foreign parties and circles.

And so in January this year — and you see, I did not know that at the time when I agreed with friends from the Presidency to convene this main committee —they sent guidelines for direct political activity on three pages — well worked out. Then basic aims on six pages and, separately, principles on 14 pages. And all this under the title DEHOS Program of Free Social Democratic Alternative. An alternative, no doubt, to HDZ and Croatia.

This is happening as Croatia has become an international player, a regional power, a state that has good relations with a world superpower, which has played a role in Washington-Dayton agreements. It is appearing not only within the circles, which wage war from Europe against the role of America in the Dayton agreements over Croatia's back, but also within the context that my predecessor Granic and Sanader spoke about. It is appearing within that context, within those plans. I have also mentioned them — Euro-Slavia, Union of South-East Europe etc.

And in these directions, in those principles they propose nicely... [pauses] They propose to the leaders of these parties to form a small coalition of HND [Croatian Independent Democrats] ASH, [Action of Social Democrats], that is the one... [pauses] Tripalo's, what is

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it called — Degen's, SDU [Social Democratic Union] — Horvat's, Bebic's — Dalmatian Action. All this under the name of the Democratic Croatian Opposition Union, which is also called DEHOS-Croatia. But this small coalition — Mesic, Degen, Bebic, Horvat, Lorger should enter the big coalition with Tomcic's New Congress 95 — namely with HSS [Croatian Peasant's party], IDS, HNS [Croatian People's Party] — who else is there?

A coalition of democratic forces should be formed. To the parties of the small coalition it is recommended that all or some of them unite into one party. And the big coalition of democratic forces should form a joint Democratic coordination body into which would enter the representative of the Tomcic's New Congress 95, DEHOS from Croatia, and DEHOS from Germany. DEHOS from Germany is an organization of HSS diaspora abroad.

Work must continue in the future as well since, and I quote, the possibility of a coalition with both the HSLS and the SDP cannot be excluded. DEHOS as it is works on, and I quote, rallying people of democratic, liberal bourgeois, and social democratic inclinations for the benefit of Croatia as a democratic law-governed state of all its citizens. This DEHOS rallies, I quote again, eminent people such as Professor Ivo Benac, and his program was drafted — this means they are not just oriented towards Europe — and his program was drafted by a political scientist from Max-Planck Institute of Goettingen and DEHOS member, Dr Krizan, who gained his doctorate from Zagreb University and taught at Split University, etc.

The left-wing parties, I quote again, must not allow Tudjman room for campaigning on the grounds that the communists are on the attack and that the HDZ is there to save Croatia from neo-communism. Tudjman and his elite must be criticized as being neo-communists and fascist-Bolsheviks [faso-boljsevici], in other words, fascists and Bolsheviks at the same time.

Well, you did not know what you are, did you? In its program principles DEHOS says, I quote again: The role of the state as some kind of protector of a privileged, national identity is non-liberal. It is conducive to conflict and as such illegitimate. In political speeches terms such as nation, nationality, ethnic group, national minority, ethnic identity should be avoided, etc., etc. All this was quoted. Any changes in state borders must also be avoided. From this stems the insistence on preventing the disintegration of existing states and on accepting the newly emerged states, in other words, insistence not to accept them. Just listen to this. From this it follows that after the disintegration of Yugoslavia, Yugo-nostalgia, as a desire to recreate it, is not legitimate but it is legitimate to regret Yugoslavia's destruction by barbaric policies. Well, there you are. We have just learned that everything we have done since the very beginning has been a barbaric policy in the name of democracy, social democrats, liberal democrats, and God knows what else. They call on all kinds to rally to topple the barbaric policy as conducted by the HDZ in Croatia.

DEHOS proposes, as its fundamental principle, regionalization of Croatia and, I quote, the abolition of the provision under which the president of the state can hold the top office in his party and work in his party's interest. The current regional situation in the Balkans, and especially in the region of former Yugoslavia, requires the opposition to be involved in line with the above. But listen, this is not just a short-sighted, short-term thinking. The Dayton Agreement is of lasting importance, and I quote, in a couple of years it will yield far-reaching changes in the wider region which will have to fit in with the global policy. Provincialism and nationalist fanaticism stand no chance unless one wants to live like a leper in quarantine, practically isolated from the community of civilized and democratic societies. This is why the Croatian opposition or its more intelligent section is expected to set up an alternative movement that will be acceptable to partners in modern democracies of the developed world.

According to DEHOS, the role of some people has its time limit. These are the people who set all this in motion, who are needed during the initial stage of implementing the Dayton Agreement, for another two and a half years at the most. You see, this is how long you will have. After that, they will be removed either individually or en masse. To this end the opposition must start building an alternative if it is to secure victory for definite peace and democracy, happiness and prosperity of the suffering people.

There you have long-term and far-reaching plans that count with the establishment of this opposition alternative movement against HDZ. Those with financial difficulties are addressed by DEHOS in writing, in writing as gentlemen. It is even signed: We wish to say clearly that parties that have won 1.4 to 3 percent are not going to receive any money. But strong parties allied in a coalition have good chances. This refers to all, I was quoting all this. This only relates to parties that establish strong links; now it is the last moment either to jump on the train or remain on the sidelines called insignificance, written in capital letters.

In addition, while we are speaking about it, some people planned at meetings in Zagreb to travel abroad to obtain tens of millions of dollars for the development

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of democracy in Croatia. This DEHOS, which counts with European and world players and with engineering changes, is announcing a big conference to be held abroad with the participation of many interesting people, to promote liberal, social-democratic, and spiritual well-being, by which they wish — I am quoting — to ease nationalistic and statist madness and the ideas of Chetnik purity — end of the quote.

Why have I devoted so many words to DEHOS? Dear party friends, because I am aware of what people and obstacles we have been encountering from the very beginning, what the Croatian people have encountered throughout its entire modern history, and HDZ in particular. This should neither be underestimated nor overestimated. I have said that on our very territory there are 15 to 20 percent of those who would like us to disappear. They want the free and sovereign Croatia to disappear. And then in the light of the international circumstances, if we allowed such a situation to arise — that such a situation extends to the entire Croatia, a situation in which Croatian state policy is negotiated and established as they were negotiating on Zagreb mayor — then I ask you what would happen to Croatia.

This program, which has been drawn up by high academic circles, is an attempt to coordinate opposition politics in Croatia with certain tendencies in European and world politics — certain tendencies not only on the margins of such politics and on the margins of official circles. This is a transfer from other centers to Germany where we have half a million Croatian people. We as a party that is responsible for all good things that have been achieved, and of course for everything that is not good, but we as a party have to take care of the Croatian future — we know what is at stake, but the same should also be done by the Croatian state and its structures.

I am hopeful, I am even convinced, that there will be in all opposition parties a sufficient number of serious and reasonable people who will understand where this is leading, and that there will also be more people who will jump off such a train, not jump on it. Such a train that would take the independent Croatia on a journey along different railway lines to different lack of roads of Euro-Slavia and the Balkans.

I hope that such people as Mr. Degen — who felt the need to send me a separate letter in addition to the joint one, who allows himself to claim, in a statement, that I had not a single argument in support of my reply to the opposition — that such people will now realize that I had more than enough arguments and that the opposition, and our public, will realize that at stake here are issues of our fate, that we cannot and must not ignore Degen-like and similar letters, currying of favors and gossip.

Everything that has been achieved can be destroyed. We must see, we must do our utmost to ensure that our public, even those in the opposition ranks, realize that it is necessary for precisely the people, from the right and the left, who are shooting their poisonous arrows at the HDZ and the current Croatian authorities, that they not lose sight of the Croatian national and state interest, that they do not succumb to the influence of the people, who for various reasons, propagate alien ideas, consciously or unconsciously. This is not a new phenomenon. Allow me to remind you of the words and thoughts of the two brothers Radic and Ante Starcevic. In the period of crucial importance for Croatia after World War One, Stjepan Radic called on those Croatian politicians who were losing links with the majority of their compatriots at home, not to be like geese in the fog, following others. And Ante Radic wrote about the people who came from the ranks of bourgeois intelligentsia: These are goods of world renown, antiquities, know the world since time immemorial. We have not invented hallmarks which mark these fine goods. And Ante Starcevic said about our topical issues over 100 years ago: All those who are involved in politics must constantly bear in mind, and I quote, that without autonomy and independence a nation cannot be a nation, a person, but only a crowd, a multitude of people.

And further, it is only in independence that nations can flourish. In independence and autonomy — when it comes to the resolution of domestic and foreign issues, political parties can express different views. But, Ante Starcevic says, when it comes to the sovereignty of a nation, there is nobody else other than defenders and traitors of the nation. [applause].

In order to secure our independence, let us listen to Ante Starcevic, I am quoting: Let us tear apart the hell-sent net thrown onto us by our common enemy, let us forget injustices and insults which we inflicted on each other. Let us pardon our enemies and work toward preventing them from damaging us in the future. Let us reconcile ourselves and become brothers, and make a pledge — one for all and all for one. Let us take a vow at the grave of our martyrs, this grave being our entire homeland.

This is what Ante Starcevic said over 100 years ago. This probably had an impact on me when I was drawing up the HDZ program. [applause]

But, of course, it was the Radic brothers who introduced this national program into broad Croat classes, including the peasantry, and those Croatian leftists who, with leftist social ideas, wanted Croatia and who enabled us — with regained Istria and Rijeka, with Croatia

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in the anti-fascist democratic world — enabled us to achieve the present-day Croatia based on the ZAVNOH principles [sentence as heard]. HDZ built its entire program on such thoughts, we were able to achieve all our successes on the path of creating state independence through the realization of such thoughts.

I am convinced that we will have enough intelligence, strength, wisdom, resolve, and courage to secure the future of the free and independent Croatian state that we have created. [applause]

Croatia: Tudjman on Conclusions of HDZ Session

LD2702205096 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 25 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The adoption of conclusions, which were read out by Dr. Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia and chairman of the Croatian Democratic Union [HDZ], brought to a close the two-day first session of the main committee of the HDZ. Considering the importance of these conclusions for implementing Croatian state policies we are broadcasting them in full.

[Begin Tudjman recording] First, the HDZ was formed as and remains the central national all-Croatian party. The HDZ, as the leading force of the Croatian people, has successfully carried out, within the framework of the establishment of the sovereign Croatian state, the establishment of the whole state system including the legislative executive body, and special emphasis should be given to the development of the army and police forces and the diplomatic corps.

Among its kindred national parties of the political center in Europe and the world, the HDZ achieved at parliamentary elections the greatest electoral victory, and was admitted to membership of the Organization for European Cooperation and Development, and the HDZ youth to membership of the European and world Democratic Youth Union.

The main committee resolutely rejects all criticism and accusations both from the opposition and from certain international political circles accusing the HDZ of having what some see as pro-communist remnants and others as extreme nationalist, and even pro-fascist phenomena.

The continuation and strengthening of the HDZ as the central democratic, all-national party is not only in the interests of our party but is above all in the interests of the future of both the Croatian people and the further strengthening of the Croatian state as a sovereign and independent, democratic, law-governed, and welfare state.

It is necessary to firmly eradicate from party life all weaknesses, even if this means dismissals, to heighten the accountability of all members, leading members in particular, from the founding branches to the central top state bodies and individuals. Leadership positions should be filled by respected and capable people prepared to consistently carry out the program of the HDZ and state policies as a whole.

Second, with regard to the securing of national and state interests, the full agreement of all Croatian political components is essential. The HDZ invites the cooperation of all forces and individuals in Croatian political life who and which, on the bases of Croatian nation-building democratic policies, wish to contribute to the solution of all current social problems of internal development and the strengthening of the international position of Croatia; and in the interests of building a stable, prosperous, democratic Croatia, the HDZ calls on them to disclose to the Croatian and world public the attempts of all those who, under the guise of democracy, unite against the HDZ the most disparate opposition parties and forces, from the far left to the far right, in their efforts to compromise, destabilize, and bring down the democratic government led by the HDZ.

Third, with the liberation of Croatia's central region and the magnificent victories in the war in Croatia and Bosnia, the preconditions have been created for the permanent existence of the Croatian state. For the permanent commemoration of that historic victory, the main committee proposes that the government and HDZ representatives in the Croatian state assembly propose that 5 August, the day of the liberation of Knin, be proclaimed a day of thanksgiving for the homeland. [applause]

With its victories in war, Croatia has altered the strategic relations throughout the region, and with its policies has played a key role in making it possible, under the leadership of the United States and the European Union, to realize the Washington and Dayton agreements.

Fourth, in line with the coordination of national and state interests with international circumstances and interests, Croatia has accepted the international guarantees for the peaceful reintegration of the Croatian Danubian region into its constitutional and legal system. Reality has overturned all criticisms directed at the HDZ for accepting the normalization of Croatian-Serbian relations. The whole strategy of the international community showed the need for this normalization in order to bring about the end of the war and create the preconditions for a new international order. The HDZ firmly takes the view that the permanent normalization of relations can only be achieved on the basis of mutual recognition of

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the sovereign states and of cooperation based on mutual interests.

The HDZ will resolutely oppose all attempts to return Croatia to the framework of any kind of union — Euroslavia, a Balkan, Adriatic-Black Sea confederation, or union of southeast Europe. The complete unjustifiability, the delusions, and the mistaken conclusions in fiercely contesting this policy of the HDZ have been made clear. Only the state policy which we have implemented has ensured Croatian national interests and was fully in keeping with the realistic possibilities and interests of the international community. It is in the strategic, national, and state interests to consistently implement the Washington and Dayton agreements on the formation of the Croat-Bosniak Federation and the alliance of this federation with Croatia in economic, cultural, scientific, and all other areas. The HDZ advocates the inclusion of Croatia, as a Central European and Mediterranean country, in European economic and security integration.

Fifth, in new peacetime conditions, the fundamental task for the HDZ and the entire state structures is further building of Croatia as a law-governed, welfare and modern democratic state. The HDZ believes that top government bodies should ensure that laws and the entire legal system are coordinated with the constitution. In the same way conditions should be created for the Croatian legal system to be adjusted to the new peacetime social and economic conditions, and to be consistently implemented in reality. The HDZ, as a majority party, has to ensure that the legal system effectively eradicates all forms of crime and abuse, particularly those in direct or indirect connection with the state financial system and property.

Sixth, the HDZ must encourage the completion of establishing a modern and professional state administration, replacing all those in municipalities, cities, counties, and top government bodies who cause inefficiency, bureaucracy, and corruption. Particular responsibility rests with all supervisory bodies which — together with the entire judicial system — ought to resolutely persecute and eradicate all forms of crime, in order to ensure the rule of law, thus dispersing illusions about the tolerance of crime and crookedness.

Seventh, the HDZ resolutely supports the continuation of economic policy on the basis of private entrepreneurship and free market economy. Particular importance should be given to encouraging domestic production. The tax system should secure equal conditions and burden for all economic factors and citizens. The process of transformation and privatization ought to be resolutely continued by removing all obstacles and encouraging expatriates to join economic acttivities in Croatia.

Eighth, in peacetime conditions the HDZ, as a true people's party which according to its program has to resolve all social issues, should take particular care to improve the living standard of every Croat, particularly the worst affected classes. The HDZ policy is inclined toward a well-balanced development of the system of free market and welfare state with social justice. According to its program and composition, the HDZ ensures that the entire Croatian state administration should be in the service of all Croatian classes, particularly of the ordinary Croatian people, the working classes and peasantry.

The HDZ is calling on Croatian workers not to let themselves be dragged into political games against their own government, because improvement in living standards, better salaries, and better work conditions can only be secured through the strengthening of our national economy in the conditions of political and social stability and the responsible fulfillment of obligations toward the state, both by businesses and all citizens.

The HDZ suggests that the position of pensioners should be urgently improved, particularly those worst affected, through an increase in the minimum pension to 615 kuna in all funds. This represents a 30 percent increase of the minimum pension in the workers' fund, a 90 percent increase in the small businesses fund, and a 200 per cent increase in the farmers' fund. [applause]

In addition, in the course of the year the government has to secure an appropriate and realistically viable rise in all pensions. The HDZ urges permanent resolution of all problems of invalids and other victims of the homeland war.

Ninth, in the conditions of peace and economic development, the HDZ believes it is necessary to improve the financial position of science, education, and culture. The HDZ urges consistent implementation of spiritual renewal through school curricula, scientific, cultural, and media activities in order to develop patriotic awareness and pride.

In the overall state and social setup, the HDZ urges support for the measures of demographic renewal, the return to Croatia of as many expatriates as possible, and prevention of the exodus of the youth, especially highly-trained experts. In this context particular attention ought to be paid to the struggle against drugs and other widespread assaults on moral, family, and national values.

Tenth, the main committee is calling on all its members and all party bodies, from its basic branches — munic-

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ipal, city, and county branches — to top party bodies to take all measures necessary to ensure the resolution of all the mentioned and other current problems in their areas of competence and in Croatia as a whole. The HDZ has fulfilled its historic task in establishing the independent Croatia and its tasks in the homeland war. Trust given by the people and current conditions make it obligatory for the HDZ to remain a leading force also in peace, in order to secure economic and cultural development and to strengthen the international position of the independent and democratic Croatian state. [end recording]

Croatia: Serb Official on Negotiating Demilitarization

AU2802125696 Novi Sad DNEVNIK in Serbo-Croatian 24 Feb 96 p 5

[Interview with Milan Milanovic, "chief of the Serb delegation in the negotiations with Croatia," by Djordje Vukmirovic; place and date not given: "Demilitarization in Mid-May"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Vukmirovic] When will all the troops of the UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia [UNTAES] arrive in the Srem-Baranja region?

Army Will Arrive by 15 May

[Milanovic] According to General Klein's assessment, all 5,000 UN troops should be deployed by 15 May. We already know that the Russians and the Belgians will remain on the border with Croatia, while the Jordanians and the Pakistanis, with heavy armor and artillery, will be deployed deep inside our territory.

[Vukmirovic] That will be followed by demilitarization. How will that be carried out? What will happen to the Slavonia-Baranja Corps and its weaponry?

[Milanovic] The demilitarization model is yet to be negotiated. We favor the dual key model, that is, we want to stock away part of the weapons in warehouses the keys of which will be in our hands and in the hands of the United Nations. A part of the corps will be disarmed but the command will continue to function, as will the military police and engineering battalions, and units for liaison and rear security.

[Vukmirovic] The demilitarization will be supervised by 100 UN military observers, who are at the same time in charge of the supervision of the bridges on the Danube and the border crossings with the FRY. What is their authority?

[Milanovic] That has not been precisely defined yet either. Our command and the military component of the UNTAES are yet to agree on that. Our experience with the military observers that were here in 1992 and 1993 was good.

[Vukmirovic] The UN civilian police will also be stationed on the bridges and border crossings.

[Milanovic] Yes, but they will only observe the work of our police and customs officials. If they believe that anything is being done in violation of the Erdut agreement, they will inform Administrator Klein about it and then he will discuss it with our relevant authorities. We received firm guarantees from him that no problem will be dealt with rashly, and that everything will be discussed first and a satisfactory solution found.

We Believe in Klein's Impartiality

[Vukmirovic] Do you believe in Klein's impartiality? What we could notice so far is that he has been giving statements in Zagreb to which the Croats applauded. He even went as far as to say that his main task was to get to the Danube bank with Tudjman, while in Vukovar he did not even mention the word reintegration, and used very moderate words.

[Milanovic] I think that this is common, even permitted, in politics and diplomacy. What is more important to us is his firm stand that both sides have to abide by the Erdut agreement equally, and that the international community will exert equal pressure on both us and the Croats to make it so. Based on that and other things we heard during the talks with the UN administrator, we believe that they will be impartial. This impartiality guarantees the impartiality of the military component of the UNTAES, regardless of the fact that a significant part of the force will be comprised of troops from Islamic countries. By the way, we consider it very significant that our objection to a battalion from Argentina has been accepted, as it would most likely have had descendants from the Ustasha emigration, which would have caused serious problems from the start.

[Vukmirovic] Last week Klein asked you for a list of 150 policemen, who would, with an equal number of Croats, be trained in Vienna and Budapest to make up a joint police force. Have you given him that list? When would the joint training start?

[Milanovic] That was in fact a Croat proposal, and we rejected the idea. Talks on that have been put off for other, better, times. Our police remains on our territory, and its ethnic composition will reflect the current ethnic composition of the population.

[Vukmirovic] People are very interested in the insignia to be worn by the policemen.

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[Milanovic] Our proposal is to have our coat of arms on the caps, and the sign of our region and the UNTAES insignia on the sleeves. We should hear over the next few weeks whether the administrator accepts that. However, there most certainly will not be any Croatian insignia.

Room for All Refugees [passage omitted]

[Vukmirovic] Elections have been envisaged at the end of their mandate. How will they be organized?

[Milanovic] The UN mandate has only just started so it is very hard to talk about its end. Of one thing I am certain though: The working out of details of the peace agreement will inevitably lead to the discovery of truths that are, I believe, not known to General Klein and his associates. One of these is that 1 million Serbs lived in Croatia before the war, not only 400,000 as the official Croatian authorities would have it. These truths, I am convinced, will have a decisive influence not only on the way in which the elections will be organized but on our overall status, too.

Croatia: Unions Meeting To Consider General Strike

AU2802090896 Paris AFP in English 0844 GMT 28 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Feb 28 (AFP) — Croatia's main trade unions were to hold a meeting Wednesday to consider plans to launch a general strike in the public sector early next month, an official at the union said.

The main union collective, the SSSH, had originally planned to launch a general strike last week but postponed it at the last minute. No reason was given by the unions for the delay.

Rail traffic in Croatia has meanwhile almost ground to a halt following a strike by rail workers which entered its seventh day Tuesday, an official at the state rail company said.

Ninety percent of trains were cancelled Tuesday, an official said.

At the weekend, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman criticised any planned strikes as "not democratic."

The general strike, if it does go ahead, would be the first in Croatia's history.

Croatia: Trade Unions Prepare for General Strike

AU2802134796 Paris AFP in English 1328 GMT 28 Feb 96

[By Veronika Radovcic]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Feb 28 (AFP) — Croatia's main trade unions were set Wednesday to announce plans to launch a general strike here next month, as social unrest mounted six months after the end of the Croatian war.

Representatives from the Society of Independent Croatian Trades Unions (SSSH) met in central Zagreb to consider plans to launch an all-out stoppage in the 80 percent of Croatian industry that is state owned.

"We intend to announce an all-out strike and possibly demonstrations across Croatia to coincide with it," a senior official of the SSSH, Hasim Bajtari, told AFP before the meeting.

Strikes in former communist Croatia have been rare since Croatia gained independence in 1991.

Since the war that followed ended in August last year when some 200,000 rebel Serbs were ousted from the southern Krajina region, social discontent has mounted.

Croatian President Franjo Tudjman's rightwing ruling Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) party won legislative elections in October but scored worse than expected with 44 percent of the vote.

Sensitive to opposition, Tudjman told an HDZ party congress in Zagreb at the weekend, the strike "is the work of people wanting to overthrow the democratically elected Croatian authorities."

The unions, who are demanding an increase in the minimum wage from 1,045 kuna (195 dollars) to 1,110 kuna (205 dollars) and an increase in the tax threshold from 700 kuna (130 dollars) to 1,100 kuna and changes to the way public sector wages are settled, were seeking to "provoke a crisis" in Croatia, he added.

They were refusing to cooperate with "the authorities who guided the country out of communism," he said.

The unions' claims are "unrealistic" and "would wreck the state's budget," a government minister said this week.

But the unions said it is the reverse.

"We have to fight so that Croatian salaries give people enough to live on and stop talented young people going abroad," Bajtari told AFP.

"We are not destabilising Croatia. Our fight is real patriotism," he said.

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The government three years ago introduced a programme of drastic economic reforms and has been praised by international financiers for its control of inflation, currently running at around four percent.

Western analysts said last year that the economy was set to grow in 1996, for the first time since 1991. The kuna is stable against the German mark, and the government deficit has been kept down.

Unemployment, on official figures, stands steady at around 17 percent but the average salary in June 1994 was just 331 German marks a month.

The unions, for their part, point out that the government can expect to benefit this year from a "peace dividend" of returning tourist revenues and a cut in defence spending which which between 1991 and 1995 accounted for some 30 to 40 percent of spending.

"It is to be expected that the government will try to protect the budget, but the problem is that budget has been allowed to go over spending in lots of areas," said Bozo Kovacevic, a leader of the opposition Social Liberals (HSLS).

Talks between the unions and the labour ministry, which broke down last Wednesday, have not been reconvened.

And in the meantime, rail traffic in Croatia has almost ground to a halt following a strike by rail workers which entered its seventh day Wednesday, an official at the state rail company said.

Croatia: Commentary Views NATO, PFP Issues

AU2702133996 Zagreb HRVATSKI OBZOR in Serbo-Croatian 26 Feb 96 p 15

[Commentary by Jozo Curic: "Concrete Step Toward NATO"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The postcommunist European countries do not want to run away from the West, but they want to take it to safety [as published]," German commentators commented on Bill Clinton's visit to Helmut Kohl almost two years ago. Isolating Russia would mean strengthening local extremists, a particular threat to Europe, and increasing instability. The United States, when Germany held the EU presidency, tried to replace the uncertainty in the east and the lack of a real concept for the West to offer the central and eastern European countries with the announcement of rapid admission into NATO's transitional "Partnership for Peace [PFP]" program. A lasting peace, appearing as a result of European integration and NATO, was to involve all of Europe, the West was to be linked to the new democracies without spending too much money, and a new European peace order, which would not allow for surprises, was to be built. Those are some of the ideas that Secretary of State Christopher was pursuing in Warsaw in 1994 when he spoke about the PFP to the ministers of Slovenia, the Slovak Republic, Romania, Poland, Bulgaria, Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia], Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Albania.

We Are Interested in NATO, Too

"The security of central and eastern Europe is of vital interest to the United States," Christopher said. The Croatian minister had not been invited, as Croatia and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina had only been informed about certain NATO programs and they looked like dreams or unrealistic promises. President Tudjman said that Croatia knew what its place was in the whole process and the new world order, while Western politicians kept repeating that the priorities were communications for the whole of Europe on an east-west axis, creation of power supplies, traffic, and information communications and their expansion eastward and southward. Approaching the east, extending toward the east both of NATO and the market economy system, according to many writers, nevertheless has remained more like a sign of traditional Western non-interventionism, of which the PFP has started being considered one of the main parts. It does not oblige anyone to defend an endangered member militarily, but nevertheless it does help develop national security systems.

The arrival of IFOR [Implementation Force] in Bosnia, the conference in Turkey on assistance to the Federation, and announcements of the "Equip and Train" program, which is supposed to make forces similar to well equipped and trained Western troops out of the Federation Army, are some examples that, even among previously skeptical individuals, have started to arouse an intensified interest in the PFP, first in approaching NATO standards and then, eventually, to obtaining full membership. "We are not interested only in the PFP but also in NATO!," Minister Gojko Susak said at the Pentagon. Six scholarships at West Point, $200,000 in aid to the Croatian Army for education only, the awaiting of the lifting of the arms embargo—first on light defensive weapons (15 March 1996) and then on all arms (15 June 1996)—saving a third of the military budget by possible joint simulation programs for the training and education of officers and men (MORH [Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Croatia] and the ministry of ground forces of the United States [as published]), the particular attention that Croatia gives to the education of its officers—all these are a series of indicators of a concrete approach toward NATO standards. Croatia is important to NATO for both its position and its

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policy of being a factor of peace in southern Europe (in the Mediterranean and Bosnia) and the Pentagon's help to Zagreb is important to bridge the period that Croatia needs to join NATO. In addition, the Americans have announced assistance to Croatia after the lifting of the arms embargo and another advantage resulting from Susak's visit is intensified cooperation according to the Military and Defense Cooperation Agreement, which in June 1995 received an additional boost.

No Titoist Balancing

After the talks between Minister Susak and Perry, it is beyond doubt that the NATO Council session in May will be followed with great attention in Croatia, which has hitherto had no opportunity to participate in talks on joining the PFP at a high level.

Toward the end of January, the EU Council of Ministers in Brussels heard Austrian suggestions that the EU should expand into central and eastern Europe. Despite the claims of Germans and others that bringing Croatia closer to European integration and NATO would also provide an instrument with which to discipline Croatia, to achieve desired behavior from Zagreb, it is indisputable that there are great opportunities for Croatia at a time when the situation in Bosnia, Croatia, and Macedonia is the EU's priority foreign policy problem. Approaching NATO standards and the military and political evaluation of Croatia as a strong partner that is of interest to the EU, which bears (sometimes to its own detriment) responsibility and is part of the international community—all these represent wealth that Croatia owes to Tudjman's "compromising" with the world, which has not been very inclined toward an independent state on the Adriatic. Therefore the accusations that Croatia is trying to keep a Titoist balance between east and west and between different forces in Bosnia are illusory, as are the stupid accusations and imputations against Gojko Susak from the world, the opposition, and even from some individuals within the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community].

Anyone who wants Croatia reintegrated into Western economic and security organizations must demand national unity, security, and strength for a policy that enables him constantly to adjust to the circumstances in the world, even after the war — Tudjman does not do this to compromise, but because he is aware that the process of creating a new European order is not finished. Among his exchanges with the opposition, he says that Croatia has not yet been secured in the world of political and economic uncertainties from the east, in a Europe that is itself experiencing crises or at least temptations. Together with internal Croatian belittling of Tudjman's great step toward NATO, there is the socialist derision at Kohl hugging Yeltsin, and, in general, there is a mocking worm that undermines the nest of Croatian reconciliation that is equally annoyed by Susak, Perry, Tudjman, and the reformist Yeltsin.

Croatia: Tudjman Awards Diplomats at Nation's Anniversary

LD2702204896 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 27 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The contribution of the Croatian diplomatic service has been of crucial importance for the development of the democratic and independent state. Today Croatia is an irreplaceable player in the international politics.

This is how President Tudjman addressed 14 Croatian ambassadors as he handed them awards to mark the fifth anniversary of the Croatian state. [passage omitted]

[Begin Tudjman recording] Ladies and gentlemen, it gives me a special pleasure to be able, personally, to award you with these high decorations of the Republic of Croatia in recognition, by our homeland, of your contribution to the development of the democratic and sovereign Croatian state and the strengthening of its international position.

As people who occupied posts of great responsibility in the Croatian political and state life even before you went into diplomatic service, you know that Croatia used to be a country which could not be found on the international diplomatic map. Many world players did not want it. You made your contribution to the creation of democratic Croatia, successes in the development within the country, the development of the democratic order, war victories we scored over those who wanted at all costs to prevent the existence of the Croatian state. Today Croatia has not only found its place on the map of the world's sovereign states, but it is also an irreplaceable player in the international order in this part of the world.

On behalf of our homeland, I want once more to pay tribute to you personally. I congratulate you and wish you success that will be your own pleasure and the honor and pride of our homeland. [end recording] [passage omitted]

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Poland: Poll: Views of Poles, Russians on NATO Expansion

WS2702131896 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 26 Feb 96 p 5

[Article by "JSK": "NATO Enlargement in the Eyes of Poles and Russians; Yearnings and a Lack of Understanding"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *The Poles are nearly unanimous on joining NATO; as many as 80 percent would vote for it if a referendum were held on the topic. Russian citizens do not see Poland's joining the alliance as a threat to their country. Those are the basic findings of a January opinion poll carried out by the Public Opinion Research Center [CBOS] concurrently in Poland and Russia.*

At the request of CBOS, the All-Russian Opinion Poll Research Center [VCIOM] asked a representative sample group of adult citizens of the Russian Federation three questions. CBOS asked the same three questions in a poll it carried out in January. As many as 77 percent of Poles and 18 percent of Russians said that Poland's joining NATO does not pose a threat to Russia. By comparison, 9 percent of Poles and 18 percent of Russians claim the opposite. "No opinion" was the answer given by 14 percent of those polled in our country and 64 percent in Russia.

Political divisions do not have much impact on the opinions of Poles on the issue. This is not so with the Russians: Supporters of democratic groupings with whom Yeltsin, Gaydar, and Chernomyrdin are affiliated tend to claim that Poland's joining NATO is not targeted against Russian security. Supporters of nationalists, communists, and presidential candidates Zyuganov, Lebed, and Zhirinovskiy are more inclined to state that our membership in the alliance is dangerous for Russia. The opinions of those supporting Grigoriy Yavlinskiy and his parties are split.

As many as 76 percent of Russians said they have no fixed view on the outcome of our joining NATO. In this group, 16 percent said that Poland's membership in the alliance would cause more tension and uncertainty in Europe, as compared with the 8 percent who claim the opposite—that such a development of events would enhance peace and stability on the continent. In Poland, 66 percent of respondents answered likewise. Among them, 14 percent fear that tension might grow in Europe, and 20 percent do not have any opinion.

The third question in the CBOS poll was: "What would be the best policy of guaranteeing Poland's security?" In Poland, 72 percent of respondents claim that the best policy is to apply for NATO membership. In Russia, 8 percent of those polled answered likewise. Not entering any military alliance and remaining neutral is preferred by 12 percent of those polled in Poland and 20 percent in Russia. No opinion is held by 12 percent of Poles and 68 percent of Russians.

CBOS has been asking the question about the best foreign policy for Poland on a regular basis for four years now; therefore, there exists sufficient data to analyze the evolution of opinions on this issue. In May 1992 opinions were still divided—there were the same number of NATO supporters and those who advocated neutrality. In the next year, the balance clearly tipped in favor of the NATO option that is currently supported by three-fourths of those polled. Political sympathies are not insignificant. As far as 85 percent of respondents declaring to be supporters of the right are for joining NATO, 70 percent of those claiming to be leftist think likewise. In the latter group, twice as many think Poland should remain neutral.

If a referendum were held today on whether Poland should join NATO, 80 percent would be for, 7 percent would be against, and 13 percent would not voice an opinion. These figures change once it is implied that NATO membership could mean that the alliance's troops would be stationed on the territory of our country; support then drops to 49 percent, and the number of opponents soars to 23 percent. An even more dramatic change is observed when it is mentioned that nuclear arms may be deployed to Poland, in which case a mere 12 percent would vote for our joining the alliance, and a staggering 61 percent would oppose. The majority of CBOS respondents, albeit firmly supporting our membership in NATO, do not want nuclear arms to be deployed in Poland.

Does Poland's membership in NATO pose a threat to Russian security?

	Poles	Russians
	Percent	
Does not pose a threat	77	18
Poses a threat	9	18
No opinion	14	64

• • •

The CBOS poll was carried out between 1 and 16 January 1996 on a representative random sample group of 1,777 adult Poles. The VCIOM poll (commissioned by CBOS) was carried out between 12 and 31 January

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on a nationwide representative sample group of 2,426 Russians.

Poland: Commentary on Poll on NATO Enlargement

WS2702144196 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 26 Feb 96 p 5

[Commentary by "JSK": "A Word In"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The enlargement of NATO to the east threatens Moscow's security and incites fear and a sense of isolation among Russians, we keep hearing from Russian politicians and analysts. Statesmen in the West echo these claims. They all argue that the intention to accept Central European states, among them Poland, as NATO members will be met by fierce protests from Russian voters, cause resentment toward the West, and pave the way to the presidency for communists or nationalists.

If the results of the poll carried out by the Public Opinion Research Center [CBOS] accurately reflect the opinions of Russians, that conviction has to be profoundly revised. It turns out that the vast majority of Russians are not sure whether Poland's joining NATO poses a threat to their security. This holds true even for two-thirds of supporters of Zhirinovskiy and just as many of Gennadiy Zyuganov. Among those who hold a firm stance, opinions are divided.

This does not mean that the Russians will cast a favorable eye on our membership in a Western alliance. The issue will not be decisive for the outcome of the presidential elections because it is far on the bottom of the list of topics of interest for the average voter, who is far more concerned about the fate of his own country and its economy than an imaginary external threat.

Thus, the scare tactic of NATO enlargement, which is used by Moscow politicians, is effective abroad but not in Russia.

Poland: EU on Membership Negotiations With Government

WS2802121496 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 26 Feb 96 p 7

[Article by Jedrzej Bielecki: "The European Commission Warns: Further Protectionism Will Delay Membership"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *"If, after having postponed the privatization of the petrochemical industry, the Polish authorities approach Brussels with an announcement that they wish to continue to protect other sectors of the economy, launching negotiations on Poland's membership in the EU will become very problematic,"* *RZECZPOSPOLITA has been told by Pierre Mirel, who chaired talks with our government on behalf of the European Commission. "This should be treated as a warning," he added.*

Thus far, the Polish authorities applied to the EU with an appeal for prolonging the protection period of only one sector of the economy—the petrochemical industry. It is known, however, that the government is planning to restructure further sectors (among them the steel industry, coal mining, the arms industry, banking) and will most probably fail to complete these projects before the liberalization of trade with the EU scheduled for next year. According to Mirel, protecting these sectors would render negotiations on our joining the EU senseless. The chief topic of those negotiations is, apart from amending laws, a far-reaching liberalization of the exchange of goods and services.

Unacceptable Arguments

The European Commission reacted very negatively to the Polish proposal of further protecting the petrochemical industry. It refused to accept the government's explanation of this decision. The EU representatives were unpleasantly surprised to have been informed of such a major decision only after it had been made, without the consultations the EU "spirit" calls for. Mirel also claims that, from a purely economic point of view, the protection of the petrochemical industry is unwarranted, even though within the EU itself there is a surplus of production in this sector. "Had the privatization of this sector been carried out in 1992, like the Polish authorities once planned, today the companies would have the necessary means and experience to keep afloat on the market," he said.

Necessary Decisions

Among the decisions the Polish authorities have to make before entering negotiations on EU membership Mirel lists an acceleration of the privatization process. He claims that, over the past year, the pace of privatization was good, yet it is still impossible to make up for time lost in the time of Waldemar Pawlak's government. The social security system has to be reformed, certain branches of industry have to be restructured, and the development of rural areas has to be stepped up so that their only calling is not agricultural production. An infrastructure, a market of services, and fruit and vegetable processing have to be developed. New jobs not directly related to agriculture have to be created.

Information Campaign

Apart from the tasks specified above, it is perhaps even more important for the state authorities to launch an

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information campaign so as to convince Polish society about the purposefulness of joining the EU. Although public opinion polls consistently show that the majority of Poles are for our membership in the Brussels-based organization, we must keep in mind that similar feelings prevailed in France before the unemployment rate soared and social benefits had to be cut, reminds Mirel.

He claims a similar thing might happen in Poland unless people realize that certain processes—for example, the restructuring of the coal-mining industry—are inevitable regardless of whether or not we join the EU. This is best illustrated by the examples of Switzerland and Norway, which, despite having renounced EU membership, still have to adapt their economies to the requirements of a common market.

Integration Is All Right

Overall, the Eeuropean Commission representative is satisfied with Poland's integration policy. He claims that Brussels fully trusts the strategy of integration with the West as declared by Aleksander Kwasniewski and Dariusz Rosati. Brussels is also satisfied with the pace at which Polish laws are being amended to conform with EU standards, and, according to Mirel, we have done "more than half the work." The European Commission representative also claims that the most recent consultations with our government are making progress as compared with last year. He is particularly pleased with the compromise that was reached on admitting to our market those EU products that do not require any special certificates (and these are predominant) by the end of this year.

The enhancement of the consultations is especially important considering that real preparations for negotiations on our EU membership have been practically launched. Mirel says that, over the next few weeks, the European Commission will send detailed questionnaires on the advancement of the process of adapting Polish legal regulations to EU standards to all Polish ministries. These questionnaires are to serve as a basis for an opinion Brussels will have to issue on Poland's preparedness to become an EU member. That opinion is expected in mid-1997. A few months later, formal negotiations are to begin.

The negotiations between Poland and the European Commission did not produce a compromise on the abolition of the 3-percent border tax. Brussels wants this tax to be abolished as soon as possible, yet the Poles failed to give any specific date.

Poland: Rosati on Foreign Policy Issues

LD2802111096 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish 2145 GMT 27 Feb 96

[Studio interview with Polish Foreign Minister Dariusz Rosati by Jerzy Marek Nowakowski; from the "State Imperative" program—live or recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Nowakowski] Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. For about two weeks now, issues of foreign policy have been—perhaps even excessively—preoccupying the public. They have been preoccupying it at least since the visit to Warsaw by Mr. Holbrooke, U.S. assistant secretary of state. Then there was the extremely important meeting between the heads of the foreign services of Russia and the United States in Helsinki, and finally there was Prime Minister Cimoszewicz's policy statement, the policy statement where the prime minister said that foreign policy should be an area of national consensus—if I may use an ugly foreign term here—which is not subject to debate.

That is why I am very glad that today Foreign Minister Dariusz Rosati, who has not been in office long but has been the head of the foreign affairs department in two governments, accepted an invitation to take part in the "State Imperative" program. [passage omitted]

Minister, these meetings—there was the famous Evans and Novak article in the WASHINGTON POST, there were these rather cool, compared to earlier ones, statements by Chancellor Kohl, by other German politicians. Has a shadow been cast on our striving to NATO? Should we not be looking with concern at the fact that the West apparently is less enthusiastic about our aspirations?

[Rosati] I think there is no such risk. Of course, the so-called Oleksy affair has not really gained us support, or it was certainly not an event that gained us points as far as the Western countries are concerned. But certainly the issue of Poland's acceptance in NATO or, more generally, of expanding NATO is too serious for it to be influenced by what after all is an incidental issue, irrespective of how it is finally cleared up.

However, it is true that recently we could observe a change in comments, in part in press comments. I hope this is not going to be reflected in the views and positions of the politicians who represent the main Western countries. But I get the impression that this is part of a game, which amounts to the fact that the issue of NATO expansion, including our membership, has to be pursued in a rational manner, in a manner that will not cause additional conflicts or hamper political dialogue on a world scale. What I mean here is that the

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country most strongly opposed to our membership—that is, Russia—must in a sense be prepared for and convinced about this decision.

[Nowakowski] To convince Russia, well, some of them have been meeting the Polish side at a roundtable. They said, especially Professor Karaganov, that they were not really all that scared of this NATO thing but it—and this is half in jest—treads on the Russian psyche. Well, that is not a field for dialogue; that is like my saying, I don't know, that someone wears red socks and I don't like that, but if he says that they keep him warm, that's his problem.

[Rosati] That is why I believe that using the expression Russia's veto against our entry into NATO is very unfortunate. Russia has no such right and it does not even claim such a right. But there is the issue of some fears and doubts, which are voiced in Russia, concerning the change in Russia's strategic situation resulting from NATO's eastward expansion, and I believe that these fears and doubts have to be treated rationally; that is, they have to be taken seriously, and sensible dialogue should be entered into with Russia. In this dialogue, we have to be patient and persistent. Persistent because Russia for a long time is going to repeat that NATO expansion strikes against its interests, and because of that the process of convincing Russia or winning it over to the notion of at least maintaining a neutral attitude has to take some time. That is why we also have to be patient in this case. [passage omitted]

[Nowakowski] Minister, is it not the case that Messrs. Primakov and Christopher talk among other things about our issues without our involvement? Should this worry us, or not necessarily so?

[Rosati] You know, that was a special meeting. Primakov and Christopher met a few months before presidential elections in Russia and a few months, although here this is a slightly longer period, before presidential elections in the United States.

I believe the change in the rhetoric, in a sense, where Russian statements about NATO expansion are concerned, is connected with the fact that it is a part of the preelection game. The issue of NATO expansion is in a sense perceived in Russia traditionally—that is, it is a threat, it is treated as in a sense a threat to Russia's strategic security. A subject such as opposing NATO expansion is a very [illegible]ar election slogan. Consequently, here, too, I would not attach too much importance to intensification of the rhetoric, the intensification that has been picked up equally by the Polish press and by the international press. It does not mean a significant change in Russia's policy; I believe it is a shift in emphasis resulting from this subject getting more widely debated for domestic, preelection purposes.

As far as certain strategic principles are concerned, well, I believe the Russian diplomacy is an experienced diplomacy. It is also a diplomacy that takes into consideration various options and scenarios. And I am convinced that, in Russia, in spite of the hard language of statements by Primakov and other official representatives of the Russian state, there is also an awareness of the fact that NATO sooner or later will be expanded and that some option for Russia's actions for this purpose or in the event of this scenario materializing has to be prepared.

[Nowakowski] Is it not by any chance that more controversial in Polish-Russian relations than NATO expansion is the issue of our relations with, our attitude toward Ukraine? During his first trip, President Kwasniewski also met President Kuchma in Paris. In Prime Minister Cimoszewicz's policy statement, Ukraine was put on a par with Russia. Is this also a priority direction for Polish policy, and what in this situation are we to do with Russia and NATO?

[Rosati] I do not believe Russia would treat this as a threat to its strategic security interests, which is what it is saying in the case of NATO expansion. Our relations with Ukraine are of tremendous importance. We treat the existence of an independent Ukraine simply as a fundamental condition of our security and European balance. But this is not in any way contrary to the Russian interests in this respect.

There is the following issue, that NATO expansion is perceived by the majority of public opinion in Russia as a traditional direction of anti-Russian expansion...

[Nowakowski, interrupting] Pushing them back against the wall.

[Rosati] Pushing them back against the wall, in a sense. This, as I said, is being used for domestic purposes so that after the elections they can return to discussions with foreign partners but more in the context—this is what I think and this is what I envisage—in the context of searching for a sensible compromise. You should note that the concept of a sensible compromise has recently appeared in Primakov's statements. This shows that the Russians do not want to close off every avenue and that this hardening of position is, to my mind, in a sense transitory, as I said.

[Nowakowski] But first of all we have to convince not only Russia but mainly our partners in the West. Perhaps before we move over to this subject we could listen together to what NATO Secretary General Javier Solana said in a special interview for our program.

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[Begin recording] [Unidentified correspondent] Do you believe an expansion of NATO is necessary, and what are the arguments in support of this?

[Solana, in English fading to Polish translation] I think an expansion of NATO will contribute toward increasing security in Europe. I also believe the structure of European security should be fashioned by all states of our continent.

In the past, for a variety of historical reasons, many European countries could not belong to European institutions. Now the situation has changed, and I believe the time has come for these states to become members of Europe's main institutions. One of these is NATO and another is the EU.

[Correspondent] Is it possible to combine an expansion of NATO with peaceful and friendly relations with Russia?

[Solana] That is precisely what we are trying for. It is possible and even, we believe, beneficial for everybody. Also for security in Europe because we want to expand NATO, at the same time reforming the pact, so that it can cope with the new challenges and maintain the best possible relations with Russia. Russia is a very important state for Europe's security. That is why the better the relations between NATO and Russia, the better it will be for everyone.

[Correspondent] What is the greatest impediment to Poland's joining NATO? Is the investigation of the allegations against Jozef Oleksy among these impediments?

[Solana] I do not think any political impediments could apply to a state that observes the same values as other states belonging to the alliance. Consequently, this should not be a problem to a state that remains democratic and preserves the principles of market economy and solidarity with other states. As long as these principles and values are observed, there will be no problems with joining European institutions. [end recording]

[Nowakowski] Minister, this sounds very optimistic, but there is one thing here that worries me, as it does in many statements from the West. This refers to European institutions. There sometimes appears a kind of union: the EU and NATO at the same time. Well, we have to work very hard to meet the EU standards.

[Rosati] Well, you know, I do not believe that there is really no need to treat these objectives as interchangeable or in a sense as competitive—that is, progress in one sector meaning a slowing down in the other sector. These are completely mutually independent strategic directions of foreign policy that can be very well implemented simultaneously. It does not mean there is a need to make a choice here.

You are right in saying that, for the EU, we have to measure up to very demanding economic criteria, which could be costly, of course, and for this we need time. In the case of NATO, however, perhaps the situation is simpler from the point of view of the costs, but from the political point of view, unlike with membership in the EU, there are far more doubts, connected precisely with Russia's position.

[Nowakowski] But is it only Russia's position? We have had various critical statements from the West here. Frankly, I get the impression that many Western states are using a convenient alibi in the form of the Russian opposition, Russian reluctance, in order not to take upon themselves the burden of a highly important political decision.

[Rosati] Well, you know, I would not like it to be so. I would like to say that the decision about NATO expansion has in principle been made. A study of NATO expansion has been adopted by the council of the NATO states. This is equivalent to deciding that NATO will expand eastward.

Of course, there remains the issue of the timetable of accession. That is a complex issue. As Secretary General Solana said, this has to be a process that will not aggravate relations with other countries—that is, Russia—but would rather contribute toward stabilizing security on our continent.

I think that, among other things, it is Poland's responsibility to suggest such a formula for NATO expansion as would at the same time dispel the Russian's fears and create conditions for increasing cooperation between NATO and Russia.

[Nowakowski] I often ask myself: Should we not tell the Russians that we are not in favor of the process of NATO expansion stopping at Poland, that in the future the area of stability or security will also reach Russia? That is, a completely new security system will be created, parallel or coincident with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which Russia appreciates so much.

[Rosati] You are absolutely right. This, according to us, is what the process of a gradual evolution of the system of security consists of. It runs from the traditional NATO on the one hand and the Warsaw Treaty on the other—that is, a system based on a balance of power between two seriously rival treaties; then we had the collapse of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO expansion into the territory of the former GDR; the next element was the inauguration of the Partnership for

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Peace program, which is now being enriched through joint military operations in Russia—I must say it is a great success that Russia and NATO have agreed to take part in joint military operations; the next stage, we hope, will perhaps be the membership of Poland and perhaps other countries.

As you rightly said, this process has to be continued in the sense that NATO expansion cannot bring about the creation of a border between military blocs on our eastern border instead of on our western border. That would not be something that would satisfy us. We want at the same time the striving for the NATO expansion process, to put it briefly, to be accompanied by a process of much more extensive cooperation in the military field and in the political field between the expanded NATO and, on the other hand, Russia.

It is, in fact, a question of Russia seeing that it is not outside this process, that it is not in a sense being marginalized because that would be very disadvantageous. Both Russian ambitions and Russian aspirations should play a significant role, and Russia is certainly predestined for such a role.

[Nowakowski] At least for military and territorial reasons. But luckily Russia and NATO are not the entirety of our foreign policy. Foreign policy was an important component of Prime Minister Cimoszewicz's policy statement. Perhaps we could go on to more general issues. [passage omitted]

[Nowakowski] Minister, Prime Minister Cimoszewicz had announced that there would be surprises in his policy statement, but in that part of it there were no surprises.

[Rosati] Just as well.

[Nowakowski] Just as well. But you are frequently asked whether there is a reorientation, a change in the priorities in Polish foreign policy, or do these remain as they have been for the past five years?

[Rosati] I would like to say that Polish foreign policy has remained unchanged for these few years, for five years, since 1989, since the time when it was decided that the chief strategic directive was Poland's membership in European structures, in the EU and NATO. This fundamental directive remains unchanged.

Of course, the gradual change of conditions, the passage of time, the gradual formation of a new system in our environment forces upon us a change in the policy instruments, it forces a change in the methods. But all this takes place within the strategic flow, which, as I said, is the European orientation.

[Nowakowski] But, apart from the West, we also have the closer partners. At one time there was the Visegrad Triangle, then the Visegrad Group. Now we tend to speak more of the Central European Free Trade Association, of CEFTA. Will this direction continue to be as important in the practice of the ministry, and what other elements in regional cooperation are going to be the important elements in our foreign policy in the immediate future?

[Rosati] Side by side with the strategic European orientation and good relations with the neighbors, Poland's regional-scale activity is one of our priority tasks. You mentioned CEFTA, the members of which are Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and, since recently, Slovenia. It is a very important instrument for establishing and expanding economic cooperation.

But that is not the only Central European or regional initiative. There is also the Central European Initiative, which also includes slightly more remote countries, such as Austria and Italy. Finally, there is the Council of the Baltic States. That is a comparatively recent initiative, which is very promising as far as cooperation in the fields of environmental protection, transport, and so on are concerned.

[Nowakowski] That's right. You, Minister, are seen as a little like one of your predecessors, like Andrzej Olechowski, as a man who is to integrate economic issues and strictly political issues in foreign policy. So how is this flavor, this burden of economics to be combined?

[Rosati] You know, of course, economic issues are extremely close to me because of my previous professional duties and, in fact, the whole of my professional life. But I believe they also have a growing significance in foreign policy. In fact, I believe that foreign policy is an emanation of economic interests. In situations where a direct threat of war or armed or Cold War conflict disappears, I believe economic interests come to the fore and should be reflected in foreign policy. That is why I regard harmonizing these economic interests with the main goals of our foreign policy as my duty.

[Nowakowski] So economic interests mean Poland as, let's say, a transit country. Transit in the sense...

[Rosati, interrupting] In what sense?

[Nowakowski] In the sense of a conduit between Russia, Belarus, and the West. We are a country of much road transit. Anyone who gets behind the wheel can feel it in the tire tracks...

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[Rosati, interrupting] Well, in a sense Germany is also a transit country, probably a bigger one than we are, but you are right.

[Nowakowski] Yes, but Germany has greater specific gravity; the transit from Germany also comes to our country to a lesser extent.

But we are a transit country because the Yamal-Western Europe gas pipeline is to pass through our territory.

[Rosati] That is true.

[Nowakowski] That is great business, but business about which it is said it could carry some risks of making Poland dependent.

[Rosati] You know, the issue of Poland's energy security to an extent assumes the ability to procure other than Russian energy and other sources.

But there are two points here. First, the Russian sources are indisputably the cheapest, there is an infrastructure, and, in effect, this decides that from the economic point of view this indeed is the bet source of supply. Second, if our plan succeeds, and this assumes increasingly better relations with Russia and that the issues of security are resolved in discussions with Russia in accordance without thinking, and Russia getting gradually involved in the process of European cooperation, in the construction of the new architecture of European cooperation, then I also think that the fears you have mentioned, justified fears because in fact every country should also be prepared for the worst scenarios, I think their importance will gradually decrease. I think there will not be a situation where we would suddenly have to fear a radical change in the political situation that would have to force us into a desperate search for energy carriers elsewhere.

[Nowakowski] Apart from Russia, we also have a partner like Belarus. A strange partner. What should we do so that on the one hand we warm up our relations with Belarus? On the other hand, I think it is in Poland's interests for Belarus to remain a sovereign country, at least for some historical reasons, our close relations with the Belarusians.

[Rosati] Very much so. An independent Belarus is certainly in the national Polish interests. You are also right in saying that our relations with Belarus are very much underdeveloped [as heard]. It is difficult for me right now to establish what the reasons are for this state of affairs, but indeed it is an adjoining country, a neighbor, in fact an important country, but political dialogue still remains at a very low level.

I would like to tell you that it is my intention to have meetings in the immediate future not only with foreign affairs ministers of EU and NATO states but also with all of the ministers of Poland's neighbor states. We are also working on such a meeting with Belarus. We want to raise these relations to a significantly higher level.

Perhaps we could also bring about a meeting between the presidents. In any case, there is much to be done in this sector.

[Nowakowski] Minister, in that case I would like to invite you, accompanied by Minister Senko, who speaks excellent Polish, for an interview, in fact for a continuation of this interview, which has related mainly to issues of security and Russian issues.

Thank you very much, Minister, for being our guest on the "State Imperative" program...

[Rosati, interrupting] No, thank you.

[Nowakowski] And on my own behalf, and I think on behalf of the viewers, I would like to ask you to appear in this green armchair more often because issues of foreign policy—and I hope here I am not distorting either the prime minister's or your own ideas—are some of the key problems of present-day Poland.

[Rosati] Thank you very much. I shall gladly speak with you again.

[Nowakowski] Thank you very much. Thank you Minister, and thank you, ladies and gentlemen, for your attention. Good night.

Poland: UOP Official Debarred; UOP Situation Evaluated

WS2802120596 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 28 Feb 96 pp 1, 16

[Article by Anna Marszalek: "Will the Fear of Purges and Structural Changes Paralyze UOP? Suspension of the Head of the UOP Branch in Rzeszow"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] *Michal Strek, head of the Rzeszow branch of the Office of State Protection [UOP], was suspended from his duties last week. Because he was appointed to this post when Solidarity was in power and the UOP branch he is in charge of is said to be one of the best in the country, this decision is seen as the beginning of political purges. The official reason for this decision was the accusation of revealing a state secret in...1991.*

"Not unlike the entire country, UOP has been clearly polarized, split into two camps. Simplifying the matter, we can say that one camp supports the governing left wing, whereas the other consists of supporters of Solidarity and post-Solidarity groups," believe opposition members of the Political Advisory Committee of the Internal Affairs Ministry [MSW]. "Consequently,

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when Kwasniewski won the presidential elections, the so-called old functionaries in UOP—old functionaries meaning people with a Security Service past who have now revealed their pro-Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] views—became more active than they were before." "The division into the 'old' and the 'new' people, which was suppressed over the past few years, has now appeared very clearly," say opposition politicians linked to the ministry. "In some UOP branches, one can hardly speak about normal work. There is mutual distrust, there are confidential reports. The same goes for the head office."

SLD deputies are saying openly that in some voivodships UOP functionaries or even heads of local branches come to them and say that they are prepared to cooperate. Very often they produce "proof" in the form of information on actions UOP has taken against various people linked to the SLD; sometimes that information is presented as a typical UOP report. SLD deputies also told us that similar delegations even come to the Sejm—for example, three officers of the Gdansk branch of UOP.

According to our interlocutors in Rzeszow, a similar mechanism worked in the case of the head of that branch. Michal Strek was negatively evaluated by the "old" functionaries; he became even less popular with them when he dismissed those whom he believed were not fit to work in UOP. As a result, UOP received materials meant to discredit him. UOP head Gromoslaw Czempinski, who has been particularly sensitive to any leaks recently, took immediate action: He suspended Strek from his duties. [passage omitted]

According to opposition members of the Political Advisory Committee, the way in which the current MSW leadership is treating the special services (including the intention of dismissing the UOP head) is a result of lack of confidence not only in Czempinski, but also in heads of directorates and branch offices, which means that they will want to replace them with "their own" people. [passage omitted]

Poland: Communications Minister Discusses GSM Bidding

WS2702144096 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 23 Feb 96 pp 1, 8

[Interview with Polish Communications Minister Andrzej Zielinski by Bogdan Markiewicz; place and date not given: "'Cells' Have Been Distributed"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Markiewicz] Could you tell us when Poles will be able to go into a shop of one of the operators who will receive licenses to build a telephone network in the Global Standard for Mobile Communications [GSM] system and purchase a cellular telephone?

[Zielinski] I believe that we can expect such a decision in the middle of this year. Thus, you should wait a little longer, save some money, and soon you will be able to get yourself a GSM phone.

[Markiewicz] While assessing the offers presented by bidders, did the ministry take a closer look at the issue involving the two American companies—Air Touch International and US West? The cellular phone branches of these two companies are going to merge in the United States.

[Zielinski] We did not deal with such disputes. Such issues were handled by the GSM team, which examined these aspects of the bidding, as well. It was stated in the protocols on the team's work that, among other things, this aspect was of no significance to us. Incidentally, capital links are commonplace all over the world. If we had wanted to select a company without any capital links whatsoever, our bidding would not have been possible. What mattered to us was to see to it that such mergers would not take place on the Polish market. RZECZPOSPOLITA presented the possibility of the two companies merging on the American market as a signal proving that there was a threat to the Polish market. The daily failed to mention, however, that a possible privileged position of one cellular phone company posed a threat to the Polish market. These two companies have been independent for a very long time. They have common goals to achieve in the United States, and we do not need to know what this specifically involves. Nonetheless, on the Polish market they are acting independently, as a result of which we are not expecting any surprises. Moreover, they do not hold a majority of the shares in the consortia, and I am hoping that in line with the intention of the law and with the actual distribution of capital, Polish partners will decide what will occur in the Polish market. After all, the Communications Law says specifically that 51 percent of the shares in the GSM consortia should belong to Polish companies.

[Markiewicz] The fee for both licenses, $670 million—is this a lot or a little?

[Zielinski] If we carefully multiplied all of the indexes, this sum might increase slightly. I believe that this is a large amount of money.

[Markiewicz] Was it possible to get more?

[Zielinski] Perhaps it was. For example, if more companies had put in their bids—that is, if the competition had been greater—the fee might have been higher. It is worth noting that actions taken by competitors on

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the Polish market—I am now talking about Ameritech's press ads, which began appearing in the Polish press in mid-December of last year—were meant to be seen as a warning for potential competitors of the American company. As I see it, such activities pursued on the Polish market by a company that wants to cooperate with the Polish Government and whose purpose was to intimidate those who were willing to put in their bids, showed the company's disloyalty to the State Treasury.

[Markiewicz] Whether we wanted it or not, we brought up the subject of Centertel shareholders and the dispute that is going on between them and the Polish Government. Did the fact that the ads appeared in the press discourage other consortia from applying for a GSM license in Poland?

[Zielinski] I do not know whether these ads caused some consortia to withdraw from the bidding. I have no proof to confirm this. If we count the companies that took part in the bidding indirectly, we will find that there were as many as 20 of them. [passage omitted]

[Markiewicz] As the bidding was still under way, some media predicted several possible results, caused by, among other things, the situation that had developed around Centertel shareholders and the ongoing dispute. According to one possible result, two companies would obtain licenses, whereas Ameritech and France Telecom would be offered participation in another system—DCS 1800. Can we still talk about such a possibility?

[Zielinski] Of course we can. On the condition, however, that bids will be invited. We agree to such a solution, but everything must be done in line with Polish law, which says that bids should be invited from companies interested in this system as well. Thus, we hope that there will be interest in it, and this is the course of events we are expecting.

[Markiewicz] There is talk that the ministry is exerting pressure on the Polish Telecommunications SA [TP SA] to agree that Centertel be allowed to put in its bid to obtain a DCS 1800 license.

[Zielinski] At this moment, it would be better for me if I were not the theoretical proprietor of TP SA. In such case, I would be able to state honestly that this is a decision that must be made by TP SA. Personally, I believe that such a decision ought to be made, but I do not intend to force it. [passage omitted]

[Markiewicz] Some newspapers are pointing out that future talks between the two victorious consortia and TP SA on settlement principles will be extremely difficult.

[Zielinski] They may be difficult indeed. Such negotiations involve difficulties. These will not be talks about flowers; they will be about money, division of profits, and no wonder they may be difficult.

[Markiewicz] However, attempts are being made to draw parallels between the situation of these operators and the situation of private stationary telecommunications operators...

[Zielinski] There is an appropriate provision in the Communications Law; in cases where such negotiations prove to be inconclusive, the decision is to be made by the communications minister. [passage omitted]

Poland: Ministry May Grant 3d GSM License in Future

WS2702154696 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 27 Feb 96 p 16

[Article by Pawel Rozynski: "Cellular Phones; the Scene After the Battle"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] *In a few months, bids are to be invited for the construction of a telephone network operating in the Digital Cordless System [DCS], which is a new type of cellular phone. The Communications Ministry does not rule out that in the future it will grant a license for the construction of a third network operating in the Global Standard for Mobile Communications [GSM] system, which is the most popular at the moment.*

Yesterday Communications Minister Andrzej Zielinski handed GSM licenses to the two winners of the bidding: Polkomtel (consisting of, among others, the Plock Petrochemical Plant and the Polish CopperPlant) and the Polish Cellular Telephones (one of the members of this consortium is Elektrim). Both companies have already made a payment of $130 million to the budget, and, over the next five years, their payments will amount to $670 million. In return, the GSM consortia have received the same number of 900-mhz channels. They also declared that over five years they would connect to the network 1.3 million people. This number may even be doubled. However, we should not go into ecstasies: In Great Britain there are already 4 million GSM telephone owners. Digital cellular telephones are very popular all over the world thanks to the higher quality of the connections and the better protection from being overheard, among other things.

Ameritech: Invalidate!

Representatives of Ameritech announced yesterday that they would ask the Chief Administrative Court to invalidate the GSM bidding. Earlier, Ameritech and France Telecom (Western shareholders in the cellular monopolist Centertel) instituted legal proceedings in a foreign arbitration court; they demanded a GSM

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license without putting in their bids. They claim that the communications minister promised them a license in 1991. The ministry argues that the letter of intent was not a contract and is therefore not binding.

According to Ameritech, by granting the two licenses, the communications minister violated provisions of the administrative proceedings code, in line with which bidding cannot be conclusive if the issue is in a court of law. "The bidding involved commercial, not administrative, proceedings," officials of the Communications Ministry reply.

The dispute with Ameritech and France Telecom was detrimental to the bidding, as a result of which only two consortia decided to put in their bids. In the neighboring Czech Republic, the bidding to obtain one GSM license is to end by the end of March; the purpose of the bidding is to find a minority partner for the Ceske Radiocomunikace company. As many as six international firms have put in their bids; among them are companies that withdrew from Poland, such as Telecom Finland and Mannesman.

Great Preparations

Polkomtel and Polish Cellular Phones are not overly concerned about the problem the government is having with the Western shareholders in Centertel. They have just increased their initial capital and are negotiating the details of the conditions of settlement with Polish Telecommunications SA. Unless they reach an agreement, it will be the communications minister who will make the decision on settlement. [passage omitted]

Time for DCS

We are in for more cellular emotions in a few months. According to Communications Minister Zielinski, we should expect that by that time bids will be invited to construct a telephone network operating in the DCS system. [passage omitted].

Trying to resolve the dispute with the Western shareholders of Centertel, the Communications Ministry is offering them preferential treatment in the bidding to build a DCS network. However, the Westerners do not believe that such a system would be profitable in Poland: "We would lose half a million dollars over five years," Ameritech representatives say.

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Federal

FRY: Perisic Promises Cooperation in Disarmament Talks

AU2702202896 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 27 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Colonel General Momcilo Perisic, commander of the Yugoslav Army General Staff, received Norwegian General [name indistinct], chairman of the talks on subregional arms control, which are based on the Dayton Accord and are being held in Vienna.

General Perisic emphasized that these talks are an essential element of the peace agreement. He reiterated the determination of FRY and the Yugoslav Army to contribute to their successful conclusion and realization.

It was concluded that it is important at the present stage of talks that all participants — the sides in the talks — submit complete and accurate information about the five categories of weapons that are the subject of negotiations and restriction. This will form a sound basis for the successful continuation of the talks.

In the talks with General [name indistinct], the chief of the Yugoslav diplomacy Milan Milutinovic voiced the Yugoslav side's readiness to fulfill the obligations from the Dayton Accord, as well as the hope that the essential talks that are on the horizon will be successfully completed within the envisaged deadlines.

FRY: Milutinovic on Readiness To Fulfill Commitments

LD2702210596 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2025 GMT 27 Feb 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb 27 (TANJUG) — Yugoslav Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic said Tuesday during a meeting with the chairman of the negotiations on subregional arms control, Norwegian General Vigleik Eide, that Yugoslavia was ready to fulfill all its commitments stemming from the Dayton Accord.

The talks on arms control in the former Yugoslavia are being held in Vienna in line with article 4 of the Dayton Accord annex 10-b.

Milutinovic pointed to Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's great interest in the establishment of comprehensive peace and security in the region.

He also expressed hope that the forthcoming talks on essential issues would be concluded successfully within the planned deadline, Yugoslav Foreign Ministry said.

FRY: Sanctions Against 'RS' Suspended

AU2702193996 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 27 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] At the session chaired by [FRY Prime Minister] Radoje Kontic, the Federal Government passed a decision quashing the Federal Government ruling of 4 August 1994 that introduced sanctions against the Serb Republic [RS]. This decision will become effective on 28 February 1996 at 0000 hours [2300 GMT 27 February].

FRY: Opposition Welcomes Lifting of Sanctions

LD2702162996 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1338 GMT 27 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Beograd, 27 Feb (SRNA) — Vuk Draskovic, leader of the Serb Renewal Movement, today welcomed the Security Council decision to suspend sanctions against the [Bosnian] Serb Republic.

At the news conference held today, Draskovic spoke on the forthcoming rally to be held on 9 March at the Freedom Square in Belgrade. The rally will mark the fifth anniversary of the 1991 demonstrations when the opposition held protests against the Serb regime.

"The rally organizers are the Serb Renewal Movement, Democratic Party, and the Civic Alliance of Serbia. The League of the Social Democrats of Vojvodina, teachers, the independent union of workers, and many others have also confirmed their participation at the rally," Draskovic said.

According to him, Belgrade university students and lecturers, pensioners, officers, and war invalids will also take part in the rally.

Invitations to participate at the rally have been sent to the diplomatic representatives of EU countries, the USA, and Russia, Draskovic said.

The leader of the Serb Renewal Movement said that the regime in Serbia is already in panic over this rally and that it will do everything so the rally is not held.

"They are blackmailing people. They are drafting and arresting them so they would not be present at the rally. They have also sent orders to the management of 'Red Star' and 'Partizan' to cancel football and basketball championship matches planned earlier for March 9," Draskovic said.

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FRY: Official, IAEA Experts Discuss Projects

LD2702205896 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2022 GMT 27 Feb 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb 27 (TANJUG) — Deputy Yugoslav Minister for the Economy Slobodan Djokovic said Tuesday that Yugoslavia's overall scientific, technical and economic development had been seriously impaired by the three-and-a-half years of international sanctions.

Djokovic made the statement in a meeting with visiting International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) experts Alejandro Bilboa and Michael Akrawy.

A government statement said Djokovic had sought expertise and technical assistance from IAEA for five projects involving the maintenance of nuclear facilities and handling of nuclear waste that have already been submitted to the agency.

Djokovic said that Yugoslavia, as one of the founding members of IAEA, was interested in continued cooperation with the agency.

FRY: Belgrade Agrees to UN Human Rights Office Opening

AU2702173096 Paris AFP in English 1624 GMT 27 Feb 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Geneva, Feb 27 (AFP) — The United Nations confirmed that it would open an office for human rights in Belgrade, despite financial difficulties, a spokeswoman for the UN secretary general said Tuesday.

The announcement came after the government of rump Yugoslavia — Serbia and Montenegro — gave the go-ahead for the office to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Jose Ayala Lasso, late Monday.

But lack of funds continues to threaten the UN's coverage of ex-Yugoslavia, ravaged by the effects of almost four years of war.

"We have 100,000 dollars at the moment," said spokeswoman Therese Gastaut, adding that while that amount would probably be enough to open the Belgrade office — the UN's seventh in ex-Yugoslavia — requests to UN member states for extra finance would continue.

"There are areas in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia which we are watching closely, like Kosovo," she said.

Kosovo is a south Serbian province with a huge ethnic Albanian majority where Belgrade has sparked ethnic tension by transferring thousands of Serb refugees from Croatia.

The establishment of an office in Belgrade is part of an overall attempt to raise the profile of human rights issues throughout ex-Yugoslavia, the spokeswoman added.

FRY: Missing Persons Search Expected To Take Years

AU2802091796 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 23 Feb 96 p 13

[Report by Branislav Radivojisa: "Search for Missing Only Beginning"]

[FBIS Translated Text] When at the end of a war prisoners are released and refugees return home, those who do not return and whose whereabouts are not known remain on the lists of missing persons.

Many detainees on the territory of the former SFRY still have not been liberated, nor have all refugees returned home, which is complicating any attempt to get at least a rough estimate on how many persons went missing in this war despite the fact that all warring sides, including those not directly "involved," have their own lists of missing persons.

The FRY is seeking 386 of its missing citizens who disappeared in the war-torn regions in the period from 1991 until today. The FRY also has a list of 999 soldiers and officers of the former Yugoslav Peoples' Army who have also been considered missing for years.

The Republic of Croatia, as announced, is seeking 2,810 persons, while the Republic of Serbian Krajina, according to the information available to the Veritas information and documentation center, registered about 2,030 missing persons. This does not include the data on the people who went missing in west Slavonia in 1991 and 1992. Veritas President Savo Strbac adds here that the Croatian list of 2,810 contains at least 250 persons whom the Serb Krajina is also seeking.

In Bosnia the situation is additionally complicated because in that former Yugoslav republic the war has only just ended and it is difficult to obtain more complete information. For that reason and also because of the longer duration of this conflict, the figures mentioned in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina are considerably larger. According to some unofficial assessments, the Serb Republic is seeking at least 50,000 persons, while the Muslim-Croat Federation is allegedly seeking even more. However, the experts approach these assessments by the two entities in Bosnia with utmost reserve, pointing out that in the course of the war 300,000 Muslims fled to Germany alone. Should these refugees be registered as missing persons and should one ask for lists of refugees from these western countries?

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Help of Family Messages

Branko Popovic, chief of the Yugoslav Red Cross search, says that he proposed to the representatives of the International Red Cross that they organize a joint meeting of all missing persons' commissions on the territory of the former SFRY precisely to obtain more reliable information.

However, we were told in the International Red Cross Committee that in a few days' time, on 1 March to be precise, a special office will open to deal with missing persons. The office will consist of representatives from the United Nations, the European Union, the Implementation Force, and the warring sides, so one can expect it to be efficient. Branko Popovic points out that the Yugoslav search service registered the majority of the missing persons — approximately 3,000 — in 1991, when the SFRY still formally existed. However, in 1992 this number declined to 1,100, the following year 300 were registered, in 1994 about 240, and last year 386.

They Do Not Want to "Create a Fuss"

The missing persons were most often located through family messages, which proved to be a very valuable tool of a humanitarian nature, as 290,000 family messages were exchanged through the Yugoslav Red Cross last year to which replies were received in 92 percent of the cases. By comparison, at the beginning of the war, in times of general chaos in 1991, only 12,000 messages were exchanged and only about 40 percent of them received replies.

Even now the families are still coming to the Veritas center in Belgrade and to the Yugoslav Red Cross to report those who went missing in Krajina. Some four or five come to Veritas every day. Savo Strbac attributes the reporting of the persons who went missing few months ago, in the Croatian Army armed operations in May and August, to psychological reasons. The relatives, he says, did not want to report them as missing because they "did not want to create a fuss." They hoped that they would be released as prisoners of war. As this did not happen they are now nevertheless reporting them as missing. Strbac suggests to those searching for a missing relative that they also visit the International Red Cross, in Roosevelt Street in Belgrade, to register the missing by filling a form.

It should also be noted that the greatest number of persons went missing in Krajina last year. Namely, until May 1995 (again discounting western Slavonia) there were only 350 missing; however, after Operation Flash 350 were reported additionally and after Operation Storm another 1,340.

— Among the missing persons there is a certain number of dead. We do not know how many, but Zagreb's report to the United Nations states that 186 Serbs died in the course of the attack on west Slavonia and 911 in Operation Storm.

— Are any of the missing Krajina residents — which, it is anticipated, happened to the residents of Bosnia — somewhere safe abroad at the moment?

— It is hard to believe that our Krajina people would go abroad without anyone knowing it. Krajina is small with its 430,000 inhabitants, and the people mostly know each other, Strbac told us.

The fate of the missing thus remains unknown, which is usual with the war conflicts. For instance, the United States still have missing persons from the Vietnam War and we have missing persons from the World War II whom we have sought for decades (for example, the children from Mt. Kozara.)

FRY: Symposium Urges Entry Into PFP Program

LD2802005796 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0044 GMT 28 Feb 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb 27 (TANJUG) — The fastest way to Yugoslavia's integration in the political, economic and social systems of the developed world would be through joining the Partnership for Peace Program, said participants at a symposium organized by the New Democracy Party, the coalition partner of the ruling Socialist Party of Serbia, in Belgrade on Tuesday.

New Democracy leader Dusan Mihaklovic said in his opening speech that the program was one of the most important channels for the integration of newly emerged European democracies into the developed world and one of the most powerful weapons for overcoming bloc divisions and reducing the chances of another cold war.

'By joining the program, Yugoslavia could redefine its position and secure better conditions for dealing with potential internal problems,' he said.

Mihaklovic said that in this way, Yugoslavia would also round up its efforts for readmission to the international community.

British charge d'affaires in Belgrade Ivor Roberts said the British Government maintained that Yugoslavia's readmission to the international community was of key importance.

Roberts said there were no rules as to who could and who could not join the Partnership for Peace Program,

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but that it was advisable that the countries seeking to join be members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

He also said it was too early to talk about the eligibility of the countries that were the chief protagonists of the Bosnia peace accord because much would depend on the implementation of the accord and their cooperation with the NATO-led peace Implementation Force.

Ivan Kovacevic, spokesman for the Serbian Renewal Movement, one of the biggest opposition parties in Serbia said his party supported [word indistinct] only Yugoslavia's entering the Partnership for Peace Program but also its admission to NATO.

Montenegro

Montenegro: Lifting of 'RS' Sanctions Welcomed

AU2702194696 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 27 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The political circles in Montenegro view yesterday's decision by the UN Security Council to suspend sanctions against the Serb Republic [RS] as a very encouraging step in the creation of a perspective of lasting peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The crucial contribution to the suspension of sanctions is ascribed to the efforts of our delegation at the recent Rome Summit and the consistent implementation of all agreements by the Serbs in Bosnia.

Montenegro: Bulatovic, UN's Annan Discuss Previaka

AU2702173896 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 27 Feb 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Montenegrin President Momir Bulatovic and Kofi Annan, special envoy of the UN secretary general, talked about the problems of Previaka in Herceg Novi today. Miodrag Vukovic has the details:

[Begin recording] [Vukovic] This is how the Montenegrin head of state assessed the talks with the UN representative:

[Bulatovic] We took this opportunity to exchange views on the particularly sensitive issue of Previaka and, in fact, asserted the resoluteness of both the Republic of Montenegro and the Republic of Croatia to have this problem solved in a peaceful way, by democratic means, and through agreement.

[Vukovic] Kofi Annan, special envoy of the UN secretary general, said that he was impressed by the positive role of Montenegro and its resolve to work on the normalization of relations between sovereign states in the region. I am glad, he said, that the president and people of Montenegro are satisfied with the work done by the United Nations in the case of Previaka. The United Nations will continue its engagement in the region and the engagement on the [word indistinct] peace, UN Representative Kofi Annan said in his statement.

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